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The central assertion of the vast ―going public‖ literature is that since the mid-1970s, the 
traditional strategy of executive-legislative bargaining has been largely supplanted by direct 
appeals from American presidents to the American public. In their attempt to analyze the causes 
and consequences of this use of presidential speeches, scholars have relied almost exclusively on 
analysis of major national addresses rather than the significantly more frequent minor addresses. 
Indeed, it is these minor presidential addresses that are most responsible for the exponential 
growth in presidential speechmaking activity during the modern presidency. Analyzing data of 
every presidential speech between 1945 and 2004, I present compelling empirical evidence that 
the ―going public‖ strategy can be best understood by concentrating more attention on these 
minor addresses, specifically the audience of these minor addresses.  
Using what is arguably the most pointed and extensive treatment of the audience of minor 
addresses to date and an illustrative case study, I document a clear increase in the number of 
speeches by presidents to what I classify as more selective rather than public audiences. In 
addition to descriptive accounts of this paradigmatic shift in presidential speechmaking, negative 
binomial regression and multinomial logit models identify leading conditions that influence both 
the frequency and choice of speeches to various audience types, particularly selective audiences. 
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THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF “GOING PUBLIC” 
 
During a six-day period in March 1994, President Bill Clinton did what other recent 
presidents have done with increasing frequency; he took the bully pulpit of the presidency on the 
road. On Thursday, March 10, the president spent the day in New York City, speaking first to the 
AmeriCorps Public Safety Forum and then addressing attendees at the United Negro College 
Fund dinner that evening. After a brief return to the White House on Friday to announce the 
upcoming Summit of the Americas and plug administration initiatives for job creation in his 
weekly radio address, Clinton hit the road again on Sunday. The destination for the next day-
and-a-half was Detroit, Michigan, where job creation was also the focus of separate speeches to a 
non-profit civil and human rights organization and a G-7 jobs conference.   
After commenting on clean fuel technology initiatives to employees of Detroit Diesel on 
Monday morning, Clinton boarded Air Force One to move on to Boston where he advocated his 
economic policy in front of a large crowd gathered at Rowes Wharf before joining fellow 
Democrats at an invitation-only New England Presidential Dinner. On Tuesday, March 15, the 
final day of this six-day stretch, the president opened the morning with a town hall session in 
Nashua, New Hampshire, where prominent topics included health care, the economy and 
international trade. Following a visit with employees of Markem Corporation in nearby Keene, 
New Hampshire, Clinton visited American servicemen and their families at Fort Drum, New 
York, before heading back to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.  
This flurry of activity was not atypical for Clinton, who spent approximately one out of 




Washington, D.C. (Edwards 2003, author‘s own data). However, as Figure 1.1 illustrates, the 
volume of speechmaking activity exhibited by our most recent presidents is markedly higher 
than those who preceded Ronald Reagan.
1
 The author of the defining study on this form of 
presidential public activity, Samuel Kernell (1986), contends that the exponential increase in 
presidential rhetorical activity has been driven by a paradigmatic shift in the Washington 
political environment beginning in the early 1970s. Alterations to the presidential nominating 
process, technological innovation, and the rise of divided government, he asserts, encouraged the 
White House to adopt political strategies that relied more heavily on direct communication with 
the American public – a strategy Kernell coined ―going public.‖ The logic is that by appealing 
directly and frequently to the American people, the president can improve the public‘s evaluation 
of the president‘s performance and policy positions – resources the president can then use to 
advance his legislative agenda.  
Kernell‘s statement about the central role of speechmaking in presidential leadership, 
explicated in the original version of his book Going Public in 1986, was triangulated by other 
prominent pieces of political science scholarship published around the same time (most notably, 
Ceaser, et.al. 1982; Edwards 1983; Lowi 1985; Tulis 1987). Lowi asserted that a more traditional 
separation of powers system had been supplanted by a plebiscitary presidency in which ―he who 
can mobilize the masses may also mobilize the elite‖ (1985, 153). Similarly, Tulis identified a 
new ―set of rules which emphasize active and continuous presidential leadership of popular 
opinion‖ (1987, 18). Communication scholars, while approaching the study of presidential 
rhetoric from a different theoretical construct also acknowledged the prominent use of 
                                                 
1
 Figure 1.1 presents the average number of speeches per year for the first three years of each president‘s first full 
term (Truman through G.W. Bush administrations). The fourth year is not included so the reader can gain some 
sense of speechmaking totals absent re-election years. Since Gerald Ford did not serve a full three years, his average 




speechmaking in governing strategies.
2
 Windt argued that the explanation of presidential 
rhetorical strategies was the most important question students of political rhetoric had yet to 
answer (Windt and Ingold 1992).
3
 The author of arguably the most complete descriptive account 
of presidential rhetoric maintains that for our most recent presidents ―rhetoric is governance‖ 
(Hart 1987, 14).  
Since these aforementioned works on the public presidency were published two decades 
ago, the literature on presidential speechmaking has exploded with no fewer than 160 journal 
articles and books generated by political scientists and communication scholars, more than 50% 
of which were published within the past six years alone.
4
 Yet despite the plethora of scholarship 
on presidential rhetorical activity, analysis of the most frequent form of speechmaking – minor 
addresses – remains grossly neglected.5  Instead, the primary focus has been on major addresses. 
This concentration is understandable in from at least two important respects.  First, these 
addresses are broadcast to national television audiences. Even with the increased competition for 
viewers created by the growth of cable television penetration (Baum and Kernell 1999; Prior 
2007), the potential reach of these addresses is magnitudes larger than any minor address. 
Second, collecting data about these speeches is an infinitely more manageable task compared to 
                                                 
2
 Medhurst draws the distinctions between the two disciplines as the rhetorical presidency (political science) and 
presidential rhetoric (communication). In the former, conceptions of rhetoric are ―narrowly drawn‖ as a substitute 
for political action where the only form of rhetoric that is meaningful to governance is policy-oriented rhetoric. In 
the latter, rhetoric is viewed as ―an art that has both practical and productive dimensions – dimensions that point 
inward to principles of operation as well as outward to the accomplishment of certain goals‖ (1996; xiv).  
3
 Windt‘s specific question, originally posed in the 1983 edition of Essays in Presidential Rhetoric, was: ―How are 
rhetorical strategies selected and adapted to persuade a target constituency (or constituencies) of the validity of the 
president‘s policy? And why were these chosen as strategies rather than others?‖ (Windt and Ingold 1992).  
4
 Author‘s calculations based on literature identified in the course of conducting this project. 
5
 I use the same definitions of major and minor addresses as Kernell.  Major addresses are ―those in which the 
president speaks directly to a national audience over radio or television‖ and minor addresses are speeches ―to a 
special audience either in person or via some broadcast medium‖ (1997, 106). However, when I refer to minor 




the herculean effort required to document the various components of the hundreds of minor 
addresses delivered by each president.   
To their credit, a handful of studies have focused more explicit attention on the use of 
minor addresses by modern presidents (Brace and Hinckley 1993; Eshbaugh-Soha 2010; 
Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary 2004; Cohen 2005, 2010; Hager and Sullivan 1994; Hart 1987; 
Powell 1999). However, as I will document more completely in later sections of this chapter, 
these studies are either purely descriptive (Hart 1987) (number, topic, general audience, genre, 
location) or primarily concerned with explanations of the frequency of minor addresses in 
general. While these pieces of scholarship have contributed to a better understanding of the 
conditions under which presidents utilize minor addresses as part of their rhetorical repertoire, 
only one of them (Cohen 2005, 2010) makes an attempt to consider one of the most fundamental 
components of any public speech – the audience. When presidents use minor addresses to ―go 
public‖ are they largely speaking to a ―public‖ audience or a more narrowly defined (Cohen 
2005) collection of listeners populated by partisan supporters and organizationally-affiliated 
interests? Under what conditions do presidents deliver speeches to certain audience types?  
Given the different types of audiences presidents could choose to address, why would they be 
more inclined to select particular audience types over others?  If presidents are indeed using 
minor addresses to speak to more selective collections of individuals, what are the normative and 
political consequences of such trends?  This thesis tackles each of these questions and, in doing 
so, seeks to provide new insights into the going-public thesis. 
Building on Hart‘s (1987) untapped treasure of data on presidential speeches, I construct 
a dataset containing information on the topic, location, audience, and format (ceremony, briefing, 




collection of data on presidential speeches to date. More importantly, I construct large n 
explanatory models of speeches to different audience types, particularly those I classify as 
selective audiences. The quantitative analysis is supplemented by archival research on the use of 
minor addresses by President Harry S. Truman – research that allows me to draw contrasts 
between predominant audience types in earlier and more recent periods of the modern 
presidency.  
Collectively, this entire project answers recent calls by leading presidential scholars for 
further research on the use of presidential rhetoric. Specifically, I provide clearer distinctions 
between the use of major and minor addresses (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005) and generate 
more refined measures of presidential public activities (Barrett 2004; Cohen and Hamman 2003; 
Cohen and Powell 2005). I seek to ―develop a more theoretically rich account of why presidents 
speak to being with‖ (Cohen and Hamman 2003, 421) and ―test hypotheses concerning exactly 
when and why presidents go public‖ as well as ―whether and to what extent they say what voters 
want to hear‖ (Jacobs et al. 2003). The conclusions derived from my analysis are both president 
and presidency-centered (Hager and Sullivan 1994; Powell 1999).  
In order to place my work in context, the remainder of this chapter is divided into four 
sections. I begin by documenting more recent extensions of the going public thesis, particularly 
findings concerning the impact of presidential speechmaking on the president‘s legislative 
success, agenda setting capacities, and public approval ratings. The second section explores the 
insights gained from limited efforts to explain the propensity of speechmaking. At the conclusion 
of this section, the reader should have a clearer sense of the need to cast a wider net beyond the 
familiar target of the nationally televised address. The third section then makes the case for more 




concludes with a brief statement of the major argument of this thesis. The fourth and final 
section presents a brief overview of remaining chapters.  
 
The Alleged Impact of Going Public   
Since Kernell‘s original presentation (1986) of the ―going public‖ phenomenon, 
subsequent scholarship positions speechmaking as the centerpiece of a new strategy of governing 
– a strategy defined as the permanent campaign (Ornstein and Mann 2000). Succinctly 
summarized by Edwards (2007), the strategy is based on three main premises. First, public 
support is considered the president‘s most valuable political commodity. Second, presidents must 
not only garner support through their accomplishments, but must vigorously take their message 
to the American people throughout their entire presidency. Third, the consistent public activity 
translates into an ability to persuade and perhaps even mobilize at least a segment of the 
American public much like a candidate would mobilize voters to support them in an election 
(2007, 28-29). This mobilization process is supported by groups (pollsters and media 
consultants) typically considered more exclusively with election campaigns (Ornstein and Fortier 
2002).   
However, as Heith reminds us, ―the permanent campaign is not simply new terminology 
for public relations. The campaign-to-govern approach to leadership subsumes traditional 
governing techniques in favor of techniques that connect to the identified wants of the 
president‘s constituency, with decisions made through the policy process‖ (2004, 75). She 
continues, ―campaign leadership is not simply Kernell‘s ‗going public‘ or Tulis‘s ‗rhetorical 
leadership‘ . . .  the commonality between the permanent campaign and governing is the end goal 




is the ultimate goal of the permanent campaign and the leading measure of success for any 
presidency, I first consider whether presidents have successfully used the bully pulpit to advance 
their legislative agenda. 
 
Legislative Success 
Before looking at the bottom line of presidential speechmaking‘s influence on legislative 
success, it is appropriate to consider how presidents discuss their legislative objectives in their 
public appeals. Arguably the most complete account to date is provided by Barrett (2005). His 
analysis of presidential appeals on significant pieces of legislation from 1977 to 1992 reveals an 
average of less than one appeal per month for each bill. Moreover, the appeals were not only 
infrequent, they were brief (approximately three paragraphs per appeal). Particularly relevant to 
my emphasis on the audience of presidential speeches, Barrett also documents that appeals were 
usually delivered to small, targeted audiences, not large national addresses that have captured the 
attention of most scholarly inquiries in this area. Indeed, Presidents Carter, Reagan and Bush Sr. 
averaged less than one major nationally televised appeal on a specific piece of legislation per 
year (Barrett 2005, 5).   
Despite this evidence, the use of nationally televised addresses to test hypotheses about 
the influence of presidential speechmaking is understandable. These rhetorical moments provide 
the best opportunity to reach the broadest possible audience and retain the largest degree of 
control over the context and content of their message. As Ragsdale puts it, they are 
―uninterrupted by queries of news reporters and challenged only afterward by the rebuttals of 




Early investigations of the relationship between public appeals and legislative success – 
relying primarily but not exclusively on the use of such high profile addresses – found some 
isolated examples of policy success (Fett 1994; Kernell 1986, 1993; Miller 1993; Mouw and 
MacKuen 1992; Peterson 1990), but no evidence of consistent influence.
6
  Fett (1994), for 
instance, asserted that Reagan‘s appeals had an impact on swing vote members from both parties, 
while Carter‘s appeals often had the effect of reducing the support of all legislators outside of 
Carter‘s core supporters.  Miller (1993) noted more influence at the committee stage of the 
legislative process while Larocca (2006) found some slight evidence of influence in the House, 
but none in the Senate. In stark contrast, some studies suggested that there are conditions in 
which presidential public appeals could actually be detrimental to the attainment of legislative 
goals (Covington 1987; Kernell 1986, 1993, 2007; Polsby 1978). Other leading accounts, 
meanwhile, contend that the strategy of going public has no significant impact, positive or 
negative, on the president‘s legislative fortunes (Edwards 2003; Powell and Schloyer 2003).  
A growing body of literature, while stressing the conditional rather than systematic nature 
of influence, paints a more optimistic view of the capacities of presidential speechmaking. One 
study (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987) identifies presidential popularity as a prerequisite for 
public appeals to advance legislative initiatives, and a more recent analysis suggests that both 
popular and unpopular presidents can exert influence through their public speeches (Canes-
Wrone 2004). Other research, however, suggests that presidential popularity must be combined 
with speeches on popular policy positions in order to realize any impact on legislative outcomes 
(Canes-Wrone 2001a). A larger collection of studies maintains that issue salience is the primary 
                                                 
6
 The definition of ―policy success‖ or ―legislative success‖ varies considerably in the literature. For some 
scholars, the standard is the passage of legislation, while for others, reasonable measures of success include the 
ability to alter roll call votes, or the adoption of more moderate positions  by members even if the legislation is not 




determinant of speechmaking‘s ultimate impact (Canes-Wrone and DeMarchi 2002; Eshbaugh-
Soha 2006; Fett 1994; Peterson 1990).  
Of these more recent studies, Barrett (2004) arguably provides the strongest case for 
something approaching consistent influence of presidential rhetoric on legislative success. 
Examining all presidential remarks over a particular time period, rather than only national 
addresses, he finds evidence of ―a strong, statistically significant and positive relationship 
between the numbers of times per month a president speaks publicly in support of a particular 
bill and the president receiving his legislative wish regarding that piece of legislation‖ (363). 
Moreover, this relationship holds regardless of whether the legislation was initiated by the White 
House or the Congress. 
While the absence of consistent findings can be partially attributed to the scope and 
methodology of the respective studies, the congressional voting behavior literature suggests that 
while members are responsive to constituent preferences when the issues are salient (Hutchings 
1998; Kollman 1998), the votes of individual members are not correlated with presidential 
popularity (Cohen, Bond, Fleisher and Hamman 2000).  Given this evidence and the 
methodological challenges associated with establishing causality between presidential appeals 
and legislative behavior, other scholars have explored the possibility that presidential speeches 
result in more modest forms of influence.  
  
Raising Salience, Influencing Public Opinion of Policies 
 As Edwards notes, ―Before the president can influence how the public thinks, he must 
influence what it is thinking about. . .  In the era of governing by campaigning, presidents often 




of policy makers in Washington‖ (2003, 128). Cohen and Collier, meanwhile, contend that in 
many ways agenda setting exceeds the importance of influencing decisions of individual 
members of Congress (1999). Indeed, the allocation of resources by recent presidents to 
monitoring and influencing public opinion is well documented (Eisinger 2003; Heith 2000, 2004; 
Jacobs and Burns 2004; Shapiro and Jacobs 2001). While the president is recognized as the 
preeminent agenda-setter among Washington elites (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Kingdon 
1995), the question is to what extent does presidential speechmaking influence both public 
attention to and perceptions of public policy issues? 
As with studies investigating the impact of rhetoric on legislative success, the influence 
of nationally televised addresses has garnered the most attention, particularly the State of the 
Union address. Despite a steady decrease since the Reagan administration in the average 
percentage of households viewing nationally televised addresses and press conferences (Baum 
and Kernell 1999), approximately one-third of all households in recent years have viewed annual 
State of the Union addresses (Edwards 2003). Because the speech is now obligatory rather than 
discretionary, it occupies a critical position in the president‘s efforts to establish the 
administration‘s broad goals (Kumar 2003a) and legislative priorities (Light 1982). Quite 
appropriately, Cohen refers to the State of the Union as the president‘s ―most important problem 
series‖ (1997, 162). While not attributing success to the impact of the speech itself, one recent 
study does find that presidents achieve approximately 40% of the requests they make in the State 
of the Union (Hoffman and Howard 2006).
7
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 From a different vantage point, but one that reinforces the unique political communication moment of this yearly 
address, communication research notes that the State of the Union represents a unique opportunity for the president 
to provide important justifications for public policy initiatives (Coe 2007) through rhetoric that is less intellectual 





Both Cohen (1995) and Lawrence (2004) demonstrate the capacity of the State of the 
Union Address to increase the salience of issues, and Barabas (2005) suggests that the address 
also has the effect of increasing citizen knowledge of public policy issues mentioned by the 
president. While Cohen (1995) finds evidence of influence regardless of the popularity of the 
president, he notes that with the exception of foreign policy mentions, the effects tend to decay 
over the course of the year. In a separate work, Cohen (1997) concludes that while the public‘s 
concern with a policy increases according to mentions in the State of the Union Address, the 
most important determinant of public concern is prior attention to the issue. More recent studies, 
however, suggest that as cable and satellite television have provided competition for viewers, the 
agenda setting impact of the State of the Union address has lessened significantly (Edwards 
2003; Young and Perkins 2005).  
 The collective evidence drawn from studies that consider the full array of presidential 
speeches – major and minor – provides no more clarity about the president‘s ability either to 
increase the salience of issues or to influence public opinion. Several early studies suggested that 
nationally televised addresses do have the capacity to influence the public‘s conception of the 
importance of public policy issues (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Hill 1998; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; 
Miller and Wanta 1996; Ragsdale 1984, 1987, Wanta 1997), but recognized that this capacity 
varied under certain conditions. In her prominently cited study, Ragsdale (1987) found that 
nationally televised addresses delivered by presidents do have an impact on public opinion, but 
not consistently across policy areas or presidents, raising the possibility that there are policy-
domain, leadership style and partisan cue nuances at work.  
 More recent scholarship reaches similar conclusions. Meernik and Ault (2001) note 




Peake (2005), Wood, Owens and Durham (2005) and Wood (2007) suggest that presidential 
rhetoric influences the public‘s perception of the economy. In a case study of Clinton‘s rhetoric 
on his ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖ policy, Bailey, Sigelman and Wilcox (2003) suggest a capacity of 
rhetoric to influence public opinion of ―easy issues‖ (Carmines and Stimson 1980) – those that 
are symbolic and center on fundamental values. Another group of studies notes that the 
likelihood of success is greater among more popular presidents (Mouw and MacKuen 1992), 
popular presidents who make repeated appeals (Page and Shapiro 1992), and popular presidents 
who speak about issues that are complex yet salient (Canes-Wrone and deMarchi 2002).  
Countering some of these assertions, however, is yet another notable collection of studies 
insisting that presidents have considerable difficulty moving public opinion under any 
circumstance or speech type (major or minor addresses) (Edwards 2003; Edwards and Wood 
1999; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005; Wood and Peake 1998). Indeed, 
Eshbaugh-Soha (2006) goes so far to suggest that we should not be surprised by the apparent 
inability of the president to influence public opinion of policy issues since ―going public‖ is 
actually more about sending signals to legislators and bureaucrats than it is about shaping public 
opinion; a conclusion he reaches by studying public appeals pertaining to civil rights, 
environmental protection and agricultural policy.  
Perhaps part of the explanation for the seeming inability of presidential rhetoric to 
enhance legislative fortunes or influence public perception of policy issues lies with the capacity 
of presidential rhetoric to affect presidential approval ratings. As Wood summarizes, ―a major 
part of the permanent campaign is presumably to secure and maintain high public approval 
ratings‖ (2007, 10). Furthermore, some of the aforementioned research identifies a prominent 




evidence of presidential rhetoric‘s influence in this respect either, perhaps time would be better 
spent determining why presidents speak and to whom. 
 
The Impact of Presidential Rhetoric on Presidential Approval Ratings 
 Unfortunately, research on the capacity of presidential rhetoric to affect the public‘s 
evaluation of the president is no more clear-cut than the evidence examined earlier in this 
section. Among the most prominent early investigations, Ragsdale (1984) found that nationally 
televised addresses contributed to modest increases in presidential approval ratings, but noted 
potential challenges in establishing the direction of causality given that a change in popularity 
was also shown to affect the likelihood of presidential speechmaking. Research by Page and 
Shapiro (1983) as well as Page, Shapiro and Dempsey (1987) supports the notion that rhetoric 
can provide a boost to a president‘s standing, but such indications were found only among 
presidents who were already popular, further muddying the waters of causality.  
A series of studies published around the same time period by one team of scholars 
concludes that major televised, prime-time speeches as well as those televised during other times 
of the day had no impact on presidential approval (Ostrom and Simon 1985, 1988, 1989). 
Edwards (2003) also finds no indication that presidents, however popular or allegedly 
charismatic, can boost their approval ratings – a result he noted among even those national 
addresses that received the largest audience share. To confound the matter further, Welch 
(2003b) points to evidence of a decline in popularity following four of only five speeches 
delivered by Reagan that showed any notable movement of public evaluations of the president 




priming effect that causes citizens to evaluate presidential issue priorities in a more favorable 
light (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Wood 2007).  
 
Making Sense of the Ambiguity 
The apparent inability of even the most popular presidents to use even the most 
pronounced means of reaching the American public (nationally televised address, State of the 
Union Address) in a manner that enhances legislative success, raises the salience of issues or 
evaluations of policies or the president himself, calls into question the efficacy of the permanent 
campaign.  Edwards (2003), for one, provides a compelling explanation for the lack of success. 
Drawing upon evidence from the political behavior literature on citizen competence, he 
maintains that the challenge for presidents is associated with the receiving end as opposed to the 
delivery end of the equation. If fewer citizens are listening to nationally televised addresses 
(which Baum and Kernell 1999 demonstrate) and even those who are tuning-in are not fully 
capable of processing the message being delivered, the null findings from studies measuring the 
impact of presidential addresses are of little surprise.  
Research by Cohen and Powell (2005) also raises the possibility that we have been using 
the incorrect unit of measurement to assess the impact of presidential speeches on presidential 
approval ratings. While other studies, most notably that conducted by Brace and Hinckley 
(1992), use national approval data, Cohen and Powell use state level polling data to assess the 
impact of presidential travel (which the empirical evidence demonstrates, always involves 
speechmaking).  Quite logically, they contend that when presidents travel to a particular state, 




modest boost in state-level [emphasis added] approval‖ during non-election years, particularly in 
large states (2005, 23).  
  Left with an unsatisfactory explanation for the impact of presidential speechmaking, I 
suggest that we could learn more about the impact of speechmaking if we understood more about 
the use of speechmaking, specifically the consideration accorded to audience selection. To quote 
Cohen and Hamman, ―we need to develop a more theoretically rich account of why presidents 
speak to begin with. We need to specify better and more precisely the costs and benefits of 
speechmaking as an inducement for this type of presidential activity. By developing these points, 
we should arrive at a finer understanding of the connection between presidents and the public 
through speech‖ (2003, 421). Instead of using presidential speechmaking solely as an 
independent variable to explain legislative fortunes, the public‘s evaluation of policy issues or 
the public‘s assessment of presidential job performance, we have a need for additional research 
that treats the speechmaking moment as the behavior to be explained. My present research 
project makes a contribution to this effort by focusing on the determinants of the most frequent 
form of presidential rhetoric – minor addresses delivered in domestic locations outside of 
Washington.  As the next section of this chapter demonstrates, despite a burgeoning literature 
that seeks to explain the propensity of presidential speeches – a literature that is instructive both 
in terms of results generated and methods employed – we lack theories that attempt to explain 
the use of minor addresses.  
 
Explanations of the Determinants of Speechmaking 
While several notable works provide descriptive accounts of the volume of presidential 




2001; Hart 1987; Kumar 2005; Lammers 1981; Ragsdale 2009), scholars have only recently 
devoted more concentrated attention to the determinants of speechmaking. Literature that treats 
presidential speeches as the dependent variable can be organized into three main areas: those that 
have examined the likelihood of only major addresses (Duff and Gubala 2005; Ragsdale 1984, 
1987; Smith 2000), those that consider the full complement of public remarks by presidents, 
including major and minor speeches (Burns, Jacobs and Kifer 2003; Cohen 2005, 2010; 
Eshbaugh-Soha 2010; Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary 2004; Jacobs et al. 2003; Hager and Sullivan 
1994; Powell 1999; Wood 2007), and those that analyze presidential travel as opposed to actual 
speeches (Brace and Hinckley 1993; Cohen and Powell 2005; Cook 2002; Doherty 2007; Hoddie 
and Routh 2004; Sellers and Denton 2006). In reviewing this growing literature, I highlight 
findings which take issue with expectations of the going public thesis and suggest the need for 
further empirical tests. At the end of this section, I summarize the collective statement of these 
studies and suggest a new avenue of research on the determinants of presidential speechmaking.  
 
Major Addresses 
Two separate works by Ragsdale (1984, 1987), provide the earliest attempts to explain 
the strategic use of any type of presidential speechmaking activity. Her analysis of nationally 
televised addresses between 1949 and 1980 found that the likelihood of a discretionary, 
nationally-televised address was driven primarily by changes in presidential approval (either 
positive or negative) and the occurrence of major national events (either positive or negative in 
terms of their reflection on the administration). Deteriorating economic conditions and military 
engagements decrease the likelihood. Differences in frequency between Republican and 




Smith‘s (2000) analysis of nationally televised addresses delivered during roughly the 
same time period makes a valuable contribution by specifically considering the timing of a 
national address. Presidents, she argues, must consider the costs and benefits of a national 
address on the president‘s partisan, congressional and public constituencies. Contrary to 
Ragsdale, Smith finds that neither the level of, nor change in approval has a statistically 
significant impact on the delivery of an address, even when addresses are coded into categories 
of domestic and foreign speeches. The only significant variables are the occurrence of 
discretionary presidential events (ex: decision to take military action) and the proximity to the 
previous national address. Smith concludes that the common wisdom of presidents altering their 
behavior when their approval turns south may require a second look. Her study also reveals that 
distinct factors drive speeches on foreign policy issues versus domestic policy topics, suggesting 
the need for more attention to the speech topic.  
Also concerned about the issue of timing, Duff and Gubala (2005) consider the 
possibility that discretionary national addresses are delivered under more favorable conditions. 
Apply the surfing theory of election timing from the comparative politics literature, they find that 
as the unemployment rate increases, presidents are actually more likely to give discretionary 
national addresses. The opposite occurs as inflation rises, particularly among Republican 
presidents. Consistent with Smith (2000) presidential approval does not influence the decision to 
deliver a discretionary nationally televised address. 
 
Major and Minor Addresses 
Our understanding of presidential speechmaking, however, is arguably advanced furthest 




contributions was provided by Hager and Sullivan (1994) who found greater explanatory power 
in presidency-centered factors rather than president-centered factors.
8
  Considering a large swath 
of speechmaking activity and using more fine-grained measures of policy topic and audiences, 
several recent studies provide further support for this general conclusion, but with some 
unexpected twists. Contrary to expectations of the going public literature, Powell (1999) suggests 
that the likelihood of minor domestic addresses decreases under divided government. Instead, the 
driving factor is national economic conditions. A one percentage point increase in the misery 
index translates into approximately eight fewer domestic speeches per year (1999, 165).  Using a 
different measure of the nature of executive-legislative relations, Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary 
(2004) find that as presidential success in roll-call votes declines, presidents are more likely to 
deliver speeches to domestic audiences outside of Washington. Consistent with findings from the 
―travel‖ literature I will address shortly, the proximity of elections appears to increase the 
propensity of minor speeches. As presidential popularity increases, however, presidents 
apparently see less of a need to deliver minor speeches.  
Even more recent analyses of a broader spectrum of presidential speeches raise additional 
questions about the going public thesis. In their case study of Nixon‘s entire rhetorical activity, 
Jacobs et al. (2003) and Burns, Jacobs and Kifer (2003), document that Nixon‘s overall volume 
of oral output declined following a drop in approval ratings. Furthermore, he resorted to a ―Rose 
Garden strategy‖ in the face of declining public approval. In other words, Nixon directed 
rhetorical appeals toward selected audiences of political elites as opposed to the general public. 
                                                 
8
 President-centered factors include variables that operationalize Barber‘s typologies of presidential behavior 
(active/negative and passive/positive) as well as whether the president is considered an outsider to the Washington 
environment (ex: former governor like Reagan as opposed to a president like George H.W. Bush). Presidency-
centered factors include measures of approval, divided government, economic conditions and re-election period 




Declining approval ratings caused Nixon to curtail his foreign policy speeches and devote 
primary attention to topics public opinion polls indicated were the most salient. While these 
studies point to the issue of audience selection, the use of volume of remarks as the dependent 
variable seems problematic not only in this instance, but certainly across presidencies where 
differences in rhetorical style and skill would account for variation in volume (words spoken).  
The issue of audience selection receives even more thorough treatment in an important 
study by Cohen (2005).  Using a ratio of minor to major discretionary speeches as the dependent 
variable, his results suggest that in an era of ―new media‖ (growth of cable and satellite 
television, new styles of reporting), presidents have increasingly turned to minor addresses 
before audiences whose partisan or ideological composition is more compatible with the 
president‘s – a trend I document in my analysis. While the penetration of cable television appears 
to play a prominent role in the explanation, Cohen recognizes that factors such as party 
polarization may be exerting considerable influence as well (2005, 16), leaving ample room for 
additional studies such as mine that examine the determinants of various classifications of minor 
addresses.   
Finally, two other studies are worthy of extended reference in this section. Barrett (2005) 
finds that when presidents do speak outside of Washington, contrary to the going public 
literature, they rarely use these occasions to promote major legislative initiatives.  Wood (2007), 
meanwhile, makes an important contribution to the consideration of minor addresses, albeit in a 
more narrowly focused policy area. Coding every presidential public remark on the economy 
from 1945 to 2004, Wood found only two variables that were statistically significant predictors 
of presidential remarks on the general economy, changes in inflation levels and the deficit. When 




finding may appear trivial, the important conclusion of Wood‘s research is that intensity 
(volume) and tone of presidential rhetoric influences the public‘s perception of the economy, 
albeit indirectly through media coverage. 
 
Travel 
While the central issue of yet another collection of scholarly research is presidential 
travel as opposed to speechmaking, the data shows that when presidents travel to locations 
outside of Washington, either domestic or foreign, they deliver public addresses. This is readily 
apparent from even a casual review of the Public Papers of the President.  Accordingly, these 
studies are instructive in their treatment of the determinants of minor addresses, which is the 
focus of my present analysis.  
The most prominent early study of this genre is generated by Brace and Hinckley (1993). 
Within the realm of travel, these authors are concerned with the extent to which presidential 
activity is either strategic or reactive. As they speculated, ―given finite resources, we might 
expect them [presidents] to allocate activities carefully across the term, whether to achieve 
reelection or to pursue some other goal‖ (1993, 384). Such activities would be considered 
strategic whereas activities that appeared to respond to changing approval levels or domestic 
and/or international crises would be classified as reactive. Brace and Hinckley hypothesized that 
if events were both strategic and reactive, activities would be ―timed in patterned ways across the 
term and responsive to changes in the polls‖ (1993, 384).  Looking at three classes of activities 
from the Truman through Reagan administrations – major televised speeches, days of foreign 




whereas minor addresses outside of Washington were strategic, regardless of the president‘s 
popularity.  
The strategic use of travel, particularly as it relates to election interests (either the 
president‘s own reelection efforts or member of his party in Congress), is confirmed by several 
recent studies (Cohen 2005, 2010; Cohen and Powell 2005; Doherty 2007; Hoddie and Routh 
2004; Sellers and Denton 2006).
9
 Of particular note, Doherty‘s finding that the number of 
Electoral College votes in a state and the proximity to the election function as the most 
significant predictors of presidential travel throughout the entire term calls into question a central 






Needed Refinements and Extensions 
 
By treating the speechmaking moment as the dependent variable, the studies in the three 
major categories I‘ve identified above point to additional investigation of the expectations of the 
going public thesis and the true ―permanence‖ of the permanent campaign. Even within the 
different classes of activities (major addresses, minor addresses, etc.), the studies fail to generate 
consistent findings about the determinants of presidential speechmaking activities. While some 
of the variation in published results can be explained by the disparity in measures and methods, I 
contend that advances in our understanding of presidential speechmaking will be furthered the 
most by focusing on the use of minor addresses, the most frequent yet most under analyzed form 
of presidential rhetorical activity.  
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 Cook (2002) is a notable exception, arguing that travel for one of his two major cases (G.W. Bush) was determined 
more by policy considerations than electoral ones.  
10




Writing more specifically about the use of presidential travel, but providing indirect 
support for my present project, Cohen and Powell (2005) contend that ―a fruitful avenue for 
future research . . . might be to refine the measurement of presidential trips, as well as public 
activities in general‖ (2005, 23). In particular, I identify the need for greater consideration of the 
audience of minor addresses. While the literature points to a proclivity to select favorable 
electoral locations for minor addresses and use them to advance electoral goals, we still don‘t 
know as much as we should know about whom presidents are speaking to in such circumstances.  
Other than Hart (1987), whose work was entirely descriptive, Cohen (2005, 2010) is the 
only scholar to have explicitly considered the selection of audience as a variable of theoretical 
importance. By treating audience type as the dependent variables in explanatory models, I am 
able to consider both president and presidency-specific influences on different audience types of 
minor addresses. 
If, as prior research has found, the president makes adjustments in the location and 
audience of his speeches due to the occurrence of major events, political dynamics in  
Washington, the state of the economy, election cycles, or his own approval ratings, we would 
expect such adjustments to hold implications for agenda setting capacity. For example, if 
presidents retreat to a Rose Garden strategy when the economy declines (as Jacobs et al. 2003 
maintain), their opportunity to rally additional support for their policies would appear to be 
limited under certain conditions. It is important, therefore, for us to understand the conditions 
that influence the frequency, location, and audience of minor addresses on policy issues deemed 
crucial to the administration‘s legislative goals. It is also vital for us to understand the extent to 
which the president is using rhetorical appeals to pander to rather than lead public opinion (see 




do not attempt to achieve all of these goals, I can address each of these considerations by 
devoting due attention to audience selection.  
 Having made a brief case for new lines of research on presidential speechmaking, the 
final section of this chapter presents a brief argument about both the rationale for delivering 
minor addresses to selected audiences in American cities – an activity Cohen referred to as 
―going narrow‖ (2005, 11). A more formal presentation of the calculus of this choice of audience 
and location, as well as a more thorough discussion of its normative implications are reserved for 
subsequent chapters. 
 
The Impetus for and Implications of “Going Local”11 
The empirical evidence demonstrates that presidents are not only speaking to the 
American public more frequently, but are doing so primarily through minor addresses to 
audiences located outside the Beltway (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3). This trend has been explained in 
part by the challenges presidents face when they deliver nationally televised addresses and major 
press conferences (Cohen 2005). Several recent studies in particular document the extent to 
which cable and satellite television has made it more difficult for presidents to even obtain 
airtime for nationally televised addresses much less attract viewers (Baum and Kernell 1999, 
Edwards 2003; Wattenberg 2004; Welch 2003a). Even when presidents convince the major 
networks that their address or press conference is newsworthy, today‘s viewing public is less 
likely to watch the president.
12
 Furthermore, while the executive branch remains the primary 
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 Cohen (2010) uses this same phrase (going local) in his book bearing the same title, Going Local: Presidential 
Leadership in the Post-Broadcast Age. 
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 Baum and Kernell (1999) consider that political apathy accounts for some or a large part of the explanation of 




focus of network news coverage devoted to the federal government, one study finds that barely 
40 percent of the stories paint recent administrations in a positive light, regardless of party 
affiliation.
13
 Faced with declining audiences and more negative than positive coverage from both 
the networks and the Washington press corps (Cohen 2004), presidents have found venues 
outside of Washington increasingly attractive.  
Indeed, research on the use of press conferences in American cities arguably provides 
some of the best evidence of the benefits of ―going local.‖ As Peake and Barrett document in 
their analysis of local newspaper coverage of President George W. Bush‘s domestic travels in 
2001, local newspaper coverage of presidential visits is more prominent (front page), more 
extensive (column inches), more descriptive than analytical,
14
 and more favorable, particularly in 
locales where a president received greater support in the prior election (2005, 689). Given their 
limited opportunities to cover a live presidential event, reporters from local newspapers are more 
easily awed by even unpopular presidents and their traveling entourage. By the nature of their 
job requirements, local reporters also tend to be less well-versed in major domestic or foreign 
policy issues than their counterparts in the Washington press corps (Lammers 1981). Enhanced 
staffing capacity in the White House Office of Media Affairs has further enabled the going local 
strategy (Kumar 2003a).
15
 Additional technological advances, and the expansion of White House 
communications operations have also resulted in the use of new communication media 
(videoconferences, teleconferences, webcasts) designed to target both more favorable media 
                                                                                                                                                             
culprit. The authors conclude that ―presidents‘ diminished access to the national television audience will present a 
serious strategic dilemma in the future‖ (110-11).  
13
 Farnsworth and Lichter‘s analysis of network news stories show that the executive branch was the focus of 88 
percent of all news stories devoted to the federal government in 1993 and 82 percent in 2001 (2004, 681).  
14
 Leighley (2004) notes that media coverage that is more analytical tends to enhance the voice of the reporter as 
opposed to a more direct accounting of the facts. 
15
 Kumar documents that the George W. Bush White House Office of Media Affairs was organized into regional 




outlets and more receptive audiences (Denton and Holloway 2003; Kumar 2003a, 2007; Lizza 
2001).  
 Like other scholars, I contend that presidents see specific benefits in going local. I 
maintain that opportunities to deliver minor speeches are plenteous and have significantly lower 
opportunity costs than major addresses (a point reinforced by, among others, Cohen and 
Hamman 2003; Cohen 2005; Kernell 2007). However, these opportunity costs are not trivial. I 
treat the president‘s time as a valuable commodity and the decision to deliver an address on a 
particular topic, in a particular location, before a particular audience and at a particular time as 
quite deliberate. As George W. Bush White House advisor Mary Matalin commented in an 
interview with political scientist Martha Joynt Kumar, ―the president himself is concerned with 
the use of his voice and the timing of when he speaks. He is interested in the vehicle, the tactics. 
In other words, you can‘t just do a press piece. You don‘t do a press conference just to do a press 
conference. You don‘t give a speech just to give a speech.‖ (Kumar 2003b, 370) 
While some drawbacks to minor speeches do exist (e.g., smaller audiences, more prone to 
interruptions, less prominent national media coverage), I join the chorus of scholars that have 
found such rhetorical moments to be an increasingly important component of presidential 
leadership (Edwards 1983; Cohen 2004, 2005, 2010; Han 2001; Kernell 1997), particularly given 
changes to the presidential nominating process, the growth of cable and satellite television 
(Baum and Kernell 1999), technological advances (specifically the speed of travel detailed most 
prominently by Burton 2006), and White House communication operations (Kumar 2003a, 
2007). As the data show, any concerns about the costs of going local have clearly not 




if, as Barrett (2005) suggests, this class of speechmaking is not being used to reinforce legislative 
priorities, then is the propensity to deliver minor addresses driven by different set of concerns?  
A key to answering this question, I maintain, is a more pointed consideration of the 
audience of minor addresses. While many pieces of literature spanning several decades have 
referenced the emphasis presidents place on targeting particular audiences in their public appeals 
(Burns 2006; Cohen 2004; Cohen 2005, 2010; Doherty and Anderson 2003; Goggin 1984; 
Maltese 2003; Miller and Sigelman 1978; Page 1978; Shepsle 1972; Wood 2007), these studies 
rely on indirect measures of audience. As noted above, in his earlier study on this topic, Cohen 
uses a ratio of minor to major discretionary speeches as the dependent variable, assuming that all 
minor speeches are ―narrowly focused‖ (2005, 13).  In his more recent contribution, this same 
measure is supplemented by Doherty‘s (2007) data on non-Washington, D.C. presidential 
appearances as a further indicator of a targeting of narrow audiences.    
As Cohen recognizes, using the ratio of major to minor addresses is problematic in that 
―minor addresses may be delivered before a wide or broad-based audience, such as journalists or 
national dignitaries, with the intention of eventually reaching the nation through national news 
coverage‖ (2010, 44).  He continues, ―To trace presidential efforts aimed at interest groups 
requires two pieces of information about a presidential appearance before the group: the nature 
of the group (the target) and the substance of the comments before the group. . . . collecting such 
data as these, although possible, requires a huge effort on the researcher‘s part because of the 
massive number of speeches that presidents make per year‖ (2010, 45). It is just such an effort 





Hart‘s (1987) classification of audience type in his descriptive analysis of presidential 
speechmaking is by far the most thorough of any study. With his generous permission, I used his 
original data and coding scheme and, following his rules, expanded the observations through the 
end of George W. Bush‘s first term. Given the publication date of this dissertation, the selection 
of this end point requires some additional explanation. The volume of speeches delivered by 
presidents Reagan through George W. Bush, combined with the number of variables the coding 
scheme required me to capture, made data collection quite time-consuming. To avoid further 
delay in the data analysis and writing stages of this massive undertaking, I make the decision to 
conclude the coding at the end of Bush‘s first term. In earlier designs of chapters I had intended 
to generate, the George W. Bush data was to be used in concert with analysis of the 43
rd
 
president‘s first-term approval ratings analyzed in a separate project (Gaines and Roberts 2004). 
Although a more fine-grained analysis of the George W. Bush presidency is not part of this 
present project, it seemed wise to include the 2001-2004 data in this project given my 
concentration on secular trends in the data rather than president-specific analyses. This decision 
leaves George W. Bush as the only presidency truncated in the data set, making the presentation 
of data in places that provided counts or proportions for specific presidents somewhat awkward.  
Figure 1.2 and 1.3 of this chapter, as well as Figure 2.1 in the next chapter fall in this category. 
These figures clearly can‘t provide an equivalent account of all two-term presidents included in 
this analysis. However, to reinforce an earlier point, my analysis is not as dependent on 
conclusions about the audience choices of individual presidents or the nature of audience choice 
in first versus second terms. Therefore, while not ideal, my present focus renders the truncated 




My resulting dataset of every presidential speech from 1945 through 2004 allows me to 
present both more descriptive accounts of presidential speechmaking and explanatory models of 
the propensity of minor addresses classified by audience, location, topic and genre. Specifically, 
through both large-n statistical models and case studies of individual presidencies, I present 
evidence of a paradigmatic shift in the use of minor addresses over the course of the modern 
presidency. When presidents speak to audiences in domestic locations outside of Washington, I 
demonstrate that they are speaking increasingly to selective (or, as Cohen would call them, 
narrow audiences). I also show how this trend transcends alterations in presidential approval 
ratings, national economic conditions or partisan institutional arrangements. I maintain that 
presidents are not pandering to either collective public opinion or partisan supporters when they 
deliver minor addresses (an argument consistent with Canes-Wrone 2006). Instead, my 
contention is that minor addresses primarily solidify and, perhaps under some circumstances, 
mobilize their base constituency. Going local, therefore, has different aims than those ascribed to 
all addresses by the going public thesis.  
Finally, given the increasingly narrow audience of minor addresses, the frequent use of 
these addresses has normative implications for presidential leadership. While presidents are not 
pandering when they engage in such activity, they are certainly not leading. Borrowing Edwards‘ 
(2003) terminology, minor speeches are enabling presidents to act as facilitators of their own 
base, but not directors. Furthermore, in delivering these speeches, presidents may not be 
fulfilling a role of educator (Smith 2000) for either their base or the citizenry at large. 




Conclusions and Overview of Remaining Chapters 
Chapter 2 presents the most comprehensive description of presidential speechmaking to 
date. Building on the coding scheme developed by Hart (1987), volumes of the Public Papers of 
the President and the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Remarks were content coded, resulting 
in a dataset containing 19,761 observations of public remarks (both major and minor) delivered 
by presidents Truman through George W. Bush (first term). This chapter highlights trends across 
all of the occupants of the White House since 1945 and notable distinctions among individual 
presidents. The resulting analysis of the descriptive data serves as a necessary starting point to 
the consideration of the use of speechmaking by modern presidents. The data also help us 
understand more about the style of leadership of both individual presidents and the influence of 
contextual factors (national economic conditions, election year) on presidential rhetorical 
strategies such as advances in technology and the nature of media coverage of presidents.  
To complement the large-n analysis of Chapter 2, and draw further comparisons across 
epochs of the modern presidency, Chapter 3 concentrates on the use of minor addresses by 
President Harry S. Truman, the earliest president observed in this study. As a glance back at 
Table 1.1 shows, Truman delivered more addresses outside of Washington, D.C. than any 
president other than Clinton or G.W. Bush. A neglected case in the going public literature, 
Truman initially appears more in line with expectations we have for presidents governing in an 
era of individual pluralism (Kernell 2007). However, Truman‘s use of minor addresses that has 
not been replicated and likely won‘t be, by any modern president. In contrast to other modern 
presidents, particularly our most recent presidents, when Truman traveled outside of Washington 
he usually addressed public audiences rather than narrow partisan audiences. Using insights 




well as the data on Truman‘s speeches in my dataset, I explore whether Truman‘s speechmaking 
strategy was truly as ―public‖ as it appears. I then discuss the implications of these findings for 
the use of minor speeches by Truman and other modern presidents. 
Chapter 4 begins the march toward models of the determinants of speeches to various 
audience types by drawing simple comparisons of audience types and factors hypothesized to 
influence the frequency of speeches to different audiences. For instance, are presidents more 
likely to deliver addresses to selective local audiences under conditions of low rather than high 
approval?  Do they seek more partisan audiences to address when the economy is not performing 
well?  Considerations of these and other conditions are examined more closely in this chapter. 
The heart of the analysis is presented in Chapter 5. Using count models, I explain the 
propensity of speechmaking to various audiences, using conditions such as presidential approval, 
national economic conditions and divided government as explanatory variables. While the 
question of frequency is one explored by scholars concerned with minor addresses in general, I 
am also concerned with the issue of choice.  Minor addresses are discretionary speeches and the 
president has a choice of audience (selective or non-selective) within this broader class of 
speeches.  Therefore, given the choice of speeches to non-selective audiences, why does the 
president speak to a selective audience and why was the choice made to speak to a selective 
audience outside of Washington rather than in Washington?  I examine such questions with the 
use of multinomial logit models where audience types are treated as the different categories of 
the dependent variable (speech).  
Chapter 6, the conclusion, considers the normative implications of findings in earlier 




Given the richness of the data, I end with recommendations for avenues of further research on 

































CHAPTER 2   
A “QUANTITATIVE BIOGRAPHY” OF “GOING PUBLIC”  
 
 As Chapter 1 noted, the vast majority of the going-public literature has been fixated on 
one class of speechmaking – major nationally televised addresses. While their small number 
(n=298 since 1945) and seemingly more pronounced impact on public opinion (see Edwards 
2003 for sufficient caution about this assumption) have encouraged such attention, these 
addresses comprise less than two percent of all speeches delivered by presidents between 1945 
and 2004.  Although the same literature documents the exponential increase over the last three 
decades in speeches commonly referred to as ―minor addresses‖ (Kernell 2007; Ragsdale 2009), 
researchers have generally been unwilling to undertake the laborious task of culling the full 
complement of presidential speeches for information pertaining to their topic, location and 
audience.  
While scholarship on the intensity of speechmaking on particular policy topics (Wood 
2007) and the location of speeches (Barrett and Peake 2007; Cohen and Powell 2005; Doherty 
2007, 2008; Sellers and Denton 2006) has made helpful contributions, outside of these very 
recent efforts, presidential scholars have not taken full advantage of the wealth of information 
contained in presidential speeches published in the pages of the Public Papers of the President 
and the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.  Ragsdale‘s (2009) helpful reference 
source and Hart‘s (1987) even more detailed but two-decade-old descriptive account of 
presidential speeches are the exception, but their work is entirely descriptive.   
 I maintain that we have much to learn from a greater consideration of not only how 




and on what topics, but to whom. The question of audience selection seems to be an increasingly 
crucial one given the documented rise in minor addresses and the assumption on the part of the 
going public literature that such speeches are designed to enhance the president‘s bargaining 
position with Congress. If this is the intent, then the use of minor addresses should constitute 
sufficient attempts to persuade or at least educate citizens outside the president‘s group of core 
supporters. This tactic would seem to be particularly important for presidents with low public 
opinion ratings as well as those who face a hostile Congress. However, the story reads much 
differently if minor addresses are primarily a means of reinforcing existing support. Thus, the 
question becomes, are presidents preaching to convert or preaching to the converted? 
 Given the centrality of audience to my central argument, I devote the bulk of the attention 
in this chapter to a presentation of descriptive data on the immediate recipients of the presidents‘ 
remarks. However, in the process of replicating Hart‘s coding scheme and updating his original 
dataset, I‘ve generated what Cavalli (2006) refers to as a ―quantitative biography‖ of presidential 
activity – in this instance one that encompasses all presidential speeches delivered between April 
1945 and December 2004. The advantages of such an undertaking, according to Cavalli, include 
the ability to draw important comparisons across presidencies and test hypotheses about 
presidential behavior more objectively.
16
 For instance, by examining data on the genres of 
speeches (ceremonial, partisan, etc.), we should be able to make better statements about the 
communication style of both individual presidents and notable shifts that have occurred over 
time. Such benefits are reinforced by scholars that have studied particular genres of speeches 
over the history of the presidency. Lim (2002), for instance, found that presidential inaugurals in 
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 century have become increasingly anti-intellectual, abstract, assertive, and 
conversational than those delivered by 19
th
 century presidents.  
 Similarly, by recording the frequency with which speeches on certain policy topics are 
delivered, we learn more about the discretionary and obligatory policy priorities of individual 
presidents and external constraints (e.g., international conflict) shared by presidents during 
similar eras. Accordingly, I also present descriptive data on notable dimensions such as the topic, 
genre and format of presidential addresses.  
 Since Hart‘s (1987) original data and coding scheme laid the foundation for this entire 
project, I proceed first by familiarizing the reader more generally with Hart‘s work and my 
extension of his work, leaving the important but more cumbersome description of the precise 
coding rules to the Appendix.  I then present data on speechmaking trends that augment prior 
accounts of presidential speechmaking activity and, most importantly, suggest causal 
relationships that will be explored in later chapters.  
 
Data and Coding Procedures 
While my initial interest in the strategic use of presidential speechmaking was sparked by 
the work of Tulis (1987) and Kernell (1986 and later  editions), my understanding of the 
opportunities and challenges associated with coding the full complement of presidential speeches 
was provided by Hart‘s 1987 book, The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the 
Modern Age. Hart undertook a herculean task, coding approximately 10,000 speeches delivered 
by seven presidents over a 44-year period for features such as location, audience, setting and 
topic. The result was a rich dataset of more than 200 thousand data points. As Hart reflects, ―The 




‗mass‘ of the American presidency. . . Moreover, such a large computerized data base helps one 
discover patterns of co-occurrence in presidential behavior that would probably remain hidden if 
other methods of inquiry were used‖ (1987, 215).  
Hart‘s resulting analysis identified notable changes in the use of presidential 
speechmaking since 1945 including the tendency of presidents to speak more often in general, to 
speak more often outside of Washington in particular, and to speak more frequently in 
ceremonial settings. Hart also drew some troubling implications from the data. Most notably, he 
concluded that presidential addresses were being used less to educate and inform than they were 
to generate favorable media coverage or target partisan supporters. Although his work stopped 
short of developing specific models explaining the behavior, the richness of the volume lies in 
the multiple dimensions of individual speeches that are captured longitudinally, and a meticulous 
coding scheme capable of being replicated.  
Professor Hart permitted me to use data he had collected for his 1987 book and later 
expanded to include speechmaking activity through the entire administration of George H.W. 
Bush. All told, this original dataset contained 11,731 instances of speechmaking from Presidents 
Harry Truman through George H.W. Bush, with omissions for the years 1983, 1984 and 1985. I 
coded all speeches for these three missing years and, using Hart‘s same coding criteria (see 
Appendix for complete details), all remarks delivered between 1993 and 2004 by Presidents Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush.
17
 Specifically, an additional 7,640 speeches met the criteria for 
inclusion, creating a total of 19,371 observations. The number of observations is almost evenly 
split between Democratic and Republican presidents (9,719 and 9,652 speeches respectively).  
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My data source is identical to Hart‘s. All presidential remarks since 1945 are published in 
the Public Papers of the Presidents or the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.
18
  
Bound volumes of the Public Papers were utilized for all speeches I coded with the exception of 
remarks made by President George W. Bush between July 2002 and December 2004. Speeches 
delivered during this 30-month period were obtained from the on-line version of the Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents maintained by GPO Access, a service of U.S. 
Government Printing Office (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html).  
As Hart notes, these two sources ―contain essential, historical information about the 
speaking events in question, including (brief) designations of audience, setting, timing, 
etc.‖(1987, 216). The headings of each document, along with a brief footer, provide the user with 
a quick sense of the audience, setting, date, and, in some cases, the general topic of the activity. 
However, in most instances a coder needs to skim the entirety of the addresses to identify the 
topic(s) covered. Although the pages also contain all written directives, announcements and 
designations issued by the White House, my concern, like Hart‘s is only with addresses 
containing verbal output by the president exceeding 150 words. These general rules, therefore, 
exclude all written directives and some brief verbal output by the president. I direct the reader to 
the Appendix for a list of all types of documents coded.  
For the Clinton and Bush years, I also made a more detailed record – in the form of a 
brief description in an adjacent column of the dataset – of the topic, audience and location of the 
speeches. I also created series for variables such as presidential approval, national economic 
conditions, and divided government that are included in the right-hand side of regression models 
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presented in later chapters. A full description of these coding procedures is documented in a 
separate section of the Appendix in order to distinguish them from Hart‘s original coding 
procedures.  
The use of an established coding scheme has obvious benefits, including greater validity 
and reliability.
19
 In this instance, the availability of Hart‘s original data also alleviated months of 
additional coding I would have had to conduct in order to include presidents from the earlier 
portion of the modern presidency. By replicating Hart‘s original coding scheme and adding cases 
to his dataset, I have been able to extend the longitudinal analysis of trends and broaden the 
number of comparisons across presidents. Finally, the inclusion of the Clinton and George W. 
Bush presidencies are particularly important not only because of the sheer volume of speeches 
delivered (a record number by Clinton in each of his terms), but because of technological 
advances that have made it easier for presidents to reach selected audiences without traveling 
(videoconferencing and webcasting) and increased speed of travel that have made it easier for 
presidents to address groups in multiple states in the same day. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I present a descriptive account of presidential 
speechmaking from 1945-2004. I begin with data that confirms the heightened intensity of the 
frequency of speechmaking, particularly the class of speeches referred to as minor addresses. 
While some consideration is given to individual presidents or individual years of particular 
administrations that are notable outliers in the data, the primary focus of this first section is the 
long-term trend in the frequency of speechmaking.   
A brief treatment of the topics (economy, international conflict, etc.) and genre 
(ceremonial speeches, partisan rallies, press conferences) is presented to demonstrate how the 
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data afford additional insights into the policy priorities and communication styles of individual 
presidents. The bulk of the attention of the chapter, however, is devoted to a consideration of the 
central variable in my entire study, the audience of the speeches. It is here that I introduce a 
definition of a selective audience and describe how presidents have increasingly targeted such 
audiences. 
 
The Growth of Going Public 
A snapshot of the volume of the entirety of speechmaking activity of presidents Truman 
through George W. Bush (as of December 2004) is presented in Figure 2.1  The data collected 
for this study and presented here confirm the trend documented elsewhere (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; 
Kernell 2007; Ragsdale 2009). Speechmaking activity increases notably after the mid-1970s, the 
juncture which Kernell (2007) identified as the end of ―individualized pluralism‖ and the onset 
of ―institutionalized pluralism,‖ when presidents turn increasingly to public appeals as a means 
of governing.  
The apparent absence of linearity we see in the most recent four presidents is almost fully 
explained by the longer tenures of Reagan and Clinton.
20
 Yet a comparison of these two-term 
presidents with other two-termers from an earlier period of the modern presidency, Truman and 
Eisenhower, provides an even more pronounced statement of the recent use of the bully pulpit. 
When the observations are packaged as a percentage of all speeches delivered (Figure 2.2), the 
last four presidents account for 57 percent of all speechmaking activity since April 1945. By 
removing the effects of heightened speechmaking during reelection years and showing the 
average number of speeches delivered per year for the first three years of each administration, 
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excluding Ford (Figure 2.3), we see a clearer linear trend since 1974. One could also speculate 
that if it were not for the public opinion challenges associated with the conduct of the Vietnam 
War (Johnson and Nixon) and the Watergate scandal (Nixon), the linearity of the data would be 
even more pronounced.  
Other outliers in the series invite a more micro-level consideration of the data. By 
examining the number of speeches delivered in individual years (Figure 2.4), we can explain 
some of the totals for individual presidents more effectively. One is struck in earlier figures, for 
instance, by the large totals from the Truman and Ford administrations. In Truman‘s case, the 
frequency is primarily a function of Truman‘s heralded whistle-stop tours in 1948 and 1952 – a 
unique, strategic use of speechmaking that will be examined more closely in Chapter 3. Moving 
chronologically across the series, the next notable outlier is 1964, a reelection year and one 
containing both a notable flurry of domestic legislation (Great Society programs) and a 
heightened public interest in the U.S. military commitment in Southeast Asia.  
The highest yearly total for any president is recorded by President Gerald Ford in 1976, 
another election year and also the nation‘s bicentennial. A visual display of the genre of speeches 
delivered during the only full years of Ford‘s administration, 1975 and 1976, shown in (Figure 
2.5) confirms the impact of not only of reelection efforts (partisan appeals), but of ceremonial 
addresses commemorating the nation‘s bicentennial. A closer examination of speeches during 
this year (not presented) confirms the attention accorded to this celebration. Other specific years 
warranting brief mention are 1973 and 1974. The Watergate scandal resulted not only in fewer 
overall speeches, but also, as Burns, Jacobs and Kifer (2003) explain, the adoption of an insular 
―Rose Garden strategy‖ that intentionally limited Nixon‘s exposure outside of formal White 




Figure 2.6, confirms this trend.  Finally, the low-water mark of activity in the post-Watergate era, 
1981, is a clear product of the assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan in March and Reagan‘s 
recovery period over the next few months.    
Having explained some of the more notable nuances of the yearly data, I conclude this 
portion of the analysis with a more macro-level view of speechmaking activity.  Following 
Hart‘s lead, I find it instructive to categorize the speeches by ―era.‖ While Hart created three 
time periods – early modern (1945-1957), middle modern (1958-1969), recent modern (1970-
1984) – the longer time period I examine renders these original divisions impractical. Instead, I 
create five different time periods and present the total number of speeches during each in Figure 
2.7.  
The presidents that preceded the advent of regularly televised news conferences and the 
widespread placement of television in American households form the first grouping (Truman and 
Eisenhower, 1945-1960). I treat the Kennedy and Johnson years as a single entity primarily 
based on policy cohesion, particularly in the area of domestic policy (civil rights and Great 
Society programs). While one could reasonably assume that the volume of speechmaking during 
this stretch probably would have looked quite different if Kennedy had not been assassinated in 
November 1963, the Vietnam conflict resulted in a heightened frequency of addresses by 
Johnson. The next period, 1969-1980 (Nixon, Ford, and Carter) contains partisan diversity and 
the unique case of a president who resigned from office, yet a fair degree of consistency when it 
comes to appraisals of the rhetorical skill of the occupants. While a direct correlation between 
rhetorical skill and frequency of speechmaking cannot be fully established, the output of 
presidents considered our most gifted orators to date (Reagan and Clinton) may be suggestive of 




It is Reagan and his successor, George H.W. Bush, who define the next ―era‖ in Figure 
2.7 Again, we see a significant leap (25.9  percent increase) in the number of speeches delivered 
from the prior era. Finally, the notable escalation in the frequency of speeches by the next 
president, Bill Clinton, makes the delineation of the final era – one that includes the last 
president in the sample, George W. Bush (first term only). The Clinton/George W. Bush 
frequency represents a 43.5 percent increase over the Reagan/George H.W. Bush total.  
These macro and micro-level views of presidential speechmaking during the modern 
presidency demonstrate the increased premium placed on this form of presidential activity. 
Combined with the findings of other scholars, the data lend additional credence to notions of an 
institutional change in the strategic use of speechmaking, particularly by the four most recent 
presidents. The data presented thus far, however, have only investigated totals for all speeches 
without drawing distinctions between certain classes of speechmaking (major vs. minor 
addresses), particular genres of speeches (ceremonial, press briefings), or identifying trends 
pertaining to the topic, location and audience of these addresses. Such considerations speak to 
not only institutional dynamics, but also leadership styles and policy priorities of individual 
presidents. The latter is most evident in an examination of the occasion and topic of presidential 
speeches. 
 
Setting and Substance 
Presidential speech is occasioned by a variety of factors, some of them that lie entirely 
outside of the administration‘s control (e.g., natural disasters, international crises) and others that 
can be scheduled at the discretion of the president‘s handlers. Considering the different occasions 




social/spatial environment surrounding the presidential speech in question, including its 
interpersonal circumstances as well as its comparative formality‖ (1987, 219).  
While full descriptions of these variables are presented in the Appendix, a brief primer is 
in order. Ceremonial addresses include those that honor foreign dignitaries, mark the passage of 
major pieces of legislation and commemorate events or days of historical national significance. 
Briefings, according to Hart, refer generically to interactions between the president and members 
of the new media or ordinary citizens.
21
 Political rallies refer to any speechmaking occasion that 
is overtly partisan in nature, thereby making it more inclusive than campaign events that may be 
implied by its name. Speeches to official gatherings of organizations fall under the category of 
―convention‖ while events that cannot be clearly assigned to one of the aforementioned 
categories are classified as ―miscellaneous.‖  
Figure 2.8 shows the totals for all presidents on which data was collected. Outside of the 
miscellaneous category, ceremonial speeches comprise the most frequent occasion of 
presidential speech, notably outdistancing partisan events. Such findings are consistent with 
assertions of other scholars that outside of campaign events, modern presidents have adopted 
rhetoric that is consciously non-partisan (Coleman and Manna 2007, citing Hart 1987; Hinckley 
1990; Kernell 1986; Lim 2002; Tulis 1987; Rottinghaus 2006; Whittington 1997).  
We see this pattern when the data is displayed by presidents (Figure 2.9), but we also 
notice some notable variation in the totals across administrations that speak to the rhetorical style 
of presidents, a term I use more loosely here than it is employed by the communication literature. 
The ceremonial event totals for Reagan and Clinton, for instance, are both supportive of their 
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documented penchant for pathos-driven rhetoric and the count for George W. Bush is indicative 
of his relative discomfort with such a rhetorical style.  
As the occasion of speeches indirectly speaks to the preferred setting of rhetorical 
appeals, the topic of speeches serves as an additional proxy of the policy priorities of a given 
administration. Admittedly, this is a more challenging variable to operationalize given the 
different ways public policies can be categorized. Even with agreement among separate coders 
about the definition of the different policy topics, some ambiguity arises in intercoder rating. 
Nevertheless, Hart developed seven distinct policy categories spanning both domestic and 
foreign policy topics: science, economy, government, human services, human values, 
international aid and war/conflict (see the Appendix for complete descriptions of each topic). 
According to his coding rules, if 25 percent or more of the speech did not fit one of these 
categories, it was classified as miscellaneous and if 75 percent or more of the content dealt with 
two or more of the categories, it was designated as multiple.  
Figure 2.10 displays the frequency of speeches delivered in each category across the 
entire range of presidents examined for this study. Not surprisingly, presidents deliver a host of 
speeches that address multiple topics. The frequency of speeches dealing with international 
cooperation (international aid) is also a product of post war reconstruction efforts, the Cold War, 
and an increasingly interdependent global economy. More meaningful analysis of the topic of 
addresses, however, is achieved by separating the data by administration. 
The discretionary and reactive features of presidential speechmaking are clearly on 
display in Figure 2.11. Looking more closely at speeches dealing with international cooperation 
(international aid), but doing so here by president, we see the influence of arguably the height of 




outpace all others – a pattern that is not evident in the totals for any other president in the series.  
Similarly, the speeches devoted to war/conflict in the George W. Bush presidency reflect the 
dominance of the war on terrorism and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. 
The use of public addresses as a leading agenda-setting tool by modern presidents is most 
evident in the figures for Reagan and Clinton. Reagan‘s use of the bully pulpit to advance his 
economic agenda, documented by a host of other studies (most prominently in Edwards 2003; 
Kernell 2007; Wood 2007), is seen in the fact that he devoted 23 percent of all speeches to this 
general topic. Human values, a category that encompasses patriotic appeals, religious freedom, 
and moral obligations is likewise reflective of dominant themes in Reagan‘s domestic and 
foreign policies. Similarly, Clinton‘s emphasis on policy areas such as health care and welfare 
reform are captured in the impressive figures (37 percent of all speeches during his 
administration) for speeches focused on human services topics (37 percent of all speeches 
delivered during his administration).   
Although the connection between speech topic and policy agenda may be a somewhat 
trivial finding to raise, it should encourage more scholarship on the attention presidents devote to 
public policies in their public addresses. Given the information contained about the frequency, 
location and audience of the addresses, we can gain a greater understanding of not only how 
often the president spoke on certain topics, but where and to whom. Using improved capacities 
to analyze the text of presidential remarks, we could also learn more about the structure of these 
appeals. Leaving textual analysis in the hands of more qualified practitioners, my immediate 
concern is with the receiving end of the equation. Unlike Edwards (2003), who also encouraged 




measure the impact of speeches on the audience.
22
 Instead, my concern is with the clear increase 
of speeches by presidents to selective audiences. While this trend has been identified by at least 
one other scholar, Cohen (2005, 2010), no effort has been made to provide a more precise 
explanation for this trend or the conditions under which presidents target such audiences. Before 
I offer such explanatory models in forthcoming chapters, I first establish my working definition 
of ―selective audience‖ and display the frequency with which this type of audience has been 
targeted by modern presidents. 
 
Narrowing the Audience 
Hart‘s original coding scheme classified the audience of presidential speeches in one of 
the following categories: government employees (encompassing federal civil servants and 
members of the armed forces), local and/or press (citizens or members of the media 
spontaneously gathered), national (reached via live radio or television broadcasts), invited guests 
(citizens or groups specifically selected for an event that included a presidential address), group 
members (members of a formal organization either gathered for the occasion of a presidential 
address or a meeting at which the president was invited to attend) and other (audiences not 
capable of being identified as one of the aforementioned classifications).
23
 Hart also has a 
category for occasions of speeches he identifies as partisan rallies, those ―political gatherings 
explicitly featuring a candidate for political office and attended by audience members explicitly 
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invited for the event or by persons united by some sort of formal, organizational tie‖ (Hart 1987, 
221).   
 Based on these criteria, I construct a variable, selective audience, which captures all 
addresses in domestic locations (including Washington, D.C.) to invited guests and group 
members. This variable also encompasses speeches at partisan rallies. To delineate speeches to 
selective audiences in U.S. cities, I also develop another dummy variable, selective local 
audience. I consider both of these variables as more refined measures of both location and 
audience that have been provided by the larger going public literature, which uses a traditional 
major vs. minor address distinction, or Hart‘s previous characterization of audience.  
 The original variables I use to construct the selective audience variable encompass 
several audience types that, even when combined, would create a high likelihood that the 
resulting audience would share the partisan and ideological orientation of the president. In other 
words, selective audiences would appear to be largely ―friendly‖ audiences. Speeches 
specifically designated in Hart‘s dataset as partisan audiences, for instance, are included as are 
speeches to organizations. Although the latter does not necessarily include a partisan or 
ideological orientation concordant with the president, I assume an increased sophistication over 
the course of the modern presidency in identifying favorable audiences for presidential speeches. 
However, the presence of the organizational affiliation code makes my claim that selective 
audiences are largely ―friendly‖ a fairly crude designation. To provide some form of support for 
this assertion, I conducted a limited amount of collateral coding for a sample of speeches to 
selective local audiences.  
 I first identified all speeches to selective local audiences in my dataset (n=2600) and 




in chronological order, I used Excel‘s random number generator to assign random numbers to 
each observation. The observations were then sorted according to the random number column 
and the first 100 observations constituted my sample of selective local speeches.  This process 
resulted in a sample containing speeches to selective local audiences from every president in the 
larger analysis. The number of speeches in the sample from each president was relatively 
equivalent to their proportion of the total of all speeches to selective local audiences. 
 To obtain a more refined measure of audience, I coded each speech according to the 
following designations that seemed appropriate for speeches to audiences with some form of 
collective identity. Audiences were designated as a partisan match if the organization or 
collection of individuals shared the president‘s partisan label. For example, a speech by Clinton 
to Democratic National Committee organizers in Chicago fit this category as would a speech by 
George W. Bush at a fundraiser for Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY). Audiences were 
designated as an ideological match if the organization was not clearly partisan, yet shared the 
president‘s ideology. For example, a speech by Reagan to the Federalist Society chapter in New 
York City fit this category. Audiences were designated as homogenous but not clearly partisan 
or ideological if it was clear that despite the commonality of their organizational affiliation, 
attendees could have held a variety of partisan and/or ideological beliefs. Remarks by John F. 
Kennedy to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations fit this profile. Finally, since the original 
categories from Hart‘s dataset used to create this new variable allow for the possibility that a 
president could speak to a homogenous group that does not share his partisan identity or 
ideological orientation, the category partisan/ideological mismatch was used. The decision by 




 In my sample of 100 speeches, 53 were partisan matches, 20 were ideological matches, 
25 were homogenous but not clearly partisan or ideological and 2 were partisan mismatches. 
Collateral coding by another individual using these same categories generated an intercoder 
reliability rating of .96 (Cohen‘s Kappa). While this small sample does not alter the crude 
designation of selective speeches as ―friendly,‖ it provides at least some empirical backing to my 
claim that the vast majority of speeches to selective audiences are speeches to individuals 
predisposed to agree with the president‘s message. Extensions of my present analysis could 
certainly utilize this coding scheme as one further refinement of audience type. 
 When viewed by era of the modern presidency (Figure 2.13), a linear trend in the number 
of speeches to selective audiences is readily apparent. However, when considered by individual 
president (Figure 2.14), we see a marked increase during the Reagan, George H.W. Bush and 
Clinton presidencies. The volume during the first term of the George W. Bush presidency, 
meanwhile, returns to pre-Reagan levels. Plausible explanations for the lower totals for Bush, Jr. 
include the short-term effects of the 9/11 attacks, the administration‘s preoccupation with the war 
on terrorism, and the military engagement in Iraq, all of which kept Bush closer to home and 
more focused on national security issues – issues less likely to spur speeches to selective 
audiences. While the president was an active campaigner on behalf of his party‘s congressional 
candidates in the 2002 midterm elections, homeland security concerns again contributed to a 
president who strayed less from his home bases (Washington, D.C. and Crawford, Texas) than 
his immediate predecessors. Separating out the possible effect of the election year on this type of 
speechmaking activity (Figure 2.15) reveals even less consistency across presidents, including 
the more recent occupants. The only stable result is the smaller volume in the first year of each 




 Given the increased frequency of travel outside of Washington, D.C. over the course of 
the modern presidency and its potential benefits, I also examine the number of speeches to 
selected audiences in U.S. cities. At least one recent study suggests that travel to domestic 
locations outside of Washington, particularly those in favorable electoral environments (states 
and/or districts presidents carried in their election year), generates more consistently favorable 
media coverage (Barrett and Peake 2007). Another leading treatment of the benefits of travel 
finds modest boosts to approval ratings measured at the state level, but only in non-election years 
and in more heavily populated states (Cohen and Powell 2005). A separate study on patterns of 
travel also suggests less consistency in the targeting of key electoral states, raising some doubts 
about the impermeable nature of the permanent campaign thesis (Doherty 2007).  
 Much like the earlier data on all addresses to selected audiences, when viewed by eras 
within the modern presidency (Figure 2.15) the series appears quite linear. With the exception of 
the Ford presidency – a consistent outlier across all president-specific comparisons – and the 
George W. Bush presidency, this general trend seems to hold true in the president-specific data 
in Figure 2.16.  
 Where addresses to selected local audiences are concerned, the question then becomes 
whether the location of the speech also enters into the strategic calculation. One measure of this 
is the electoral significance of the state in which the address is scheduled, measured simply by 
the number of Electoral College votes. These speeches, even in instances where the president has 
been invited to attend, are still discretionary events. As Figure 2.17 shows, more addresses to 
selective audiences are clearly delivered in the most significant electoral prizes. The extent to 
which electoral conditions or other factors raised in this section contribute to variation in the 




further bivariate comparisons and multivariate models presented in Chapters 4 and 5 
respectively. The emphasis in this present chapter has been to introduce the reader to the 
definition of a selective audience and present trend data associated with the delivery of such 
addresses. 
Conclusions 
 The central thesis of the going public literature is that presidents are using public 
speeches as a means of soliciting direct support from the American people – support that can 
then be utilized at opportune moments in the president‘s bargaining relationship with the 
Congress. While a host of studies suggest that the president is, at best, marginally successful in 
translating public appeals into even measurable short-term support, the descriptive account 
presented in this chapter and confirmed by other scholars (see, most prominently, Kernell 2007) 
is that scheduled speeches have constituted an increasingly larger component of the president‘s 
activities. Successful or not, the permanent campaign has become a staple feature of the modern 
presidency. In particular, we have seen a marked increase in minor addresses located outside of 
Washington, D.C.   
 The school of thought that sees presidents performing a key educational role likely views 
the increased time presidents are spending outside of Washington as a positive occurrence. 
Surely opportunities to explain public policy alternatives, even if from the biased position of the 
messenger, should contribute to a more politically aware, if not more informed populace.  Given 
that local media coverage of presidential events is also more extensive and more balanced than 
that delivered by national media outlets (Barrett and Peake 2007), even some of those who are 




coverage of the event than they would have been if the president had remained in Washington on 
that day.  
 However, as we scratch beneath the surface of minor addresses a different picture begins 
to emerge. In particular, when we take a closer look at the immediate audience of these addresses 
– a facet of going public that other studies have largely neglected – we see that the most recent 
collection of modern presidents are actually spending more time speaking to a more selective 
group of Americans. To what extent particular conditions such as divided government or the 
approval ratings of the messenger explain this activity is the concern of forthcoming chapters. 
What the reader needs to understand immediately, however, is the dramatic shift we have made 
during the course of the modern presidency in the audience presidents target when delivering 
addresses outside of Washington – by far the most frequent addresses they make.  
 I opened this thesis with a sample week on the speechmaking trail with one of our more 
recent, popular and rhetorically gifted presidents, William Jefferson Clinton. The former 
Arkansas governor did his puddle hopping across a series of states in a matter of days via an 
aircraft capable of moving at more than 600 miles per hour and fully equipped with every 
convenience of a fully-staffed stationary office.  Almost 50 years earlier a president from the 
neighboring state to the north, Missouri, traversed 30,000 miles of the American landscape by 
train over several months of a single year. The audiences who listened to Truman speak at each 
stop, however, differed dramatically from those reached by Clinton or most other presidents 
since Truman‘s time. Therefore, before we consider the conditions under which Clinton-era 
speeches are delivered, it is instructive to look back at a form of going public that is now largely 


























































































































  TRULY “GOING PUBLIC” WHILE “GOING LOCAL”:  
THE CASE OF HARRY S. TRUMAN   
 
 
If one were testing the hypothesis that presidential speechmaking activity is explained by 
conditions such as job approval ratings, major military engagements, election outcomes, and 
oratorical skill, then the first and last presidents examined in this study would be favorable test 
cases. Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush both exited the Oval Office with some of the 
lowest public approval ratings of any president in Gallup Organization polling history.
24
  
Truman‘s final 32% approval rating is a meager two points worse than Bush‘s lowly 34%, 
although Bush has the dubious distinction of the highest disapproval rating in the last Gallup poll 
of his presidency (61%).
25
 The second term was also not particularly kind to either president. 
Curiously, Bush and Truman have identical approval averages for their second terms (36.5%), a 
mere two points higher than the lowest-ranking president (Nixon‘s 34.4%).26  
These approval ratings were certainly related to U.S. involvement in armed conflicts 
during their respective administrations – conflicts that were called into question by large 
segments of the American people. In the first Gallup poll following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq 
in March 2003, only 23% of those surveyed believed the action was a mistake. However, in the 
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 Richard Nixon recorded the lowest final job approval rating (24%). While Jimmy Carter‘s 34% final approval 
rating is identical to Bush‘s, the next closest president to this collection of chief executives is Lyndon Johnson who 
had a 49% rating when he left office in 1969.  Lydia Saad, ―Bush Presidency Closes with 34% Approval, 61% 
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 Bush also recorded the highest disapproval rating in Gallup history (69% in April 2008). Ibid.  
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last poll conducted prior to Bush‘s departure from office this number jumped to 56%.27 
Approximately 50 years earlier, when Truman committed U.S. troops to the Korean conflict, 
only 20% of the American public saw the move as a mistake. While comparatively fewer 
Americans (36%) viewed U.S. involvement in Korea as ill-advised when they were surveyed at 




Truman and Bush each experienced their fair share of drama in their presidential 
elections as well as a mixture of triumphs and setbacks in their party‘s fortunes in midterm 
elections. Bush‘s victory in 2000 marked only the fourth time since the Civil War that the 
winning candidate did not have more popular votes than his opponent (Gaines 2001). While 
Truman ran only once, his defeat of Dewey in 1948 marked what is still widely regarded as the 
most improbable triumph in any modern presidential election. Truman‘s victory was sweetened 
by a net gain of 85 seats for Democrats in Congress. While Republican fortunes in Congress did 
not mirror Bush‘s in 2000 (the GOP lost six House seats), the 2002 midterm elections produced a 
net GOP gain of eight seats, marking only the third time the president‘s party increased its 
numbers in the House in the first midterm election of an administration since 1902.
29
  Stronger 
parallels can be found in the second midterm election and the election of their successors. In 
2006 Republicans suffered a net loss of 36 seats and in 2008, the coattails of Barack Obama 
catapulted Democrats to a net gain of 31 seats.
30
  In uncanny similarity, Truman‘s Democratic 
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Party suffered a net deficit of 35 seats in 1950 and Dwight Eisenhower‘s 1952 triumph was 
accompanied by a net increase of 26 Republicans in Congress.
31
  Finally, neither president 
evokes comparisons to the more skilled orators who have occupied the Oval Office, particularly 
regarding their proficiency in delivering formal addresses. Truman was no Franklin Roosevelt, 
and Bush was no Ronald Reagan.  
Instead of similarities in their use of speeches, however, we find stark contrasts – 
contrasts that speak to a paradigmatic shift in the use of presidential addresses over the course of 
the modern presidency. The difference is immediately apparent when the sheer volume of 
addresses each president delivered is compared (Table 3.1).  Truman averaged almost 300 fewer 
speeches a year than Bush. This comparison of frequency between a mid-20
th
 century and 21
st
 
century president, however, has been well documented by scholars whose work demonstrates 
that modern presidents are increasingly taking their message more directly to the American 
people (Edwards 1983, Kernell 2007). Changes in communication technology and transportation 
capabilities (particularly the speed of air travel) are also frequently cited as logical explanations 
for the heightened frequency (Kernell 2007).  
However, in documenting the rise of ―going public,‖ scholars have largely neglected a 
consideration of the composition of the ―public‖ on the receiving end of the addresses. Since the 
overwhelming majority of research on presidential speeches centers on major addresses such as 
nationally televised addresses or formal press conferences, treatments of audience are reasonably 
limited to measures such as network share ratings and public opinion surveys (see Baum and 
Kernell 1999; Edwards 2003).  
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The problem is that the vast majority of speeches delivered by presidents are minor 
addresses directed at smaller audiences, an increasing number of them gathered in American 
cities outside the Beltway.  Despite the increased scholarly attention to such minor addresses 
documented in Chapter 1, the composition of the listening audience has remained an 
afterthought. We say presidents are ―going public,‖ but when they deliver these minor addresses 
in locales across the U.S., are they speaking to ―the public‖ or a selectively assembled group of 
individuals already favorably inclined to the president‘s policy position? If it is the latter, then 
are presidents really ―going public‖ when they are ―going local‖ or does some other description 
more accurately describe their activity? More significantly, if presidents are spending an 
increasing amount of time preaching to the choir, what are the normative implications for 
presidential leadership? 
I maintain that speeches delivered by a president from the rear platform of a train to 
hundreds or thousands of individuals who have voluntarily and eagerly assembled – a scene 
indicative of Truman‘s minor addresses outside of Washington – constitute a vastly different 
form of ―going public‖ than those delivered to hand-picked town hall audiences or small 
gatherings of loyal partisan supporters in a private home located in an electoral stronghold. The 
first audience type, I argue, is more ―public‖ in the sense that access to the address is primarily 
constrained by the physical attributes of the event (ability to travel to the precise location or hear 
the words being delivered), rather than the political or socioeconomic demographics of the 
recipients.  
Likewise, I contend that there is virtually nothing ―public‖ about an audience restricted 
by event organizers on the basis of organizational or partisan membership. In this study I classify 




presidents speak to a selective audience in a domestic location outside of Washington, something 
modern presidents are doing with increased frequency (see Figure 2.13 in Chapter 2), I classify 
such events as a selective local address.  
When it comes to selective local addresses, the Truman and Bush comparison once again 
illustrates the stark contrasts during the modern presidency. As Figure 3.1 shows, Bush delivered 
16% of his addresses during his first term in office to selective local audiences, a mark that is 
almost identical to the average of presidents since Richard Nixon (16.6%). Truman, meanwhile, 
is the outlier in the entire collection of presidents examined in this study, having delivered less 
than 4% of his speeches during his nearly eight years in office to such audiences, a level 
conspicuously lower than the average of the first five presidents considered (8.87%).  
As the evidence presented in this chapter will establish, when Truman delivered speeches 
outside of Washington, he went ―public‖ in a purer sense of the word than has any other modern 
president. While more recent presidents maintain that their domestic travel places them in more 
direct contact with average Americans than speeches in Washington, I‘ll demonstrate that no 
president since Truman has delivered speeches in such a variety of American cities to such a 
diverse cross-section of Americans. Accordingly, his form of ―going local‖ is distinct among 
modern presidents. What Truman accomplished, how he accomplished it, and why other modern 
presidents have not even attempted to replicate it are thus important considerations in this study 
of presidential speechmaking.  
In highlighting the Truman case, I present both quantitative and qualitative evidence. A 
brief presentation of descriptive statistics generated from the full dataset of presidential remarks 
coded for this study both further distinguish Truman from the rest of the modern presidents and 




understanding of Truman‘s unique use of localized public addresses is provided by qualitative 
accounts. Here, I draw upon leading pieces of scholarship on the Truman presidency, published 
reflections of former Truman administrative officials, and primary source documents from the 
Harry S. Truman Library. Particular attention is devoted to Truman‘s local addresses during his 
famed Whistle-Stop Tours in 1948 with some lesser discussion of similar tours in 1950 and 
1952. I conclude by considering the conditions that have made Truman‘s version of ―going 
public‖ while ―going local‖ a relic. 
  
Truman’s Style of Going Public  
As Kernell reflected, ―One might think that Truman, having assumed office on the death 
of FDR, would also have found good reason to travel around the country to gain national 
exposure and build support among local party organizations‖ (2007, 133). However, as Figure 
3.2 documents, Truman pursued a less than ambitious public speaking schedule in the first three 
years of his administration. During this time period, he delivered an average of 70 speeches a 
year, with speeches in domestic locations outside Washington accounting for only 11% of this 
total. The bulk of Truman‘s public addresses during his entire tenure were clearly concentrated 
in election years (presidential and midterm) and, as Figure 3.3 displays, bursts of activity in 
particular months explain the totals during these key years. During 1948, Truman‘s only 
campaign for the White House, 75% of all speeches delivered in U.S. cities outside of 
Washington occurred in September and October when Truman held the first two of his famous 
Whistle-Stop tours. The same Figure (3.3) also shows a similar impact of the Whistle-Stop tours 




Given the large number of speeches during election years, a reasonable assumption 
would be that these speeches were primarily political and, as a result, were delivered to 
deliberate gatherings of partisan supporters in an effort to rally the base and minimize opposing 
voices that might be associated with a larger, unconstrained crowd. Quite the contrary, Truman‘s 
political rallies drew crowds that could not be mistaken for orchestrated partisan events. While 
evidence from secondary sources and primary documents presented in the next section provides 
the clearest proof, quantitative data derived from coding Truman‘s speeches also demonstrates 
the ―public‖ aspect of Truman‘s political rallies.  
Hart‘s (1987) coding scheme, which I follow for original coding of more recent 
presidents (Reagan through George W. Bush), distinguishes between two types of political rallies 
– open and partisan. As Hart defines them, open rallies are ―political gatherings explicitly 
featuring a candidate for political office and attended by self-selected audience members. 
Typically,‖ notes Hart, ―such gatherings were held on public grounds, in public buildings, or in 
private, large-space facilities rented for the event‖ (1987, 221).  Partisan rallies, meanwhile, are 
―political gatherings explicitly featuring a candidate for political office and attended by audience 
members explicitly invited to the event or by persons united by some sort of formal, 
organizational tie. Typically, such gatherings were held in private dining or meeting facilities‖ 
(1987, 221)  
Figure 3.4 displays the number of open and partisan rallies for all eleven presidents 
included in this study. As the bar chart clearly demonstrates, the number of open rallies Truman 
held exceeds the number of partisan rallies by a ratio of more than 40 to 1, the largest of any 
modern president. Contrastingly, the president with the largest number of partisan rallies, Bill 




other modern presidents (Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and G.W. Bush) did hold more open than 
partisan rallies, the Truman case stands in stark contrast with all other modern presidents, 
particularly those since the mid-1970s. It is this point of demarcation Kernell (2007) classified as 
the shift in the partisan arrangement in Washington from ―institutionalized pluralism‖ to 
―individualized pluralism‖ – an alteration he believes ushered in the permanent campaign as the 
dominant governing strategy for presidents. 
More broadly, political rallies (whether open or partisan) fall under the category of minor 
speeches – those delivered outside of the limelight of the national network or cable television 
cameras or, in earlier eras, without the national reach of radio. While minor addresses to 
audiences situated in either Washington or other domestic locations comprise the vast majority 
of all speeches delivered by modern presidents, Truman‘s totals remain the highest of all these 
presidents (Figure 3.5) – a statistically significant difference from the average percentage of the 
other presidents in the study (t= -6.737, p<.001). Considering the smaller number of households 
with televisions during his presidency, Truman‘s greater reliance on minor speeches than other 
presidents is not all that momentous.
32
 When the volume of minor speeches delivered to 
domestic audiences outside of Washington is isolated however (Figure 3.6), only Gerald Ford 
rivals Truman‘s use of this category of speechmaking by a president. Indeed, these two 
presidents are the only chief executives since 1945 whose speeches in U.S. cities outside the 
Beltway exceed the number delivered in Washington (Figure 3.7). Here again, the mean for 
Truman is statistically significant from the average of all other presidents in the sample            
(t= -5.789, p<.001).  
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While most scholars use the major/minor speech dichotomy to discuss the use of 
presidential speeches, including general characterizations about the audiences, a more refined 
measure of audience is provided by my designation of a minor speech as either selective or non-
selective.  To reiterate, only 19% of Truman‘s addresses were delivered to selective audiences in 
either Washington or domestic locations and less than 4% of his speeches were delivered to 
selective local audiences – percentages that represent statistically significant differences from the 
averages of the other ten presidents examined.
33
 Even when Truman engaged in speechmaking 
that could be tabbed as ―partisan‖ by most definitions due to its clear connection with 
campaigning, it is important to note that the overwhelming number of these addresses was held 
in venues where it would have been impossible to restrict attendance to partisan loyalists. As the 
next section of the chapter will present in more vivid detail, the aim of the famed Whistle-Stop 
tours was to put Truman in as close proximity with the average American as possible.  
In the introductory section of a chapter Hart (1987) devoted to the use of speech in 
building presidential image, Truman‘s Whistle-Stops served as the illustration that speeches are 
more than a string of words delivered in a particular cadence by the orator. Instead, they are a 
direct exchange between people who experience the speech event. As he put it, speeches ―do as 
well as say.‖ Elaborating further, he writes, ―by giving an inaugural address, a president makes 
himself president. By presenting a State of the Union message, a president creates a legislative 
agenda. . . .  and by speaking in Austin, Texas, a president gives that spot on the railroad line 
special status (greater than Uvalde‘s, greater than Bay City‘s) but, most important, becomes for 
his immediate listeners a flesh-and-blood creature (literally, ―one of them‖) who by coming to 
their town acts in their behalf‖ (1987, 45).  To comprehend how speeches like the ones Truman 
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delivered in hundreds of American towns from the rear platform of a train constitute such a 
different form of ―doing‖ from other modern presidents, we must first understand how Truman 
came to adopt this form of ―going local.‖ 
 
Truman’s Unique Style of “Going Local”  
Clearly, prior to 1948 Truman spent little time delivering speeches in any location, much 
less outside of Washington. Once he had decided to run for reelection, however, the president 
and his advisors needed to develop a strategy that put Truman into more direct contact with the 
American people. The resulting approach would become more than simply a campaign strategy. 
It would transform Truman‘s use of the bully pulpit throughout the remainder of this presidency. 
In order to appreciate more fully the extent of the adaptation, it is first necessary to revisit both 
the political environment the president faced in early 1948 as well as the range of his rhetorical 
skills.  
In April 1948, on the eve of the initial thrust of the presidential campaign, Truman‘s 
approval rating stood at a grim 36%, down seventeen points from December. Large swings in 
approval numbers were old hat for Truman. He had gone from initial approval ratings around 
90% following FDR‘s death in April 1945 (Figure 3.8) to a low of 27% at the time of the 1946 
midterm elections – elections that saw Republicans gain control of both chambers of Congress 
for the first time since 1933. Public perception of the president rebounded during 1947, a year 




his legislative agenda through the Republican-led 80
th
 Congress left the president in a precarious 
electoral position in 1948.
34
   
 
Responding to a Recalcitrant Congress 
Having served in the Senate from 1935 through 1944, Truman thought that he could 
relate well to members of the legislative branch. One scholar compared Truman‘s management 
of Congress early in his administration to ―the behavior of a prime minister . . . confident in his 
ability to deal with the congressional leadership on a personal basis‖ (Ferrell 2003, 233). But 
Conservative southern Democrats and Republicans strengthened their numbers in the 1946 
midterm election and thereafter emerged as the dominant ruling coalition in Congress (Donovan 
1977, 260).  James Rowe, Democratic strategist, in a memo entitled, ―Cooperation or Conflict‖ 
suggested little advantage to be gained by direct negotiation in Congress in 1946. Instead, he 
urged Truman to marshal the resource of public opinion in his dealings with Congress – a pure 
illustration of the going public strategy (Kernell 2007, 62). Acting on what they believed was a 
mandate to roll-back New Deal programs and reign in the power of the executive branch; 
Republicans flexed their legislative muscle in their dealings with the White House over the next 
two years (Donovan 1977, 260). By the time Congress adjourned in the fall of 1948, its six 
overrides of presidential vetoes would be the most in a single year since the presidency of 
Andrew Johnson (Ferrell 2003, 234).  
The challenges within his own party were arguably even more pronounced. Polls 
conducted in the early spring showed Truman as a projected loser to three different potential 
Republican nominees, New York Governor Thomas Dewey, Minnesota Governor Harold 
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Stassen, and Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg (Dallek 2008, 77).  Based on such projections 
a group of Democrats, led by Franklin Roosevelt‘s son James launched an initiative to draft 
General Dwight Eisenhower as the party‘s presidential nominee (Karabell 2000, 41). Harold 
Ickes, former Interior Secretary under FDR went so far as publicly to call for Truman to abandon 
the campaign (Donovan 1977, 388). An appraisal of Truman‘s political base showed support 
primarily among farmers, traditional labor, younger Americans, Catholics, and African 
Americans (Levantrosser 1986).  Truman‘s support of policies favorable to the latter group 
deepened the regional fissure of the Democratic Party more than could have been anticipated. 
 In his 1948 State of the Union Address, Truman introduced several legislative proposals 
designed to appeal to his electoral base, including new conservation and reclamation projects in 
western states, initiatives for rural electrification, improved price supports for farmers and an 
increase in the minimum wage (Donovan 1977, 352). The proposal that proved to be the most 
controversial was a civil rights package designed to strengthen anti-lynching laws, eradicate poll 
taxes, and curb racial discrimination in the use of public transportation. A major lightning rod of 
the package was a call for the elimination of discrimination in the armed forces (Donovan 1977, 
353).  
The civil rights components, writes, Donovan, ―touched off such an outburst of comment 
on Capitol Hill from members from [several southern states] as often exceeded the standards of 
what was printable in the newspapers of those days‖ (Donovan 1977, 354).  A national survey 
conducted by Gallup in March recorded a dismal 6% of respondents supportive of Truman‘s 
legislative program. Even among whites in non-southern states, only 21% of respondents voiced 




the program or no opinion on the matter. By a margin of 51% to 34%, white southerners believed 
Truman‘s administration had treated their region unfairly (Hamby 1995, 435).  
Opposition by Southern Democrats to Truman‘s civil rights program would eventually 
come to a full boiling point during Democratic Convention – one that ultimately spurred a 
splinter group of the party to form the States Rights Democratic Party, or Dixicrats as they 
became more commonly known. This party, and their eventual nominee, South Carolina 
Democrat Strom Thurmond, forced the White House to revisit its campaign strategy for southern 
states and treatment of the civil rights issue during the campaign in general. As a matter of fact, 
Truman did not deliver a major speech on civil rights until October 29 when he became the first 
Democratic presidential nominee to make a campaign speech in Harlem (Savage 1997, 123). The 
relative inattention to civil rights in speeches during 1948 is an indication not only of the delicate 
nature of the issue, but stands as a stark contrast to the more recent strategy of a series of a flurry 




   
A New Rhetorical Style for a New Rhetorical Strategy 
 Faced with declining public approval ratings, a recalcitrant Congress, a splintered party, 
and dim reelection prospects, Truman‘s advisors recognized the need to put the president on the 
offensive. They needed a strategy that would solidify his political base and raise doubts about the 
Republican Party in the minds of independent voters.  It was also increasingly clear that the 
president needed new mechanisms for connecting with American people – mechanisms that 
                                                 
35
 It is worth noting that by the end of the campaign, Truman‘s awkward inattention to civil rights during the 
campaign was credited with the return of some southern Democrats to the Democratic Party fold during Truman‘s 




would likely require recalibration on the part of staffers, the Democratic Party apparatus, and the 
president himself. 
 In 1947, a group of key White House aides met regularly on Monday evenings in the 
apartment of DNC vice chairman Oscar Ewing to strategize ways in which the administration‘s 
agenda could be effectively furthered. In the summer of 1947, the Monday Night Group – as this 
collection of individuals would be called – reviewed a document generated by former FDR 
administrative assistant, James Rowe, Jr. ―The Politics of 1948‖ outlined a strategy to engage 
Truman‘s core constituencies:  labor unions, western progressives, and African Americans.  
As the Monday Night Group saw it, the initial delivery vehicle to execute Rowe‘s 
strategy would be a pre-convention tour in which the president would put the Republican-
controlled 80
th
 Congress on the defensive on policies such as affordable housing, farm subsidies, 
civil rights and tax policy (Karabell 2000).  Rowe acknowledged that this line of attack 
particularly where civil rights was concerned, would potentially alienate voters in the South. As 
documented in the prior section of this chapter, while Rowe‘s instincts were correct, the severity 
of the response was greatly miscalculated.  
Despite the potential political fallout, The Monday Night Group felt this strategy was a 
good fit not only for current political needs (more direct challenges to the GOP-controlled 
Congress, more direct public exposure for Truman), but was also in line with the president‘s 
perceived strengths – namely his plain spoken style and ability to establish a personal connection 
with the average American citizen (Savage 1997, 115).  Not unusually, some staffers in the 
Truman White House attributed the president‘s poor approval ratings to ineffective 
communication rather than deficiencies in the substance of policies (Towle 2004, 41). The 




the American public. A structure that placed Truman in close contact with the people, therefore, 
was absolutely essential in the minds of most key strategists, including William Batt, Jr., the 
director of the DNC‘s newly created Research Division.36 
 Armed with what advisors believed would be the booster shot the campaign needed, the 
question became one of timing and logistical development. An invitation from the president of 
the University of California at Berkeley to deliver the spring 1948 commencement address 
served as the convenient excuse for the formation of a trip the president would make to the west 
coast that June (Karabell 2000). Airplane travel, while still underdeveloped by modern standards, 
was a feasible option for the trip. However, the use of this mode of transportation would have 
resulted in disproportionate attention to larger cities and, accordingly, increased difficulty in 
attending to issue areas such as farming and reclamation that the president wanted to emphasize. 
 Although it would be a greater logistical challenge and test of endurance for the White 
House staff as well as the president, the advantages of a cross-country train trip became 
increasingly clear.  A train would allow for more exposure to smaller cities and towns that were 
better matches for the message and the messenger.  
Key advisors from both the White House and DNC believed a more informal, off-the-cuff 
speaking style would be a better fit for the president, particularly when he was delivering minor 
addresses.
37
 Throughout the first three years of his presidency, however, Truman had not been 
encouraged to experiment with such a style. In part, the thought had been that more formal 
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addresses discouraged spontaneous deviations from a honed message and, therefore, left fewer 
openings for criticism from opportunistic political opponents or a watchful press.  
Given the president‘s upcoming cross-country tour, advisors targeted an April 1948 
speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors as a prime opportunity to experiment with 
a more extemporaneous style. Truman‘s performance and audience response were clear 
indications to both the staff and the president, that this new model had substantial merit and 
would indeed be an ideal fit for the planned train tour of western states.
38
 ―The great virtue of the 
new speaking style,‖ writes Hamby, ―was that it allowed Truman to be himself, a usually genial 
Mr. Everyman speaking plain, unaffected English, the words flowing from the heart‖ (1995, 
440).  Elaborating further, Ferrell comments that when Truman spoke in this manner, ―what he 
said took on immediate urgency and, especially, partook of the Truman personality, which was 
direct, interested, concerned, and filled with information. . .‖ (2003, 278).  
 With the dominant rhetorical style for the trip established, the staff could now devote 
more attention to content. White House staffers, particularly Clark Clifford, would have ultimate 
control of the speech outlines and managed the collection of relevant policy information while 
the DNC‘s Research Division provided background information about each of the stops along 
the route, including the leading policy needs of the local community and notable historical facts 
and key local politicians.
39
 This background information allowed the staff to tailor Truman‘s 
notes to the nuances of the specific locale (Savage 1997).  Karabell maintains that this level of 
coordination ―created the first modern campaign team that systematically obtained, analyzed, 
and collated information on the total spectrum of issues and personalities. This meant that 
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Truman could react to developments, produce a speech, or take a stand on an issue with the 
benefit of intensive prior research and information‖ (Karabell 2000, 40).  ―Local residents,‖ 
recalled Hechler, ―gaped in surprise because their distinguished visitor seemed to know a great 
deal about their town . . . at every stop, he left the people prouder of themselves and their 
community and injected adrenaline into the local Democrats, at the same time he was hammering 
home his repeated theme of the failures of the Republican Eightieth Congress and the consistent 
record of the Democrats on behalf of average people‖ (1982, 94).  
The ―speech‖ itself really consisted of a brief outline. ―Sometimes it was only a few 
rough pencil notes,‖ comments Truman aide Ken Hechler, ―which I wrote early in the morning 
and handed to the President before most of the people on the train had gotten up‖ (Hechler 1982, 
71). The staff ensured each speech during the course of a day was unique, creating a constant 
flow of new material for the press (Elsey 2005, 167). With very few exceptions, the speeches did 




To allow the messenger (Truman) to convey the message in the style envisioned by the 
White House (frequent stops, direct exposure to citizens), the setup of the president‘s train, the 
Ferdinand Magellan, was central to the success of this enterprising tour. Well-equipped with a 
private suite (including shower), private dining room and lounge area, the train‘s rear platform 
contained speakers that were permanently attached. So, when the train pulled into a stop, little if 
any setup was needed for the president and local dignitaries to deliver remarks (Karabell 2000, 
McCullough 1992).  Dallek maintains that the rear platform configuration, which included room 
for local VIPs to stand with the president, made Truman ―seem less like a remote Washington 
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figure than an associate of each town‘s local officials‖ (2008, 78).  ―Anybody who had the desire 
to see the president had a chance to do so at any street corner,‖ recalled Hechler (2000, 71). 
―Many of them, in turn,‖ writes Dallek, ―saw someone who might be running a local bank or 
small business: decent, respected, well traveled, but not much different from themselves‖ (2008, 
79).  
Truman reveled in the spirit of the tour.  He loved the ability to speak to Americans in 
their unique communities. During the first stop of the June trip in Crestline, Ohio, Truman 
lamented, ―The president, you know, is virtually in jail . . . when you get out and see people and 
find out what people are thinking about, you can do a better job. . .‖41 At each stop, comments 
Karabell, ―a higher percentage of the local populace came out to hear Truman than had ever 
come out for any politician. Thousands trekked, drove, or hitched to meet the president.‖ (2000, 
134). In Los Angeles, an estimated crowd of one million gathered along the tracks between the 
station and the Ambassador Hotel (Karabell 2000, 136). Goldzwig writes, ―Audiences were 
warming to the president‘s easy manner and homespun chit-chat. These kinds of exchanges were 
fast becoming an endearing ingredient that people assembled at the next stop seemed to 
anticipate with relish‖ (2008, 32). 
Ironically, it was Truman‘s archrival in Congress, Senator Robert Taft (R-OH), who 
provided the president‘s trip and future train tours with its signature name that remains to this 
day. Shortly into the trip, Taft joked that Truman was ―lambasting Congress at all kinds of 
whistle-stops across the country‖ (Miller 1985, 255).  As Truman aide George Elsey explains, 
―A ‗whistle station‘ signified a town so small that a train would stop to discharge a passenger 
only if the train conductor signaled to the engineer that a stop was necessary‖ (2005, 167). 
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Therefore, Taft‘s comments were intended and viewed as derogatory, playing right into 
Truman‘s hands. Elsey continues, ―Truman intended to emphasize small cities, towns and rural 
communities throughout the campaign. Taft had handed him a useful political slogan‖ (2005, 
167).  
All told, the June trip took 15 days (June 3-18) and covered 9,545 miles during which the 
president delivered 76 speeches, only six of which could be classified as ―major‖ by modern 
standards.
42
 Across the route the crowds were large, contained a mixture of average Americans 
from different walks of life and clearly un-orchestrated. While towns along the route had clearly 
made preparations for the president‘s visit and notable local dignitaries were given greater 
personal access to Truman, these were not speeches confined to audiences of the party faithful.  
The June trip, writes Karabell, ―put him in touch with the public, or at the very least with a wider 
range of people than he tended to encounter in Washington‖ (2000, 129). A little more than 
midway through the trip, the New York Times made a similar acknowledgement when they 
reported, ―The word from political leaders to the official party on the train is that the president is 
making a hit . . . President Truman set out on his long trip to allow as many people as possible to 
see and hear him. He is doing that with good results.‖43 
Republicans and the press were equally skeptical of the administration‘s claim that this 
was a non-political trip – and they were right; the trip was very political in many respects. 
Reporters were also swift to expose any missteps by presidential staffers and instances where 
crowds did not meet with expectations as they clearly didn‘t in Omaha on June 6 when Truman 
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spoke before an estimated 8,000 empty seats in a 10,000 seat auditorium.
44
  ―But whatever the 
impression of fumble and stumble,‖ writes Hamby, ―shrewd observers realized that the president 
was peddling ideas with his personality and that, although he still had an uphill fight, the 
combination had electoral potential‖ (Hamby 1995, 444). 
 Shortly after the conclusion of the western trip, it was clear to the Truman campaign that 
a Whistle-Stop tour had more than ―electoral potential‖ – it was the best recipe for electoral 
success. The conception of a fall train trip from September 17 through October 2 in which 
Truman would eventually deliver 135 speeches over 8,600 miles was summarized in an August 
1948 memo authored by Clark Clifford. In addition to continued emphasis on issues stressed 
during the campaign, Clifford‘s memo called for specific attention to labor and economic issues 
that would help with key voting blocs, specifically the labor unions. Specifically, the president 
should remind voters of his commitment to labor by his veto of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and 
the Republican-controlled Congress‘s role in overriding his veto. Second, the president should 
hammer away at the challenges the 80
th
 Congress was having in their efforts to combat inflation. 
Truman should do so, the memo stressed, by drawing parallels with Republican Party 
stewardship at the outset of the Great Depression.
45
 The tour, notes Savage, was also seen as a 
way to ―circumvent the mostly pro-Republican major newspapers and enable Truman to 
communicate directly to the public‖ (1997, 132).  
Contrary to public lore about Truman‘s disdain for public opinion polls, it is also worth 
noting that the Truman White House did use such polling to craft their message. In a well-
documented revisionary account, Rottinghaus (2003) finds evidence of instances where polling 
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data resulted in the adaptation of rhetorical strategies and the development of campaign 
strategies in 1948.  Documents from various collections in the Truman Library I reviewed 
confirm that staffers paid attention to surveys about the president‘s performance in major 
addresses, the use of radio addresses and audience share from televised or broadcast (radio) 
addresses, particularly during his last four years in office.
46
 
In the 1948 campaign, the White House staff carefully targeted key swing states from the 
1944 election that comprised 274 Electoral College votes. Eleven of the states had been captured 
by Democrats and six by Republicans, but all within a margin of just under 2%. Nine of the 
states were in the Midwest or West.
47
 Major speeches would be scheduled in the largest cities, 
including Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco.
48
 At the same time, many of the stops were 
located in states that could hardly be called favorable electoral territory. Iowa was a prime 
example of the latter. The governor, both U.S. senators and all eight representatives in the House 
were Republicans. In the 1944 presidential election it was Dewey, not FDR, who carried the 
Hawkeye State (McCullough 1992, 658).   
While the focus of this trip was reelection, the strategy was similar to the June trip – 
allow the president to make his case directly to the people (McCullough 1992, 655). Again, 
Truman achieved this in grand fashion. The crowds that gathered at the train stops ranged from 
the hundreds to the hundreds of thousands and represented a cross-section of the population. New 
York Times reporter W.H. Lawrence wrote, ―Back-platform crowds at wayside stops were 
notably friendly and appeared to represent a good cross-section of the communities in which they 
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live. At most stops large parking fields filled with automobiles indicated that many had driven in 
from the surrounding area to see and hear him [Truman].‖49  While nearly impossible to identify 
the motivation of those who attended the president‘s addresses in these towns, Lawrence, for 
one, believed that ―when they turn out in the early hours of the morning at small railroad centers 
it can be assumed that they are interested in the message of the candidate.‖50 McCullough 
provides a vivid description of a typical stop: 
The crowds would be gathered at station stops often from early morning, waiting 
for him to arrive. Men and boys perched on rooftops and nearby signal towers for 
a better view. . . His train would ease into the station as the band blared, the 
crowd cheered. Then, accompanied by three or four local politicians – usually a 
candidate for Congress or state party chairman who had boarded the train at a 
prior stop – Truman would step from behind the blue velvet curtain onto the 
platform, and the crowd, large or small, would cheer even more (1992, 665).  
 
 Truman‘s newfound rhetorical style was clearly well-suited for these brief speeches to 
general audiences gathered at the rear of a train platform.  ―During the campaign,‖ writes Ferrell, 
―Truman, who for years had been a distressingly poor speaker, turned into an orator. . . the 
Republicans did not know how to respond to Truman‘s tactics –his mixture of truth and 
hyperbole delivered with evangelical enthusiasm that excited his audiences‖ (2003, 73). As 
DCCC director, Victor Harding commented to one reporter, ―Truman talked grass roots language 
to grass roots people. Dewey never caught the language on the level on which the people were 
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talking‖ (cited in Savage 1997, 130).  ―He loved meeting people and chatting with them, writes 
Karabell. ―He loved freewheeling speeches, and he loved the feeling of connection to the land, to 
the people, to the issues that he cared about, to the crops soon to be harvested, and to the towns 
and cities and the counties that he passed through‖ (2000, 217).  
Presidential aide Ken Hechler, reflecting on the 1948 trips, remained amazed years later 
at the stamina the president displayed while delivering up to 15 speeches a day, chatting with 
local dignitaries who often traveled with the president to the next stop and meeting with staff 
members about the next day‘s itinerary (Thompson 1984, 63). Days started as early as six in the 
morning and concluded as late as ten in the evening most days.
51
  
Before the end of the campaign, Truman would make two more train tours. Between 
October 10 and 16, he would deliver 46 speeches over 3,556 miles and between October 24 and 
November 1, he would cover another 2,534 miles making 49 speeches along the way.  All told, 
Truman traveled a total of 31,739 miles spread over 29 states, and made 355 speeches in a few 
months in 1948.
52
 Despite the large crowds and even some reluctant credit from skeptical 
journalists, Truman was still considered the decided underdog in the pending election (Karabell 
2000, 137). However, in one of the most stunning upsets in the history of presidential elections, 
Truman emerged victorious by more than two million popular votes and an Electoral College 
margin of 303 to 189. His victory also contained coattails as Democrats regained control of both 
the Senate and the House.
53
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Scholars who have poured over archival records of the Whistle-Stop tours and Truman 
staffers who‘ve reflected on their first-hand experience acknowledge that what occurred could 
never truly be replicated. The modern media has all but rendered this impossible. Without 
network and cable television cameras, webcasts and blogs that could immediately transmit his 
exact words, Truman was afforded the luxury of the slight exaggeration or mischaracterization of 
the record or the harsh criticism of the opposition without concern that even a miniscule 
percentage of the American people would ever hear about the infraction (Karabell 2000, 213).  
Elsey, for one, was convinced that modern television would have favorably distinguished Dewey 
as the more eloquent communicator and thus more polished candidate (2005, 171).  
Truman‘s campaign rhetoric also differed notably from that of more modern presidents. 
A number of studies have pointed to an increased effort on the part of modern presidents to use 
rhetoric that distances themselves from the political party establishment (Coleman and Manna 
2007; Kernell 1986; Hart 1987; Tulis 1987; Rottinghaus 2006; Hinckely 1990; Lim 2002; 
Whittington 1997), even during political campaigns (Heith 2000). Truman‘s rhetoric during the 
Whistle-Stop tours left little distance between him and the Democratic Party. There were no 
grand efforts to unite the country or introduce a new style of governing if elected. As Karabell 
eloquently describes, ―Truman did not offer poetic rhetoric . . . he did not talk of grand 
philosophical themes . . . and he did not dwell on lofty ideas . . . it was a campaign waged on 
small themes worked out in brief speeches. It was a campaign of plain speaking. And it was a 







“Going Local” Beyond the Reelection Campaign 
 With the election won, the style of local addresses used during the campaign would not 
disappear. The familiar Whistle-Stop design would be used again over the next four years, 
primarily during the forthcoming midterm (1950) and presidential (1952) election years. The 
challenge became how the president would shift gears from local addresses delivered as a 
presidential candidate to local addresses delivered as a president promoting his party and 
policies. In 1949, for instance, after the president‘s Labor Day speeches in Pittsburgh and Des 
Moines, the Washington Star commented that the speeches did not ―bear the mark of 
statesmanship. In the main, they were political speeches, drafted in a spirit of extreme 
partisanship.‖54 
In the early spring of 1950, the heightened approval ratings that accompanied his 
stunning 1948 election had long since disappeared. Truman‘s ratings hovered in the mid to upper 
30s. The president once again went public by ―going local‖ in the manner that had been so 
effective two years earlier. Billed by the White House as a non-political trip (the similar name 
having been attached to the June 1948 trip), Truman embarked on a 10 day trip that took him 
through eight states identified as crucial to the Democratic party‘s success in the midterm 
elections.
55
  However, much like the 1948 tours, the president faced a skeptical press. At least 
one news outlet responded that ―this polite fiction is fooling no one who realizes the President‘s 
intense interest in bolstering the Fair Deal majority in the Senate and House.‖56 
While cynical about the advertised purpose of the trip, the press eventually had no choice 
but to recognize Truman‘s ability to generate substantial crowds. New York Times reporter 
                                                 
54
 ―Labor Day Speeches,‖ Washington Star, September 9, 1949. 
55
 ―Political Preview – Truman‘s Trip and Twelve Key States,‖ New York Times, April 16, 1950. The states covered 
by the trip were Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington and Wisconsin. 
56




Cabell Phillips commented, ―While reactions in Congress often tend to belie the existence of any 
such personal power by the President, there is indisputable proof that it still exists in substantial 
measure among the people at the nation‘s whistle stops.‖57 Previewing the first speech on the 
stop in Lincoln, Nebraska, the Washington Post conceded, ―Anyone who looks realistically at the 
political picture must acknowledge that this will be powerful medicine. It is calculated to appeal 
directly to thousands upon thousands of farm families beginning to feel nervous about drought 
and blowing dust.‖58  
The major speeches would center on farm programs, conservation and reclamation, small 
business, labor and social legislation in addition for foreign policy and world trade.
59
 Topics for 
the minor speeches were selected in order to cover the administration‘s leading domestic 
initiatives in many of these areas, but with localized examples.
60
 Background research support 
was largely supplied by the Departments of Interior, Agriculture and Labor to ensure that 
Truman was equipped with information on the federal projects in and around the towns as well 
as information on local economic and political conditions.
61
 Speech outlines consisted of three 
main sections: a greeting to the local community; the main policy focus of the speech, including 
direct tie-ins with local concerns; a conclusion that summarized the New Deal program and/or 
articulated the president‘s commitment to preserving peace in the international community. The 
focus on peace was usually reserved for the final speech of the day.
62
  
Primary source documents show how invaluable state and local officials were when it 
came to advice on how to maximize the connection with audiences at each stop. One prominent 
                                                 
57
 Cabell Phillips, ―Truman‘s Tour Opens Battle of ‘50 and ‘52,‖ New York Times, April 15, 1950. 
58
 Marquis Childs, ―Truman and the Drought, Washington Post, May 2, 1950. 
59
 George M. Elsey, Memorandum for the President, April 25, 1950, Box 43, Whistle-Stop, Master Copies, Elsey 
Papers, Truman Library. 
60
 Analysis of Northwest Trip, May 1950, Box 39, President‘s Western Trip, Elsey Papers, Truman Library. 
61
 Analysis of Northwest Trip, May 1950, Box 39, President‘s Western Trip, Elsey Papers, Truman Library. 
62




example is the assessment Wyoming Senator Lester Hunt provided on the tradeoffs between a 
stop in Cheyenne and Laramie.  Hunt advocated Laramie because of the presence of the 
University of Wyoming student body, through which he maintained the president could 
effectively ―reach every section of the state.‖63  Similarly, for a stop in Idaho, a local organizer 
described how she had formed a committee of three individuals that ―represent every type of 
citizen in Idaho‖ who ―would in turn contact all civic organizations, lodges and schools, with the 
thought in mind of having as many people as possible participate.‖ She conveyed that ―schools 
and business firms would close in order that all would be given an opportunity to see the 
President.‖64 
Evaluations of the 1950 trip by White House staffers and external evaluations in the form 
of news stories concurred that the trip was the most successfully planned and executed trip of 
Truman‘s presidency.65 Crowds were large along the route whether in small towns or large cities. 
As in 1948, the president was not merely preaching to the faithful, he was speaking to a much 
more diverse public. An estimated 20,000 welcomed the president in Pendleton, Oregon.
66
  In 
Fargo, close to 35,000 people packed in around the president‘s train (Hechler 143). In Chicago, 
22,000 squeezed into Chicago Stadium and parade route crowds in the Windy City were 
projected as high as 450,000.
67
 The bulk of the press coverage was largely favorable, particularly 
that generated by local media outlets, a finding consistent with more recent research on 
presidential press coverage (Barrett and Peake 2007). Reflecting on the news coverage Truman 
received throughout 1950, U.S. News and World Report noted, ―A visit by the president is top 
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news in any state. What he says and does commands headlines and gets public attention. And it 
puts new enthusiasm into party workers.
68
 
Electorally, the train tours did not generate the same political magic for Democratic 
congressional candidates as they did in 1948. Consistent with the six-year itch thesis, the party 
suffered a net loss of seats.
69
  The results did not serve as a deterrent two years later when the 
Ferdinand Magellan would once again be called into campaign mode. This time, however, it 
would be carrying a president who‘d forgone a reelection bid but was still intent on giving 
Republicans ―hell‖ on his way out the door. Truman would take the party‘s case directly to the 
people in his unique style of ―going local.‖  
The president made three major Whistle-Stop tours in 1952, a two-week trek through 
western states in September, a mid-October venture through the portions of the Northeast and a 
concluding push through the Midwest culminating in a rousing speech at Kiel Auditorium in St. 
Louis. Collectively, the president traveled 17,000 miles through 24 states delivering more than 
200 speeches (Hamby 1995, 613). While some locations drew smaller crowds compared to 1948 
and 1950 expectations, others were on par with 1948 totals (Hechler 1982, 268). At some stops, 
particularly in the Northeast, Truman outdrew the Republican presidential candidate, General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (McCullough 1992, 910).  ―The crowds and the ‗give-em-hell‘ cries were 
ample,‖ writes Hamby. ―The pace was grueling, but the president loved the experience of being 
away from Washington, talking to real Americans, and being removed from the day-to-day 
burdens of governing‖ (1995, 613). ―As so often before,‖ comments McCullough, ―the grueling 
business of a campaign seemed to restore and enliven him‖ (1992, 909).  
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Truman‘s last hurrah with the American people would also mark the end of a special 
form of engagement with the American people, the likes of which we will never see again, at 
least not with the intensity of 1948, 1950 and 1952. A comparison of Truman and the 1952 
Democratic nominee, Adlai Stevenson, serves as useful contrast of the Truman and post-Truman 
styles. Truman took to the railways while Stevenson took to the air – the default mode for future 
presidents and presidential hopefuls save some more minor bus excursions by recent candidates. 
Rhetorically, Truman still opted for the extemporaneous remarks that allowed him to establish 
more personal connections with the immediate audience.   Stevenson was the more polished 
formal speaker (McCullough 1992, 908) – the kind that would be required of presidents in the 
era of television and the new media age (Cohen 2008). ―Going local,‖ campaign season or not, 
would look much different in future administrations.   
 
Conclusions 
Since the mid 1970s, presidents have been delivering more speeches to audiences located 
outside of Washington, D.C. This classification of speeches accounts for a significant percentage 
of the growth in the total number of speeches delivered by presidents. While these minor 
addresses cannot approximate the listening audience of a nationally televised address, even in an 
era of declining audiences (Baum and Kernell 1999), the ability to see the orator in person 
provides the opportunity for a speaker-receiver dynamic that cannot be captured via television, 
radio, or the Internet. Therefore, in many respects, a speech in a city outside the Beltway holds 
the greatest promise for engaging the public. Such expectation is most likely to be realized, 
though, only if the audience attending the address is really ―public.‖ Party loyalists who have 




audience that is representative of the diversity of views and interests held by the American 
people. 
Our most recent presidents speak to audiences in American cities comprised of 
individuals that have not been hand-picked by campaign strategists or are required to be card-
carrying members of the president‘s party to gain admittance. But they do so with significantly 
less frequency than their predecessors at the outset of the modern presidency. As the quantitative 
and qualitative evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates, no modern president engaged 
the ―public‖ in speeches outside of Washington more frequently than Harry Truman.  
 The Truman White House wanted to put the boss in as direct physical contact with the 
American people as possible. When Truman went ―public,‖ he really did so in the purest sense of 
the word. The open access to most of Truman‘s local speeches created an environment that 
would have made other presidents and presidential strategists cringe. The factors that allowed 
Truman to go local in this manner, however, are nearly impossible for future presidents to 
replicate.  
First, Truman‘s rhetorical skills and populist message tailored to the specific community 
(Goldzwig 2008) were perfect matches for more informal minor addresses, particularly in a 
string of smaller towns that were not accustomed to direct exposure to the nation‘s chief 
executive. Second, while air travel was certainly feasible, it was far from the dominant mode of 
travel for either most Americans or the president. Hence, there was still something quite natural 
about a president speaking to individuals gathered around the rear of the train – a setting that 
both scholars and presidential aides have verified made Truman even more accessible to his 
audience. ―Truman‘s rhetorical legacy,‖ writes Goldzwig, ―is one that may not translate well in 




But Truman may yet have a few lessons for the sophisticated postmodern politician. At the very 
least, a focus on his campaign teaches us that there is no substitute for old-fashioned human 
contact‖ (2008, 123).  
Third, the nature of media coverage has changed dramatically. While the president‘s 
statements were recorded, and journalists filed stories that eventually received more national 
exposure, for the vast majority of speeches delivered during these tours, there was no 
instantaneous national reporting. Both the remarks and the reporting were quite localized in this 
respect, providing Truman with rhetorical leeway not afforded to presidents of either the ―golden 
age of television‖ (Baum and Kernell 1999) or those of the new media age of cable/satellite and 
the Internet (Cohen 2008). Fourth, the modern demands of campaign finance discourage frequent 
appearances in which there is no admittance fee. The ability of the 2008 Obama campaign to 
attract large numbers of smaller denomination contributors offers evidence  that there may be 
alternatives to the $1,000(or more) dinners, but it remains to be seen if other candidates will be 
able to broaden the base of donors sufficiently to rely on smaller donations. The Truman case 
serves as a useful contrast to more recent uses of presidential addresses in one other important 
respect. Truman‘s minor addresses to these non-selective audiences in American cities were 
concentrated in election years (Figure 3.9). Future presidents, particularly our most recent 
leaders, have made more frequent use of minor addresses outside of Washington during all years 
of their administrations – a level of activity that has been characterized as the permanent 
campaign. One could argue that more frequent exposure to the American people provides helpful 
opportunities for presidents to serve as educators who elevate the nature of policy discourse. But, 
if presidents are largely preaching to the converted or making rhetorical appeals to nonaligned 




2001), how can they effectively fulfill this role?  While I take up such normative considerations 
in the final chapter, I turn my immediate attention to a consideration of the conditions under 
which presidents employ the use of minor addresses, particularly addresses to selective local 
audiences.  











Table 3.1  Volume of Speeches Delivered, by President (Truman – G.W. Bush, 2004) 
President Total Years Months  Yearly  Monthly 
       Average Average 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Truman       1407 7.33 87.96  191.95  16.00 
Eisenhower   933 8.00 96.00  116.63  9.72 
Kennedy      771 2.92 35.04  264.04  22.00 
Johnson      1633 5.08 60.96  321.46  26.79 
Nixon        1034 5.58 66.96  185.30  15.44 
Ford         1236 2.42 29.04  510.74  42.56 
Carter       1320 4.00 48.00  330.00  27.50 
Reagan       2696 8.00 96.00  337.00  28.08 
G.H.W. Bush       1843 4.00 48.00  460.75  38.40 
Clinton      4588 8.00 96.00  573.50  47.79 





































































































































































































CHAPTER 4    
CONTEXTUALIZING “GOING PUBLIC” 
 
 Data presented in prior chapters is consistent with the going public literature in two key 
respects. First, it is abundantly clear that as the modern presidency has progressed, speechmaking 
has become a larger component of presidential public activities. The four most recent occupants 
of the Oval Office, in particular, have delivered notably more speeches than their predecessors.
70
 
Second, the driving force behind this exponential growth is the class of speeches the literature 
defines as minor addresses – essentially all speeches that are not delivered to a national 
television or radio audience.  
 However, as the case study of Harry Truman‘s use of minor addresses in Chapter 3 
illustrates, the audiences for these minor addresses can vary widely. There is a notable distinction 
between minor speeches like the ones Harry Truman delivered from the rear platform of a train 
and those in hotel ballrooms by more recent presidents under increasing pressure to appease 
partisan loyalists and pad their campaign finance coffers. Truman‘s whistle-stop addresses could 
be attended by anyone capable of getting within earshot of the reach of the loudspeaker mounted 
to the last coach car – a slightly different crowd from the events that require attendees to meet 
certain organizational, political or financial designations. In this study, I have termed this latter 
audience type a "selective" audience and drawn a further distinction by identifying whether these 
speeches were delivered in the president‘s home turf of Washington, D.C. or in any other U.S. 
city (presumably, chosen on some strategic basis).  While presidents do still occasionally make 
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speeches to large groups of American citizens gathered in public places where their political 
handlers are unable to exercise ―crowd control,‖ such rhetorical moments are not the norm. The 
―public‖ side of going public is diminishing, or, at least, being increasingly filtered and qualified, 
as it becomes only a rather selective slice of the whole.  
 What remains to be explained is why presidents are speaking more frequently to these 
selective audiences and to what effect. While the normative implications of the increased 
attention to this audience type are reserved for the final chapter, the first question is now taken 
up more directly here and more thoroughly in the chapter immediately following. I begin by 
considering whether particular types of speeches occur more frequently under certain contexts.   
 Relevant scholarship on the use of presidential rhetoric points to presidential job approval 
ratings, national economic conditions, presidential election years, and the partisan composition 
of the executive and legislative branches as leading determinants of the volume and timing of 
presidential addresses (Brace and Hinckley 1992; Canes-Wrone 2001a; Cohen 2005, 2010; Duff 
and Gubala 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2010; Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary 2004; Hager and Sullivan 
1994; Hinckley 1990; Powell 1999; Ragsdale 1984; Smith 2000). Of these studies, however, 
only those by Brace and Hinckley (1992), Eshbaugh-Soha (2010), Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary 
(2004), Cohen (2005, 2010) and Powell (1999) attempt to explain the incidence of minor 
addresses. Of this subset, the only two to use monthly observations of minor addresses are by 
Eshbaugh-Soha (2010) and Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary (2004). Due to differences in the units of 
analysis (yearly vs. monthly data, major vs. minor speeches), time periods studied, and the time-
varying nature of explanatory variables included in the models, there is still no consensus about 




these studies directly considers the audiences of these minor addresses – a major distinction 
between these efforts and mine.
71
  
 Using audience type as the dependent variable, I perform a series of simple tests to 
compare speeches to different audiences under various conditions identified in the 
aforementioned literature (approval ratings, national economic conditions and partisan 
composition of the presidency and Congress, etc.). In each comparison, I start with the broad 
category of minor speeches and minor speeches delivered to domestic audiences outside of the 
Beltway. I then examine speeches to selective audiences in both the Washington, D.C. 
metropolitan area and U.S. cities. The final category of audience type is the selective local 
audience, the target for those speeches to invited or restricted audiences in U.S. cities other than 
Washington, D.C. Before I consider the extent to which levels of presidential approval, national 
economic conditions, types of partisan arrangements (divided vs. unified government, etc.) or 
reelection years influence presidential rhetorical strategies, I present a series of simple scatter 
plots of each speech type over time – displays which demonstrate trend and variance more 
effectively than other forms of graphical displays.  
 
Speeches to Audience Types over Time 
In Chapter 2, I documented the general linear increase in the frequency in certain 
categories of presidential speeches since 1945 through a series of line graphs and bar charts 
using years or entire presidencies as the unit of measurement.  While one can ascertain the trends 
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in speech types, the displays do not reveal the full extent of the variation present in the data.  At 
the end of this chapter, I present scatter plots of both yearly and monthly occurrences of four 
audience types (all minor speeches, minor domestic speeches, all selective speeches, and all 
selective local speeches) speech types both confirm this trend and highlight the variability 
present in the observations, including notable outliers.   
The broadest category is minor addresses, essentially comprising all presidential speeches 
except major addresses. The trends for these speeches delivered between 1945 and 2004 are 
displayed in Figures 4.1 (yearly) and 4.2 (monthly). Lowes lines in each figure accentuate the 
trends. In these first two snapshots, the yearly plots reveal a more pronounced linear increase 
(R
2




 In both plots, there is less variability in the 
frequency of speeches during the past two decades. Outliers from the Truman, Johnson, and Ford 
administrations are readily apparent, with the monthly data providing a better indication of the 
occasional bursts of minor addresses from the various administrations. Minor speeches delivered 
in domestic locations outside of Washington (Figures 4.3 and 4.4), while still increasing over 





 Greater variability and more notable increases over time can be seen in plots of selective 
speeches (Figures 4.5 and 4.6). As stated earlier, the main distinction for this speech type is 
access to the event. Selective speeches are ―closed‖ in the sense that the attendees are members 
of particular organizations hosting the event, including partisan organizations (e.g., DCCC, 
NRCC). Examples include speeches Bill Clinton made to the Democratic National Committee 
Saxophone Club and George W. Bush delivered to the Tax Relief Coalition. As Figure 4.5 
shows, this speeches to selective audiences increased in both frequency and variability over the 
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 A similar trend, although not quite as linear (R
2
=0.24), is visible 
in the plot of monthly occurrences of selective speeches in domestic locations outside of the 
Washington, D.C. area (Figures 4.7 and 4.8). Again, with the passage of time the variability in 
observations increases. In months surrounding the transition from the Clinton to George W. Bush 
administration (January 2001) for instance, monthly figures range from a handful of selective 
local speeches to more than 30 in a given month.  
These visual representations reinforce that recent presidents have both given more minor 
speeches and are targeting more speeches outside of Washington to narrower audiences. What 
isn‘t as clear yet is whether the frequency of such speeches across all administrations is affected 
by certain conditions such as national economic conditions or the president‘s own popularity 
rather than larger transformations in the president‘s relationship with the public or the 
idiosyncratic, strategic choices of individual presidents. The next sections of this chapter, 
therefore, take a closer look at speechmaking under various conditions, starting with the partisan 
composition of the executive and legislative branches.  
 
Partisan Composition of the Executive and Legislative Branches 
Before examining the frequency of different speech types under various partisan 
alignments, some brief discussion of the motivation for going public under such conditions is in 
order.  Canes-Wrone (2001b) and Cohen (2005) present two of the most formal and compelling 
arguments about the president‘s calculus concerning the use of public appeals and legislative 
strategies.  Canes-Wrone maintains that presidents consider the relationship between their policy 
position, the median member of Congress, the median member of the public and the status quo.  
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When the public and Congress are more closely aligned and the president prefers the status quo, 
he is more likely to adopt a strategy more akin to traditional bargaining, foregoing the more 
highly visible public appeals.   
Along somewhat similar lines, Cohen reasons that national and narrow appeals are 
mutually exclusive strategies. Presidents, he maintains, will select the one that holds the greater 
likelihood for influencing congressional behavior in the desired direction. This selection, 
according to Cohen, is determined by the extent to which the president believes he can activate 
the constituency (either national or narrow) that Congress will be most receptive to. 
In terms of actual activity, Hart‘s original analysis of presidential speeches delivered 
between 1945 and 1982 demonstrated a stark contrast between numbers of speeches delivered 
outside Washington during periods of unified government versus during divided government. 
When the president‘s party also controlled Congress, presidents delivered 24 percent of all 
speeches outside of the Beltway. When the opposition party controlled Congress, this figure 
jumps to 37 percent. As Hart put it, ―presidents head for the hills – the Black Hills of North 
Dakota, the Hill Country of Texas, the foothills of Colorado – when they are frustrated by 
congressional behavior. . .‖ (1987, 83).  
Powell (1999), looking at speeches, both inside and outside of Washington, found no 
indications that divided government altered the level of activity. Hager and Sullivan (1994), 
while using political activities as the unit of measurement, found that divided government 
actually depressed the frequency of presidential public activities.  Barrett (2005), meanwhile, 
found that presidents went public frequently on only a few legislative proposals, most of these 
being their own schemes, that they promoted with equivalent activity regardless of the partisan 




Barrett finds a ―strong statistically significant, positive relationship between the number of 
presidential remarks per month and presidential legislative success‖ (2004, 355).  
In this same study, divided government also emerges as a statistically significant 
influence on the likelihood of presidential public appeals concerning presidential, as opposed to 
congressional initiatives. However, among congressional initiatives supported by the president, 
divided government is not significant.  As Barrett explains, this outcome is logical because 
―When the president supports a congressional initiative, the presence of divided government, in 
effect, becomes irrelevant because the president no longer represents a final obstacle in the 
lawmaking process that needs to be overcome‖ (2004, 359).   
 As a further consideration of such findings, I provide simple bivariate tests of presidential 
speechmaking activity under different partisan alignments. I start with the most commonly used 
measure of the partisan makeup of the executive and legislative branches, the unified/divided 
government dichotomy. Given the speech types I am considering, I would expect more minor 
addresses (both overall and those delivered in U.S. cities) during periods with partisan alignment 
(unified government).  The hypotheses for the frequency of selective speeches and selective local 
speeches (those delivered in U.S. cities outside of Washington) however, could take a couple of 
different forms. Faced with a recalcitrant Congress, a president might conclude that the only 
reasonable strategy to pursue is to close ranks by shoring up his partisan base through a series of 
selective appeals. Under slightly different conditions (but still under divided government), the 
president might view a series of speeches to selective audiences as more harmful than helpful, 
particularly if there is a possibility he could gain the support of more moderate legislators.  
As Table 4.1 shows, while higher levels of speechmaking activity are recorded under 




for all selective addresses and selective addresses delivered outside of Washington, D.C.  The 
differences for minor domestic speeches, while consistent with the expectations of the going 
public thesis, fails to achieve standard levels of statistical significance by the narrowest of 
margins (p=.057).  The differences for all selective and selective local speeches, while 
significant, are more problematic to interpret given a simple divided vs. unified classification 
incapable of capturing other partisan nuances that may exist in executive-legislative relations. 
The implication of the data, on face value, is that as presidents face a more challenging 
legislative environment (control of at least one chamber of Congress by the opposite party); they 
deliver addresses to more narrowly tailored audiences with greater frequency. Given such 
uncertainty, I construct two additional measures of partisan alignment and conduct appropriate 
tests to determine whether they constitute an improvement over the standard dichotomy.  
 The first measure, Partisan Alignment, considers the full complement of partisan 
arrangements that are possible in any executive-bicameral legislative governing structure. With 
two legislative chambers and a single executive, eight permutations are possible: Republican 
president, Republican Senate, Republican House (RRR); Republican president, Republican 
Senate, Democratic House (RRD), etc.  During the period under investigation, all but the DRD 
and DDR arrangements have occurred. Table 4.2 shows the frequency and years of these partisan 
arrangements between 1945 and 2004. Split partisan arrangements have occurred during 36 years 
(59.5% of all years), with the RDD arrangement constituting 22 of these years. The unified 
government arrangement has occurred 40.5% of the time, with the DDD arrangement comprising 
33.1% of the total.  Clearly, much of what we know about the effects of unified and divided 
government is based on unified Democratic government and divided government under a 




The second alternate measure, Partisan Control, is a three-category measure of whether it 
is only the White House, the White House and one chamber of Congress or the White House and 
both chambers of Congress that are controlled by the same party. This measure combines certain 
types of partisan alignments by pooling across party and ignoring the House/Senate distinction in 
favor of simply counting chambers.
74
  It is useful to determine whether this more nuanced 
treatment of divided-government creates better fit in models of speech-making activity than the 
traditional dichotomous variable for divided/unified government. To make this determination, I 
compare the models with an F-test (Gujarati 1995, 258).  The test is appropriate whenever one 
model in the comparison can be formed by imposing constraints on the other model. The test 
statistic is then formed from measures of fit for the unconstrained and constrained models, and 
follows an F distribution with degrees of freedom corresponding to number of constraints 
required to convert one model to the other (numerator) and overall degrees of freedom in the 
unconstrained version (denominator): 
    
    
    
    
   
       
 
where     
  is the    of the unrestricted regression and   
  is the    of the restricted regression, 
m equals the degrees of freedom in the constrained model (or number of regressors omitted from 
the model), n is the number of observations in the respective models and n-k is the degrees of 
freedom in the unconstrained model.  If the computed F exceeds the critical value of F, then the 
null hypothesis of equal effects can be rejected. In my present example, the simple divided 
government model is 
y = b0 + b1 (divided government) + e      (1) 
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In addition, a model using the three-category variable is  
 y = c0 + c1(presidency and one chamber) + c2(presidency only) + e(2) 
In my instance, the constraint that produces (1) from (2) is c1=c2, since the conditions 
"presidency and one chamber" and "presidency only" are a partition of "divided government". 
After performing F-tests for each of the dependent variables (all minor speeches, minor domestic 
speeches, all selective speeches and selective local speeches), the computed F was not significant 
at either 0.05 or 0.10 level (Table 4.3).  
 Inspection of the mean number of monthly speeches by the partisan alignment coding, 
shown in Table 4.4, reveals outcomes that are both consistent with and contradict expected 
outcomes based on the going public thesis. Looking at the category of minor addresses, the 
largest monthly means do occur under divided government (RDR, DRR), but the lowest total, 19 
speeches per month, also occurs under divided government. More inconclusive results occur 
under the minor domestic heading, with the lowest monthly average occurring under conditions 
of divided government (RRD), but the second lowest total occurring under unified government 
(DDD). More consistent outcomes can be found under the last two categories. The lowest 
monthly averages for selective speeches occur during unified government (Republican = 8.55, 
Democratic = 9.54), suggesting that when presidents have a more favorable legislative 
environment they are less likely to spend time preaching to the choir. Two of the lower monthly 
totals for selective local speeches also occur under these partisan arrangements. However, given 
the totals that occur under conditions short of complete control, it is not possible to attribute the 
lower totals to partisan unity.  
 As one further test of the influence of partisan control, I also create a variable for 




statistically significant differences appear in the category of selective local speeches (p<.001), 
followed by all selective speeches (p=.001) and minor domestic speeches (p<.05). Differences in 
the category of all minor speeches were not statistically significant (p=.038). In this comparison, 
the outcomes are consistent with expectations. Presidents are more active rhetorically when they 
face a Congress where the opposition controls both the House and the Senate. Returning to Table 
4.4, however, a similar outcome is not apparent.  
  
Election Year Influence 
 Theoretically, a presidential election year should spur overall higher volumes of 
speechmaking activity. If a president is running for re-election, he will certainly be traversing the 
country in an attempt to convince voters of his worthiness to serve another four years in office. 
Minor speeches as well as speeches to selective audiences to shore up their partisan base and 
improve their campaign finance situation, should both occur more frequently. Even if a president 
is not running for reelection, we might still expect more presidential speeches in an attempt to 
advance the fortunes of the president‘s party (possibly excepting the cases of departing 
presidents with such low approval that the campaign of their party's nominee shuns explicit 
endorsements).  
Cohen also reasons that presidential election years could result in more frequent national 
appeals in an attempt to gain greater support from voters located around the political median (on 
some general policy space) (2005, 15). However, in a multivariate model of his analysis of the 
factors influencing the ratio of minor to major presidential public activities from 1946 to 2003, a 
presidential re-election year does not emerge as a significant impact on speechmaking activity 




however, Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary (2004) find that speechmaking increases by nearly seven 
speeches per month in presidential election years.     
Consistent with Hart‘s original data of presidents Truman through Reagan (as of 1982), 
my data though 2004 show that every president has delivered more addresses during election 
years than nonelection years. As Table 4.6 shows, regardless of the type of speech, more 
addresses are delivered during election years than in non-election years. These differences are 
statistically significant in every instance except all selective speeches (p=.073).  The smaller 
actual difference between the mean monthly speeches during presidential election years and non-
election years for all selective and selective local speeches suggests that presidents use selective 
speeches fairly evenly throughout their terms. During election years, there may also be a larger 
attempt to hold more events that can be attended by a broader constituency. Similar outcomes 
can be seen in Table 4.7 where activity in presidential or midterm election years is compared to 
all other years. Here, the differences are statistically significant for all speech types.  
 
Public Opinion of Presidential Performance 
While there is general agreement among scholars that presidential approval ratings do 
influence an array of presidential decisions, including strategies involving public speeches 
(Edwards 1997), the literature presents diverse findings on the relationship between approval and 
the likelihood of major or minor addresses. Once again, the ambiguity is at least partly 
attributable to differences in the units of analysis, time periods studied and, in the case of 
multivariate models, the time-varying independent variables included in the equations.  
From a motivational standpoint, some of the earliest accounts of the public presidency 




approval support (Ostrom and Job 1987, Tulis 1987). Whether presidents can achieve this result, 
however, has been called into question. One notable study provides a strong rebuttal to the 
notion of a ―bank account‖ presidency, asserting that approval is not a resource that can be 
effectively stored or replenished (Hager and Sullivan 1994).  Examining data of all presidential 
speeches delivered between 1945 and 1982, Hart concluded, ―one of the most consistent findings 
of this study is that, in general, there is no relationship between how often a president speaks and 
how well he does in the public opinion polls‖ (1987, 86). Relying on more recent examples, 
Edwards (2003) also fails to find any evidence that even nationally televised addresses pertaining 
to salient topics have any impact on the public‘s support of the president or his policies.  
Among studies that focus more directly on the relationship between approval and the 
likelihood of presidential speeches, Ragsdale (1984) finds that any change in approval (positive 
or negative) increases the probability of a major address. Data collected by Brace and Hinckley 
(1993) shows that major addresses are more likely to occur both when approval declines in 
general, but particularly following hard decisions that are not well received by the public.  Using 
the number of lines of text in a speech as the unit of analysis in a case study on Richard Nixon‘s 
speechmaking activity, Jacobs et al. 2003 find that a one point decline in level of approval is 
related to a 19-line increase in public statements on domestic issues. Most relevant to my 
inquiry, they noted that a one point decline in approval resulted in an increase of 18 lines of text 
delivered in speeches directed to private audiences. In their study, this relationship between 
presidential approval ratings and presidential rhetorical output could be observed two months 
later even when controlling for the influence of national economic performance (employment 
rates and inflation levels). One other recent study that examined both obligatory and 




presidential approval ratings affected the likelihood of either type of speech (Smith 2000). A 
similar conclusion was reached by an even more recent analysis that considered both major and 
minor addresses (Duff and Gubala 2005).  
To examine the relationship between approval and frequency of speeches by speech type, 
I first generate simple scatter plots of monthly speech frequency by monthly approval rating.  
These plots, which include lowess trend lines, are displayed in Figures 4.9 – 4.12 at the end of 
the chapter. Minor addresses (Figure 4.9) are normally distributed for the most part, with heavier 
concentration of observations occurring between the 45 and 65 percent approval range, although 
there is evidence of more frequent speechmaking activity under less favorable approval 
conditions (less than 50 percent approval).  Minor speeches delivered to domestic audiences 
(Figure 4.10) are both less frequent and more evenly distributed across the range of approval 
ratings. Again, it is clear that presidents were more apt to deliver speeches under conditions of 
lower approval.  In part, this is likely a reflection of the average approval for all presidents 
during the time period under consideration (54% for the 1945-2004 period).  
The scatter plot for all selective speeches (Figure 4.11), while exhibiting some features of 
a normal distribution, reveals more variation in frequency across approvals levels than the 
previous plots of minor addresses or the display of selective local speeches (Figure 4.12).  The 
trend line for selective local speeches, however, is notably flatter than the one for all selective 
speeches, which plateaus at slightly higher than 40 percent approval before slowly declining.  
An arguably less cluttered view of the relationship between speechmaking activity across 
all four types of speeches and presidential approval ratings is provided in Table 4.8 where means 




(2006, 167), whose dataset has an equivalent mean presidential approval level (55%).
75
  Given 
the distribution of approval ratings, it is not surprising that the highest mean monthly speeches 
for each of the four types of speeches occurs under average approval. In all four instances the 
frequency of speeches is also greater under low than high levels of approval, suggesting a greater 
inclination of presidents to go public when public support is waning.  
Differences between speechmaking activity under low and high approval, however, are 
notably less for all selective and selective local speeches. While the differences across low, 
average and high approval for these two speech types are highly significant (p<.01), the results 
point to a more consistent use of speeches to selective audiences, regardless of the public‘s 
perception of presidential performance.  
 
Economic Performance  
Like the other main indicators I have addressed in this chapter, the literature is equally 
murky about the influence of the national economy on the likelihood of a major or minor speech. 
Presidents certainly speak frequently about the economy. Indeed, speeches where economic 
policy topics constituted the focus of the speech accounted for nearly 10 percent of all speeches 
during the nearly 60 years of remarks coded for this project. If speeches where economic 
concerns were mentioned, but not the primary focus were included, the percentage would be 
notably higher. If there is a general consensus about the economic and use of the bully pulpit, it 
is that presidents are more likely to deliver addresses in general and about the economy in 
particular, when national economic performance is lagging. However, just as the data in the 
previous section on presidential approval showed, presidents do not rest on their laurels when all 
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cylinders are clicking. As Wood, Owens and Durham contend, ―presidential remarks 
significantly affect people‘s perceptions of the economic news, as well as their confidence about 
current and future economic conditions‖ (2005, 627).  
 Quite reasonably, literature cited in earlier sections of this chapter has also been 
interested in the potential influence of national economic performance on both major and minor 
addresses. In these studies, inflation levels and unemployment rates serve as the proxies of 
choice. Where national addresses are concerned, both Brace and Hinckley (1993) and Ragsdale 
(1984) found that likelihood of this speech type declines as unemployment and inflation increase. 
The former authors, however, found that under these circumstances, presidents were actually 
more likely to travel throughout the United States. While Brace and Hinckley measure travel 
activity instead of actual speeches, my analysis of presidential speechmaking makes it safe to 
assume that these excursions outside of the Beltway were accompanied by at least one speech 
per location, with some presidents exceeding this baseline.  
Other scholars, however, either reach differing conclusions that vary according to the 
model they construct or the measure of economic activity they use. Smith (2000), for instance, 
predicts that probability of a major address increases when previous month‘s change in 
unemployment was positive.  Similarly, Duff and Gubala (2005) find that as unemployment rate 
increases, presidents are more likely to give discretionary speeches, but that as inflation rises, 
they are less likely to do so. Results in their analysis also differed somewhat according to party. 
Republicans presidents were less likely to deliver discretionary addresses as inflation increases, 
but unemployment had no impact on the timing of the address. Among Democratic presidents, 




Examining monthly data of minor speeches, Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary (2004) noted 
that for every one percent increase in the unemployment rate, the president‘s total monthly 
speech output by almost five speeches. Similar impacts were found for increases in the inflation 
rate. When they divided their data into pre and post-1981, however, the results showed that 
presidents give more speeches when unemployment improves, something Eshbaugh-Soha and 
Andary attribute to presidential efforts to keep inflation in check. Finally, while I‘m not 
concerned with the frequency of presidential speeches on the economy itself, after coding every 
unique sentence of presidential public statements about the economy from 1944-2004, Wood 
(2007) discovered that when inflation is rising, presidents talk less about general economy, but 
presidents are equally likely to talk more or less about the general economy when economic 
growth or unemployment is increasing or decreasing.  
Like these other scholars, I consider the influence of both unemployment and inflation on 
presidential speechmaking. Similar to my earlier analysis of presidential approval on the four 
categories of speeches, I present scatter plots (including lowess trend lines) for each category by 
inflation and unemployment before examining the frequency of speech type under low, average 
and high inflation/unemployment.  
The plots for inflation (Figures 4.13 – 4.16) each show higher concentrations in the 2-4% 
inflation range. Like the approval analysis, this is not surprising given that average inflation for 
the period under investigation is 4%. Accordingly, it would be misleading to claim that the 
displays each show that presidents are more likely to deliver addresses under lower inflation 
levels. The plots do clearly indicate that presidents do not retreat from speechmaking activity, 
regardless of audience type, when economic conditions worsen. Looking at Figure 4.13, one can 




delivered as inflation levels were between 10 and 15%. Figure 4.16 shows a similar pattern for 
speeches to selective local audiences.  
The comparison of means test (Table 4.9) reveals statistically significant differences 
among low, average and high inflation for all speech types except minor domestic speeches 
(p=.10).
76
 In each instance, the average number of speeches delivered under high inflation 
outpaces the totals for lower inflation. Since this is true for speeches to selective audiences and 
speeches to minor audiences in general, we cannot assert that presidents retreat to a Rose Garden 
strategy under higher inflation (Jacobs et al. 2003).  
Shifting to the scatter plots for unemployment (Figures 4.17 – 4.20), the lowess trend 
lines show a gradual increase in speechmaking frequency as the unemployment rate increases in 
every instance except for minor domestic speeches. The trend is more pronounced for all minor 
and all selective speeches. Similar to the collection of inflation and approval plots, the higher 
concentrations around the mean level of unemployment is not surprising. Here, even more so 
than inflation, however, we can say that presidential speechmaking activity is not notably 
curtailed by worsening economic conditions. Like inflation, the comparison of means tests shows 
statistically significant differences among low, average and high unemployment across every 
speech type except minor domestic addresses (p=.077).  Unlike the inflation comparison, the 
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Prior studies have either assumed a great deal about the conditions under which the minor 
addresses are utilized by modern presidents. Even those studies that have specifically tried to 
explain the frequency of such addresses have done so by treating all minor addresses as similar, 
taking little or no regard for facets such as the audience and location of these addresses. In this 
chapter, a series of simple tests provide further evidence that these previously neglected 
dimensions of audience and location are important considerations that may cast new light on the 
nature of the permanent campaign.  
One of the main arguments of the going public thesis is that public speeches have become 
a key tool of presidential leadership in an era dominated by divided government. While leading 
studies don‘t assert that traditional bargaining has been replaced, the logic of leading by going 
public is that presidents can use the bully pulpit to persuade American citizens of the efficacy of 
the White House‘s position and the American people, in turn, can communicate such support for 
the president to their representatives in Congress. A simple examination of the frequency of 
minor addresses in periods of both divided and unified government appears to provide 
confirmation for this notion. By explicitly considering the audience of such speeches however, 
certain refinements to this general account may be in order. While I found higher levels of 
speechmaking activity for all speech types under conditions of divided government as opposed to 
unified government, the most statistically significant differences were for speeches to selective 
audiences, suggesting that as presidents encounter a less favorable legislative environment, they 
actually go ―narrow‖ (Cohen 2005) rather than go ―public.‖ 
If presidents are more likely to address selective audiences when the going gets rough, is 




head south? After all, declines in presidential popularity appear to be generated by a loss of 
support among independents and partisan opponents rather than partisan supporters.
77
  Under 
such conditions, the best strategy to avoid further deterioration of their approval ratings may be 
to maintain the support of their core partisan base. In a series of scatter plots and comparisons of 
means, I found speeches to all audience types, including those to selective audiences, to be more 
frequent under low rather than average or high approval levels. Indeed, this was the pattern for 
all audience types. The levels of statistical significance were also quite similar for speeches to 
both selective and non-selective audiences. Additionally, the actual differences in frequency 
among the three levels were more pronounced among speeches to non-selective audiences than 
they were selective audiences. Such evidence raises the possibility that presidential job 
performance ratings, therefore, may exert a similar influence on all audience types within the 
broader class of minor addresses. 
Measures of national economic performance (inflation and unemployment) provide yet 
another opportunity to see how the frequency of speeches to selective and non-selective 
audiences varies under favorable and unfavorable conditions. In the face of a poorly performing 
economy, do presidents retreat into a Rose Garden strategy (Burns, Jacobs and Kifer 2003) 
where they can exercise greater control over the audience and backdrop for the speech, or do 
they engage a wider audience in an attempt to lead the nation out of the economic doldrums? 
Simple scatter plots of speechmaking activity by inflation and unemployment levels suggest that 
presidents heighten their rhetorical activity as inflation and unemployment levels increase. This 
was true for all audience types, but the differences among low, average and high unemployment 
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and inflation levels were more pronounced for speeches to selective audiences in U.S. cities than 
they were for speeches to non-selective audiences in U.S. cities.  
Finally, I considered whether there was notable variation among speeches to the different 
audience types during a presidential election year. Since this broad category of speeches 
encompasses partisan events such as political rallies, we would expect the frequency of minor 
addresses to differ significantly from addresses in non-election years.  While this was indeed the 
case among all minor addresses, when audience type is again considered, only speeches to 
selective audiences failed to achieve statistical significance. This absence of statistical 
significance and the smaller actual differences between election and non-election years suggest 
that presidents may have less incentive to ―go narrow‖ during election years. The results also 
suggest variation in the intensity of the permanent campaign over the course of an 
administration.  
Having uncovered such patterns through simple scatter plots and comparisons of means, I 
now devote attention to the development of multivariate models, which allow me to more 
accurately ascertain the influence of the conditions I have explored in this chapter. More 
specifically, two general collections of models are presented in the next chapter. The first are 
models of frequency, designed to identify conditions associated with the incidence of speeches to 
the audience types within the broader category of minor addresses. The second are models of 
choice. Having documented the rise of speeches to selective audiences and highlighted certain 
conditions under which the frequencies of such speeches vary, I now turn to a more important 









Table 4.1  Comparison of Means Test for Speech Type under Divided and Unified 
Government (Monthly Observations) 
 
  All Minor Minor Domestic All Selective     Selective Local 
Divided          23.50         9.02     12.55           4.41  
Government        (18.25)            (14.08)         (9.90)          (5.60) 
 
Unified                     21.07    6.97        9.21           2.44 
Government        (16.78)            (14.02)      (7.13)          (3.74) 
 
p value (t-test)             .072                   .057          .000              .000 
n=717 months; standard deviations reported in parentheses  
Note: “Minor All” is defined as all minor speeches regardless of location. “Minor Domestic” is defined as all minor 
speeches delivered in U.S. cities outside the Washington, D.C. metro area. “All Selective” is defined as all speeches 
delivered to selective audiences regardless of location. “Selective Local” is defined as all speeches delivered to 










Table 4.2 Executive-Legislative Partisan Control, 1945-2004 
 
Partisan Arrangement  # Years Dates 
RP, RS, RH         4  1953-1954, 2001*, 2003-2004 
 
RP, RS, DH         4  1981-1984 
 
RP, DS, RH         2  2001*-2002 
 
RP, DS, DH       22  1955-1960, 1969-1976, 1985-1992 
 
DP, DS, DH       18  1945-1946, 1949-1952, 1961-1968, 1977-1980 
 
DP, RS, RH       8  1947-1948, 1995-2000 
 
DP, RS, DH         0 
 
DP, DS, RH         0 
Note:  In “Partisan Arrangement” abbreviations, the first letter refers to the political party and the second letter 
refers to either the presidency, the Senate or the House.  
*Republicans controlled both chambers of Congress between January and May 2001 before Senator Jim Jeffords of 
Vermont left the Republican Party to become an Independent and a member of the Democratic caucus, creating a 
50-49 Democratic advantage in the U.S. Senate for nearly the whole remainder of the 107
th
 Congress. Republicans 
re-gained control in late November 2002, when Jim Talent was seated as Missouri's new senator, replacing Jean 
Carnahan.  Carnahan had been had been appointed to fill the seat won posthumously by her late husband in 
November 2001, but Talent defeated her in a special-election to the 107th that coincided with the general election 






Table 4.3    F-tests Comparing Restricted and Unrestricted Regression Models Using  
                    Traditional and Alternate (Three Category) Measure of Divided  
        Government (Monthly Observations) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
      
 
  All Minor Minor Domestic  All Selective  Selective Local 
 
Computed F      1.10      0.937              0.155           0.354 
 
crit.  F.05         3.84      3.84        3.84           3.84 
 
crit. F.10      2.71      2.71        2.71           2.71 
 
crit. F (1, 714) 
Note: The three-category measure is: control of White House only, control of White House and one chamber of 





Table 4.4 Mean Number of Speeches per Month Under Executive-Legislative Partisan 




  All Minor Minor Domestic All Selective  Selective Local 
 
RRR (n=53)     21.79         10.40                    8.55           3.85 
    (15.55)        (12.71)      (6.69)          (3.86) 
 
RRD (n=72)     21.96           5.75     12.14           3.31 
       (9.39)          (6.68)      (6.09)         (3.21) 
 
RDR (n =19)     33.26         13.95     14.42           7.00 
       (8.09)          (7.61)      (6.78)          (4.91) 
 
RDD (n=240)     19.08           7.22     10.87           3.62   
     (17.22)       (12.47)      (9.41)          (5.46) 
 
DRR (n=96)     32.89         14.72     16.43           6.66 
     (22.54)        (20.19)    (12.57)          (6.64) 
 
DDD (n=237)     21.32           6.35       9.54            2.19 
    (17.17)        (14.11)      (7.31)          (3.65) 
 
n= number of months; standard deviations reported in parenthesis 
Note: ANOVA shows statistically significant differences between alignments significant in all four speech types 
(p<.001). In abbreviations, first letter refers to control of White House, second refers to control of Senate, and 
third refers to control of House.  “Minor All” is defined as all minor speeches regardless of location. “Minor 
Domestic” is defined as all minor speeches delivered in U.S. cities outside the Washington, D.C. metro area. “All 
Selective” is defined as all speeches delivered to selective audiences regardless of location. “Selective Local” is 









Table 4.5    Comparison of Means Test for Speech Type and Party Control of White House  
                    (Monthly Observations) 
 
 
   All Minor Minor Domestic All Selective  Selective Local 
White House      23.02           9.37         12 .46           4.49  
Only     (19.87)       (15.43)        (10.70)          (5.97) 
 
White House      22.10           7.18          10.13           2.87 
& One Chamber   (15.57)       (12.70)           (7.12)         (3.84)  
 
p value (t-test)                     .489             .038              .001             .000 
n=717 months; standard deviations reported in parentheses 
“Minor All” is defined as all minor speeches regardless of location. “Minor Domestic” is defined as all minor 
speeches delivered in U.S. cities outside the Washington, D.C. metro area. “All Selective” is defined as all speeches 
delivered to selective audiences regardless of location. “Selective Local” is defined as all speeches delivered to 









Table 4.6    Comparison of Means Test for Speech Type and Presidential Election Year  
                    (Monthly Observations) 
 
 
   All Minor Minor Domestic All Selective  Selective Local 
Presidential     31.74                     17.85      12.58           5.41 
Election Year   (26.76)       (24.65)    (10.78)          (7.01) 
 
All Other Years    20.68           6.26       10.95           3.27 
     (14.60)          (9.71)       (8.64)          (4.43)   
 
p value (t-test)        .000             .000           .073                .000 
n=717 months; standard deviations reported in parentheses  
“Minor All” is defined as all minor speeches regardless of location. “Minor Domestic” is defined as all minor 
speeches delivered in U.S. cities outside the Washington, D.C. metro area. “All Selective” is defined as all speeches 
delivered to selective audiences regardless of location. “Selective Local” is defined as all speeches delivered to 







Table 4.7   Comparison of Means Test for Speech Type and Presidential or  
                   Midterm Election Years (Monthly Observations) 
 
 
   All Minor Minor Domestic All Selective  Selective Local 
Presidential or      25.36         11.25          12.05           4.39 
Midterm Election Yr.    (21.34)        (18.47)        (10.19)          (5.93) 
 
All Other Years     19.68           5.13          10.39            2.86  
     (12.45)                    (5.98)           (7.64)          (3.74)   
 
p value (t-test)         .000             .000               .014              .000 
n=717 months; standard deviations reported in parentheses  
“Minor All” is defined as all minor speeches regardless of location. “Minor Domestic” is defined as all minor 
speeches delivered in U.S. cities outside the Washington, D.C. metro area. “All Selective” is defined as all speeches 
delivered to selective audiences regardless of location. “Selective Local” is defined as all speeches delivered to 






Table 4.8    ANOVA of Frequency of Speech Types Under Low, Average and High  
Presidential Approval Levels 
     
 
   All Minor Minor Domestic All Selective  Selective Local 
 
Low       23.29       9.16      10.96           3.73 
Approval    (19.23)    (16.65)       (8.63)          (5.23)  
 
Average                 25.45     10.15      12.85           4.53 
Approval    (19.40)    (16.07)       (9.94)          (5.65) 
 
High      19.20        5.53      10.06           2.73  
Approval    (13.61)      (7.52)       (8.42)          (3.95) 
 
p value           .000          .001          .003              .000 
n=717; standard deviations reported in parentheses 
“Minor All” is defined as all minor speeches regardless of location. “Minor Domestic” is defined as all minor 
speeches delivered in U.S. cities outside the Washington, D.C. metro area. “All Selective” is defined as all speeches 
delivered to selective audiences regardless of location. “Selective Local” is defined as all speeches delivered to 
selective audiences in U.S. cities outside the Washington, D.C. metro area. See Appendix for definition of low, 






Table 4.9   ANOVA of Frequency of Speech Types Under Low, Medium  
       and High Inflation Levels 
     
 
  All Minor Minor Domestic All Selective  Selective Local 
 
Low       19.18       6.78        9.39           2.82 
Inflation    (17.50)             (13.49)      (8.22)          (4.01) 
 
Average      25.93       9.51     12.71           4.40 
Inflation    (15.80)   (11.56)      (9.35)          (5.26) 
 
High      22.10       8.17     11.38           3.58 
Inflation    (19.51)   (16.80)      (9.19)          (5.49) 
 
p value          .000         .103          .000             .002 
n=717; standard deviations are reported in parentheses 
 “Minor All” is defined as all minor speeches regardless of location. “Minor Domestic” is defined as all minor 
speeches delivered in U.S. cities outside the Washington, D.C. metro area. “All Selective” is defined as all speeches 
delivered to selective audiences regardless of location. “Selective Local” is defined as all speeches delivered to 
selective audiences in U.S. cities outside the Washington, D.C. metro area. See Appendix for definition of low, 






Table 4.10    ANOVA of Frequency of Speech Types Under Low, Medium and High 
Unemployment Levels 
     
 
   All Minor Minor Domestic All Selective  Selective Local 
 
Low        18.77           6.59        9.15           2.65 
Unemployment   (19.93)       (16.57)    (10.07)          (4.85) 
 
Average       23.93           9.07      11.79           3.93 
Unemployment    (15.02)       (11.21)       (7.95)         (4.21) 
 
High       25.26           9.09      12.95           4.39 
Unemployment    (17.07)       (13.70)       (8.52)          (5.79) 
 
p value            .000             .077          .000              .000   
n=717; standard deviations are reported in parentheses 
“Minor All” is defined as all minor speeches regardless of location. “Minor Domestic” is defined as all minor 
speeches delivered in U.S. cities outside the Washington, D.C. metro area. “All Selective” is defined as all speeches 
delivered to selective audiences regardless of location. “Selective Local” is defined as all speeches delivered to 
selective audiences in U.S. cities outside the Washington, D.C. metro area. See Appendix for definition of low, 










































































































CHAPTER 5   
TARGETING AN AUDIENCE  
The descriptive accounts of presidential speechmaking in Chapter 2 and portions of 
Chapter 4 largely confirm existing knowledge of speechmaking activity during the modern 
presidency. While Commanders-in-Chief are delivering fewer nationally televised addresses (see 
Ragsdale 2009 for additional confirmation), they are also speaking more frequently to smaller 
groups of Americans gathered in locations from the Rose Garden of the White House to 
Anchorage, Alaska. These ―minor‖ addresses have increased in number dramatically over the 
past three decades, but have been largely neglected as a point of inquiry by presidential scholars. 
As I emphasized at length in Chapter 1, we therefore know relatively little about the most 
recurrent presidential public activity.  While some advances have been made in our 
understanding of the topics of these addresses and the frequency with which presidents have 
delivered minor addresses (Eshbaugh-Soha 2010; Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary 2004; Powell 
1999), only one other scholar (Cohen 2005, 2010) has made a concerted effort to develop an 
explanation of presidential speechmaking activity that takes the audience of these speeches into 
consideration. In this chapter, I offer what I believe is, to date, the most pointed and extensive 
treatment of the audience of minor addresses.  
Building on Hart‘s (1987) underutilized treasure trove of data on presidential 
speechmaking data from 1945 to 1985, I not only extend his descriptive account of major and 
minor presidential addresses –including coding for audience type – to the end of President 
George W. Bush‘s first term in 2004, but also develop more refined categories of the audiences 
of minor addresses. Specifically, I create an audience type I define as selective – audiences 




organizational membership, etc.) to hear the president speak.
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  I contrast such audiences with 
those for other minor addresses, both in Washington, D.C., and other domestic locations, where 
such qualifications do not restrict access to the president‘s live spoken words.   
In Chapter 3, I drew comparisons between selective and non-selective audiences through 
a closer examination of the audiences of President Truman‘s addresses and some broader 
comparisons to the audiences of the more recent occupants of the Oval Office, particularly 
George W. Bush, with whom Truman shared some uncanny similarities. When the Ferdinand 
Magellan pulled into the train station and Truman stepped onto the rear platform, the only 
restrictions for those interested in hearing the president was whether they could physically get 
themselves within earshot of the mounted speakers blaring Truman‘s plainspoken Missouri 
voice. Admittedly, this was no small ―entrance requirement‖ in some cities along the Whistle 
Stop Tour as many crowds numbered in the hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands.  
"Going public" in Truman‘s time really meant confronting the general public as the audience.  
As the modern presidency has evolved, however, going public has meant scheduling appearances 
before audiences either largely predisposed to agree with the president‘s message or, at a 
minimum, those that are assured of the commonality of group membership. In both cases, the 
president is working with a controlled and largely predefined audience. As I will argue more 
extensively in the next chapter, this shift in audience type holds considerable implications for 
presidential leadership.  
Before concluding with the normative concerns, however, two significant empirical 
questions remain. The first is whether certain conditions increase the frequency of speeches to 
particular types of audiences, most importantly those I have classified as selective audiences. 
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 Relying on different data and measures than my study, Cohen (2009) also uses the term ―selective‖ to refer to a 




While other audience types are not unimportant, I am primarily concerned with what Cohen 
(2005) terms ―narrowcasting.‖ In other words, under what conditions are presidents likely to 
address the selected few as opposed to the broader public? Given the documented increase in the 
number of speeches delivered outside of Washington, D.C., I am specifically interested in the 
decision to speak to a more selective audience in a setting that may also have been selected for 
its electoral importance or favorable partisan environment. In this sense, audience combines with 
location (D.C. vs. U.S. city) to form a unique audience type.  
In Chapter 4, I made some initial inroads toward identifying conditions associated with 
particular audience types (audience and location combination) by conducting some simple tests 
of speechmaking activity to different audiences under conditions identified by prior studies as 
leading determinants.  The results from both comparison of means (t-tests) and analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) revealed statistically significant effects of the partisan composition of the 
legislative and executive branches (divided government), election year (presidential or midterm), 
presidential approval ratings, and national economic conditions (inflation and unemployment) on 
the frequency of minor addresses in general and selective addresses more specifically. In this 
chapter, I extend such analysis through the use of negative binomial regression, allowing me to 
estimate the explanatory power of these same conditions in a multivariate setting.  
The second, more theoretically compelling question concerning audience is one that 
cannot be answered by count models like negative binomial regression. This question is the 
choice of audience type. Speeches such as the State of the Union and inaugural address have 
evolved into obligatory addresses.  Some major addresses are also arguably non-discretionary. 




occur, the nation expects the president to provide both comfort and assurance. Presidents do so 
predominantly through their spoken word.  
All other speechmaking moments, however, are discretionary. While the costs and 
potential payouts in political capital inevitably differ from speech to speech, the decision to 
speak involves choices about the combined elements of location and audience. So, given the 
choice of a particular combination of audience and location (e.g., selective address in U.S. city), 
under what conditions is a president likely to select one audience/location type over other 
audience/location types?  Since these are discrete choices selected from multiple causal paths 
rather than models of incidence or timing, my present objective is to identify systematic patterns 
with respect to the audience typology. Given the nature of this question, an appropriate model is 
multinomial logistic regression, since speech type is a nominal dependent variable, with several 
(unordered) categories representing the different audience types. 
Both models, therefore, allow me to explore slightly different, but equally relevant 
research questions. The incidence models afford comparisons to prior studies attempting to 
explain the frequency of certain types of speeches. Again, the predominant speech type 
examined by these studies are major addresses, with some passing attention to the broad category 
of minor addresses or addresses categorized by the substance of the address (Eshbaugh-Soha and 
Andary 2004; Wood 2007). In two separate works, Cohen (2005, 2010) makes an important 
contribution by distinguishing between broad and narrow audiences – the same general 
consideration I place great emphasis on in this study. His measure of audience, however,  is 
based on presidential appearances at party fundraisers (data originally collected and reported by 
Doherty 2007) and the ratio of major and minor addresses, including those delivered outside of 




from Hart‘s coding scheme of audience of actual presidential speeches. Therefore, I present what 
I believe to be the first model of the frequency of speeches to particular audience types.  
Estimates are provided for all audience types (major, selective local, etc.) for the full set of 
observations (n=19,371) as well as certain subdivisions of the dataset to demonstrate conditions 
unique to particular epochs within the modern presidency.  
The ―choice‖ model, meanwhile, constitutes a unique attempt to depict the multiple 
causal paths of audience selection and the conditions associated with the selection of one 
audience type over another. While the labors of archival research can inform us about the 
decision to speak to a specific audience on a particular occasion, my attempt here is to identify 
patterns associated with speeches to a particular class of audiences and, therefore, new insights 
into the strategy of the permanent campaign.  
A few points about my modeling choices ought to be spelled out clearly.  Critically, these 
models are not about timing or dynamics. In particular, the models of monthly totals discard all 
of the natural information about temporal sequencing inherent in time series data.  Each 
observation is a monthly total (for all speeches or speeches of a given type), but I make no effort 
to model dependence across observations created by temporal proximity.  This decision is made 
in the interest of simplicity, not because of any strong theory that timing is uninteresting.  
Therefore, the count models in this chapter treat, for instance, October 1975, November 1975, 
and July 1976 as three independent observations, no two of which ought to be more alike, except 
insofar as they are similar in values of independent variables.  Moreover, I make no effort to 
model dependence across models. If a president elects to give more speeches to selective 
audiences in DC in a given month, is he, correspondingly, likely to cut back on speeches of other 




The second set of models is also lodged in assumptions best spelled out in advance. In 
modeling speech type, using the whole set of existing speeches, I essentially assume away the 
initial choice of whether or not to deliver a speech.  On any given day (or week, or hour), a 
president can select to speak, or not.  As the factors I study as independent variables – public 
approval, proximity of elections, economic indicators, and so on – fluctuate, presidents, 
presumably, make informed, deliberate and strategic choices of when to speak. By modeling the 
form of speech for the whole set of recorded speeches, I ignore the logic generating the speech, 
and ask, instead, what patterns (in terms of predictors) predominate for each type, given that 
about 19,000 such choices were made over the 50-odd years I examined.   
 
Audience and Incidence 
Given that I code every speech that meets Hart‘s (1987) criteria (see Appendix), it is 
possible to construct weekly measures of the various audience typologies. However, because 
many predictor variables consist of monthly measures (particularly the inflation and 
unemployment series), I choose to generate monthly counts of speeches delivered to the various 
audiences.  The use of monthly counts places my analysis on par with the work of Eshbaugh-
Soha (2010) and Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary (2004), although with a longer time horizon than 
these two studies (1945-2004 compared to 1969-2000 data).
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  The typologies of audience type, 
presented in greater detail in both earlier chapters and the Appendix are major addresses, all 
minor addresses, minor addresses delivered in U.S. cities, all selective addresses and selective 
                                                 
79 The choice of months as the level of aggregation is more than a matter of convenience or a simple decision to 
match the choice of existing studies. By aggregating to months, the counts generate few instances of zero speeches 
to particular audience types. Therefore, the variance that can be studied is mainly in the non-zero range. If the level 
of aggregation was in days, we would see many zeros and I would actually come closer to studying the decision to 





addresses delivered in U.S. cities.  Aggregates (that is, counts) of dummy variables for each 
audience type constitute the dependent variables in the negative binomial regression models. 
The choice to use monthly count data rather than president-specific proportions, however, 
does involve some significant implication for the resulting analysis. The models presented in this 
chapter rely on pooled data in an attempt to address secular trends and variance in speechmaking 
activity across all presidents (Truman through the first term of George W. Bush). As such, they 
do allow an analysis of variance in total speechmaking activity across presidents for the different 
audience types I‘ve identified. However, by not calculating the number of speeches a president 
delivered to a particular audience type as a proportion of their total number of speeches, I forfeit 
the ability to examine whether the effects of the independent variables observed in the aggregate 
hold within the activity of individual presidents. Declining economic conditions, for instance, 
might increase the likelihood of speeches for one president, but have little or no impact on 
audience selection for another president.  
By not using president-specific proportions as the dependent variable, the explanation for 
speeches to particular audience types across the modern presidency may also be driven by the 
rhetorical activity of a smaller handful of presidents. Presidents Clinton and Reagan, for instance, 
collectively account for more than 34 percent of all speeches analyzed (across all audience 
types).So, while declining economic conditions may appear to reduce the likelihood of speeches 
to selective audiences for all modern presidents, it may only reduce this likelihood for certain 
modern presidents. As I explain in forthcoming sections of this chapter, however, I do make an 
attempt to explore presidency-centered explanations in the analysis. They are included in the 
certain models via the use of dummy variables for each president. These dummies, however, 




fundamental assumption is that there is a constant underlying model of how decisions about 
audience type are made that is stable across administrations. Further discussion of this logic is 
presented in the section titled ―Selecting an Audience‖ that appears later in this chapter. Given 
my present interest in variance in speechmaking activity across modern presidents and my 
interest in drawing comparisons with other analyses that have relied on similar counts of 
presidential speeches, I confine my choice to counts and relegate the use of proportions which to 
future extensions of this initial analysis of audience.  
Before proceeding to a discussion of the selection of estimation methodology and the 
predictors in the models, it is important to note a key assumption I make about the counts for the 
typologies; namely their independence. I presume that the conditions that lead to increased 
speech making to one of my coded audience types (e.g., selective audience in a U.S. city) are 
independent of the factors affecting the frequency of other types of speeches.  However, I make 
this assumption to simplify the current analysis of audience type – a decision that I contend does 
not significantly detract from the usefulness of the models. The fact remains that the president 
could legitimately make more of all types of speeches in a given month. 
 I also adopt a simple approach in estimating the models.  As Cameron and Trevidi 
discuss in considerable detail, time series models for count data, while still relatively new 
innovations compared to more fundamental count models, do exist (1998, 221). One could 
reasonably construct a model of the frequency of speechmaking to an audience type as a function 
of prior speechmaking to this same audience type. Given logical conclusions the literature 
reaches about the costs associated with the delivery of major nationally televised addresses in 
particular, the likelihood of such an address at time t is probably conditional on an address at 




selective audience categories), I contend that the exclusion of this or other time-varying 
components, do not substantially detract from the fundamental explanation of the traits 
associated with the incidence of speeches to the various audience typologies.  This reasoning 
leads me to the use of simple count models. 
While the most familiar count model is the Poisson regression model, one of its most 
important properties is that the variance and mean of the dependent variable are equal, a 
condition that is rarely met in observed events (Long 1997, 218). My monthly data for the 
frequency of speeches to audience types is no exception. As one might logically expect, the 
number of zeros (no occurrences) is greatest for major presidential addresses. Selective speeches, 
to both audiences in Washington and U.S. cities are also more likely to result in a large number 
of zeros – much more so than minor addresses – although months without some occurrence of a 
selective speech are rare among presidents since the 1970s.   Following procedures documented 
in Long and Freese (2006), I test for over dispersion in the data, first examining simple summary 
statistics and histograms of the various dependent variables (audience typologies) and then 
comparing both Poisson and negative binomial regression models.  In all instances, the 
parameter estimates and results of likelihood ratio tests confirm the choice of a negative binomial 





In this section, I set forth expectations of the conditions associated with the incidence of 
speeches to particular audience types. In presenting these hypotheses, I draw upon findings from 
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other attempts to explain the frequency of various types of presidential address and, for certain 
explanatory variables, the bivariate comparisons I made in the prior chapter.  
 
Presidential Approval 
On the question of whether presidents are concerned about and attempt to influence their 
public approval ratings, there is no debate (Kumar 2007). The use of public speeches is viewed 
as one means of raising approval ratings despite evidence that suggests that public addresses 
have, at best, a temporary positive impact on the public‘s perception of presidential job 
performance (Ragsdale 1987; Edwards 2003). My present concern, however, is whether 
presidential speechmaking activity is influenced by the president‘s assessment of his approval 
rating. Among those studies focused on the frequency and timing of major national addresses, 
Ragsdale (1984) finds that a change in approval (either positive or negative) increases the 
likelihood of a major speech, whereas Brace and Hinckley (1992) maintain that it is declining 
approval that makes a major address a more likely occurrence. Smith (2000), however, found no 
evidence that changes in approval increases the frequency of a major address, regardless of the 
topic. Using different units of analysis and a fuller complement of speeches beyond major 
addresses, but only for a single president (Nixon), Burns, Jacobs and Kifer (2003) point to a drop 
in approval ratings being associated with a decrease in the volume of speech output (measured as 
lines of text). In a more recent study, Eshbaugh-Soha (2010) documents a 10% decrease in 
approval leading to one additional policy speech per month. Among studies examining a fuller 
complement of presidential public activity, Hager and Sullivan (1994) and Powell (1999) do not 




When I classified approval as low, average or high and drew comparisons of counts 
(Table 4.8), the speeches were delivered with greater frequency during periods of average 
approval (50-60%) than those of low (less than 50%) or high (60%) ratings.
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  Given these 
comparisons, knowledge of the overall trend in the number of speeches delivered during the 
modern presidency, and the conclusions of the studies referenced above, I expect higher levels of 
approval to be associated with fewer speeches of all types (Hypothesis 1).   
 
Indicators of Economic Performance 
Unemployment and Inflation are two of the most widely used predictors of presidential 
behavior, including the frequency and timing of public addresses. As with other predictors, 
however, the literature about their influence is inconclusive. Ragsdale (1984), looking at the 
propensity to deliver a major address, found that as the economy worsens, the possibility of a 
national address decreases, with Republican presidents more likely than their partisan 
counterparts to avoid major speeches during high unemployment. Democrats, meanwhile, 
delivered fewer speeches than Republicans when inflation was high. Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary 
(2004), along with Eshbaugh-Soha (2010), looking at both major and minor addresses, maintain 
that a poor economy results in more frequent speeches by presidents. Other studies looking at a 
larger complement of speeches, however, suggest that economic conditions have no influence on 
such activity (Hager and Sullivan, 1994; Powell, 1999).  In more fine-grained analysis, Duff and 
Gubala‘s (2005) data shows that as unemployment increases, presidents are more likely to 
deliver discretionary speeches, but that as inflation rises, presidents are less likely to give major 
discretionary speech. Given the evidence that presidential remarks on the economy impact public 
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perception of the economic news and impressions of potential economic growth (Wood, Owens 
and Durham, 2005; Wood, 2007), it is not surprising that presidents speak more about the 
economy than any other issue, and do so regardless of whether measures of economic growth, 
including unemployment, are increasing or decreasing (Wood 2007).   
Hearkening back yet again to trends presented in Chapter 4, simple scatter plots of 
speechmaking activity by inflation and unemployment levels showed a larger concentration of 
speeches under more average inflation and unemployment (Figures 4.13 - 4.20).  This 
distribution can be seen more clearly in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 where the volume of addresses under 
low, medium and high levels of inflation and unemployment are presented. As with the 
frequency of addresses under different levels of presidential approval, speeches are made more 
often under average inflation than either low or high inflation (Table 4.9, p<.001 for all minor 
and all selective addresses, p<.01 for selective local addresses and p=.103 for minor domestic 
addresses). The pattern is different, however, for levels of unemployment.  Here, more addresses 
are delivered under high unemployment regardless of speech type (Table 4.10, p<.001 except 
minor domestic, p<.07). Given my data and the collective wisdom of prior scholarship, I expect 
negligible impact of inflation on the frequency of speeches (Hypothesis 2), but expect increases 
in unemployment to result in more speeches of all types, including major addresses (Hypothesis 
3).  
 
Presidential Election Year 
Not surprisingly, relevant scholarship agrees that presidents are more likely to deliver all 
classifications of speeches (major, minor, discretionary, non-discretionary) during presidential 




Hager and Sullivan 1994; Powell 1999). Using monthly counts, Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary 
(2004) find that a reelection year increases total speechmaking output by seven speeches per 
month. Given these expectations, I choose to address election year influences on audience type in 
the models via presidential election years rather than both presidential and midterm election 
years. While midterm elections clearly have an impact on the legislative fortunes of the 
president‘s agenda, the president himself is not a candidate.  In addition to making the model 
more parsimonious, the comparison of audience selection in presidential versus non-presidential 
election years speaks more directly to questions about the nature of the permanent campaign – 
particularly the question of whether there is a distinction in rhetorical activity in campaign and 
governing mode.   
In Chapter 4, a simple comparison of mean numbers of speeches in presidential election 
years and all other years showed that presidents are more likely to deliver addresses in 
presidential election years for all speech types (Table 4.6).  Differences were statistically 
significant (p<.001) for all minor addresses including minor addresses in U.S. cities and selective 
local addresses in U.S. cities. The differences were smaller and not statistically significant for all 
speeches delivered to selective audiences (p=.073). Accordingly, I expect the presence of 
presidential election year to increase the likelihood of all types of addresses, except major 
addresses and all selective addresses (Hypothesis 4). Despite the findings of other studies that 
suggest that even major addresses increase during election years, I argue that such a connection 
is not particularly persuasive. Ultimately, major addresses are not a leading reelection tool. 
Indeed, presidents have an interest in maintaining separation between the stately nationally 
televised address and speeches to selected audience that can be highly politicized.  It is thus 




Finally, given that the category of all selective speeches includes remarks in the White House or 
Washington proper, the likelihood that speeches in these venues would increase in a presidential 
election year is questionable.  
 
Divided Government 
The increased frequency of divided government over the past 30 years is cited by Kernell 
(2007) as one of the driving forces behind the growth in going public, particularly to audiences 
outside the Beltway during this same time period.  Combined with evidence suggesting that 
speeches have some impact on legislative success (Barrett 2004; Eshbaugh-Soha 2004), either 
the traditional divided government measure or another measure of the partisan context of 
executive-legislative relations has been included in virtually all studies of the likelihood of 
presidential addresses. Studies that consider the broadest swath of speeches, however, run 
counter to the going public thesis. Hager and Sullivan (1994) as well as Powell (1999) find that 
divided government translates into fewer speeches, even among ―outsider‖ presidents (Powell 
1999, 164). An even more recent and extensive study of speechmaking propensity reaches a 
similar conclusion (Eshbaugh-Soha 2010). Using presidential success scores instead of divided 
government as their measure, Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary (2004) point to a propensity to deliver 
more speeches as success in the legislative environment increases, a pattern also found by 
Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2004). Finally, while measuring presidential travel instead of 
speechmaking, Hoddie and Routh (2004) present evidence that polarization in executive-
legislative relations encourages presidents to take their message on the road.  
 Table 4.1 in the prior chapter seems to confirm the going public thesis. Presidents are 




is more pronounced for selective addresses (p<.001) than minor addresses (p=.072 for all minor 
addresses and p=.057 for minor speeches in U.S. cities).  This suggests that preaching to the 
faithful is a strategy that is adopted with greater frequency when the president is faced with 
opposition on Capitol Hill. Weighing this evidence against the chorus of null findings in the 
literature, the expectations for speechmaking activity under divided versus unified government 
across the various speech types are not as clearly determined.  
Despite evidence which raises considerable doubt about the ability of major addresses to 
alter public opinion about major legislative initiatives (Edwards 2003), presidents may be more 
temped to turn to major addresses when they have fewer bargaining advantages. Given the nature 
of the permanent campaign, the influence of divided government may not play a significant role 
in the propensity of minor addresses delivered either inside or outside of Washington or to 
selective audiences. Accordingly, I expect speechmaking activity to increase under divided 
government for those speeches directed at nationally televised audiences (major addresses), but 
not other audience types (Hypothesis 5).  
 
Cable Television Penetration 
Baum and Kernell (1999) demonstrate how the expansion of cable television into U.S. 
households has caused presidents to change their public speaking strategy. With increased 
competition for viewers and less favorable reception from networks to air even major nationally 
televised addresses, minor addresses – particularly those located outside of Washington, D.C. – 
have become more attractive options for presidents seeking to boost approval ratings (Cohen, 
Bond, Fleisher and Hamman 2000; Cohen and Powell 2005) increase the salience of issues 




both major and minor speechmaking events found cable television penetration to be a 
statistically significant influence on the frequency of presidential speeches outside of 
Washington, D.C. (1999, 165).    
In addition to serving as a measure of the new media age (Cohen 2005, 2010), this 
variable is also arguably a proxy for technological change more generally, given the linear 
increase in cable television penetration over the time period examined. Consequently, I expect 
the rise of cable television in U.S. households to increase the likelihood of all forms of addresses, 
with the exception of major addresses (Hypothesis 6).  
 
Presidential Administrations 
 In separate models, I include dummy variables for each presidential administration 
(Truman through George W. Bush 2004) in order to consider the influence of president-centered 
influences (Hager and Sullivan 1994) on speeches to various audience types. While I will not 
attempt to generate specific hypotheses for each president across each speech type, consistent 
with my analysis in Chapter 3, I expect earlier presidents of the modern presidency to deliver 
fewer speeches to selective audiences and more recent presidents (particularly George H.W. 
Bush forward) to deliver more addresses to selective audiences (Hypothesis 7).
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 Term of office is another conspicuous exclusion from the current models. While not unimportant theoretically, the 
other variables in the models can be applied more consistently to all presidents, regardless of the nuances associated 
with their time in office. Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford each have either a non-traditional first or 
second term because of the conditions surrounding their entry to or exit from the Oval Office. As noted earlier, I 
also have one president (George W. Bush) who is a two-term president, but whose second term does not appear in 






 Table 5.2 presents the results of negative binomial regression models for the five core 
audience types between 1945 and December 2004. Each of the models is statistically significant 
(Prob>         , and the hypotheses presented above are generally all confirmed. The 
coefficients for presidential Approval are all correctly signed, suggesting that higher levels of 
approval lead to a slight decrease in the log count for all speech types (Hypothesis 1). However, 
approval is only statistically significant in the case of minor addresses. While one could infer 
from the results that presidents are more likely to use minor addresses during times of lower 
approval, the meager coefficients are perhaps more indicative of the absence of any association 
between approval levels and frequency of speeches to any audience type, given the other 
conditions included in the model. 
 Results for the two measures of economic performance, Unemployment and Inflation, are 
also consistent with expectations. Inflation is significant in only one of the models (minor 
speeches to domestic audiences) and the sign of the coefficients are not consistent across the four 
minor speech types. Inflation, therefore, does not seem to have any real impact on the pattern of 
speeches to particular audiences (Hypothesis 2).  Rising unemployment, however, is a 
statistically significant influence on the likelihood of speeches to all audience types except one 
(Hypothesis 3). The size of the coefficients and their level of significance for the selective 
addresses (last two columns) are the most pronounced in all the models. Unemployment, 
therefore, exerts an influence similar to that found by at least three other studies of speechmaking 
incidence discussed above (Duff and Gubala 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 2010; Eshbaugh-Soha and 




 The impact of a presidential election year has the powerful impact suggested by both my 
simple comparisons in Chapter 4 and relevant literature on presidential speechmaking patterns 
(Hypothesis 4). As we would expect, during election years, presidents are clearly taking their 
message on the road. The coefficients for speeches to minor domestic audiences and selective 
local audiences are the largest and most statistically significant in any of the models (1.19, 
p<.001; .49, p<.001). Presidential election years also tend to be associated with more minor 
addresses, regardless of location. The model for major addresses, however, suggests that 
presidential election years are not associated with increased incidence of major addresses. Here, 
the coefficient is both statistically significant and signed in the negative direction. It is also 
important to remember that the presidential election year variable identifies instances where an 
incumbent president may not be running for reelection, a condition that occurred five times 
during the time period under consideration (elections of 1952, 1960, 1968, 1988, 2000).  
 The traditional measure of divided government, meanwhile, generally fails to support the 
going public thesis.  The results suggest that instead of encouraging more speeches to minor 
audiences or controlled audiences (selective addresses), particularly in locations outside of 
Washington, the condition of split partisan control of the executive and legislative branches is 
actually associated with fewer such speeches. The results are particularly striking for both all 
minor addresses and all selective speeches, each with coefficients greater that .18 and significant 
at the p<.001 and p<.01 levels respectively.  Hypothesis 5 is confirmed in that divided 
government is associated with a statistically significant increase in the use of major addresses. 
To the extent partisan alignments in Washington may encourage presidents to go over the heads 
of members of Congress, these results indicate that a major nationally televised address is the 




 Finally, the measure of cable television penetration is also consistent with expectations 
(Hypothesis 6). The variable is statistically significant at the p<.001 level across all audience 
types. Again, the expectations in this instance are partially a result of the monotonic patter of 
increase in this variable. Consistent with the going public thesis, we would expect the availability 
of cable television in a larger number of American households to be associated with attempts by 
presidents to use non-nationally televised addresses more frequently as part of their 
speechmaking repertoire. The logic is that greater competition for a viewing audience would 
make a nationally televised address less impactful than during the golden age of television 
(Baum and Kernell 1999).  However, the size, direction and significance of the coefficient for 
cable television are virtually identical across all speech types.  It is this result that engenders 
speculation on my part that the variable is capturing the general trends of all speech types rather 
than a particular media-related dynamic.  
 To provide a more straightforward approach to the interpretation of the impact these 
variables have on the frequency of speech types, I also calculate the percent change in the 
expected count of speech type for a unit increase in the independent variable (Table 5.3).  A 
presidential election year increases the number of monthly addresses to minor domestic 
audiences by almost 228%.   Focusing more attention on the main audience type of interest in 
this study, selective audiences, we see that a rise in unemployment rates brings about the greatest 
percentage change in addresses to such audiences (9.4% increase for every 1% increase in the 
unemployment rate).  While a presidential election year remains the largest influence on the rate 
of addresses to selective audiences outside of Washington, unemployment also factors 
prominently here as well, with every 1% increase in the unemployment rate boosting the number 




 The extent to which the frequency of speech to audience type varies across 
administrations is also a notable consideration. Dummy variables for each president are thus 
added to the core models (Table 5.4).
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 The results are, once again, largely consistent with 
expectations, particularly where addresses to selective audiences are concerned. Focusing on the 
last two columns of Table 5.4, we can see that earlier presidents were less likely to be associated 
with the frequent use of speeches to these narrow audiences. Comparing Truman with Clinton, 
for instance, we can clearly see that Truman was least likely to be associated with the use of 
speeches to selective audiences, while Clinton is one of the most likely presidents to be 
associated with this audience type. Indeed, with the exception of Reagan, all modern presidents 
after Nixon are positively associated with the use of selective addresses, regardless of location 
(positively signed coefficients for these presidents in the last two columns).  Reagan‘s lack of 
congruence with this pattern is explained by his frequent use of ceremonial addresses (most of 
any modern president)
 84
 and less frequent travel than any president since Ford (Doherty 2007).
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 All of the results reported in this section have simply considered which conditions are 
associated with the frequency of certain speech types. The impact of key explanatory variables is 
largely consistent with results reported in other notable studies that have examined yearly or 
monthly counts of all presidential addresses. However, both in these instances and the data 
reported here, no attempt has been made to consider the likelihood of a particular type of speech 
given the choice of other speech types. While some studies have considered the frequency of 
discretionary vs. non-discretionary major addresses (Smith 2000) or policy speeches vs. political 
speeches in general (Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary 2004), the analysis is still restricted to counts.  
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Given that a speechmaking moment is an outcome of a conscious decision, it is appropriate to 
model speechmaking as choice – in this instance a choice of audience and location given other 
plausible audience/location combinations.  The next section of this chapter contains a simple 
model to estimate the conditions associated with these choices.  
 
Selecting a Location and an Audience 
Like other scholars, I operate under the assumption that speechmaking is strategic 
(Austen-Smith 1992), and that the action presents fairly minimal opportunity costs (Cohen and 
Hamman 2003). Major national addresses certainly are the most costly from a standpoint of the 
time required of the president himself and presidential aides (e.g., speechwriters, schedulers). 
This particular type of address also obviously requires the cooperation of broadcast and cable 
networks to make such an event possible. As Baum and Kernell (1999) document, networks have 
become less cooperative partners in this venture as they weigh the time for the president against 
other programs they could offer in an increasingly competitive market for viewers. Unlike other 
speech types, major national addresses can only be selected sparingly.  They are also not 
completely discretionary (Lammers 1981; Ragsdale 1984; Smith 2000).  Major natural disasters 
(e.g., Hurricane Katrina), pronounced acts of terrorism (e.g., 9/11 attacks) and other catastrophic 
events necessitate a response from the president.  
Recognizing that such moments do occur, I nevertheless consider a national audience as a 
possible choice relative to other audience types. Speeches outside of the White House or 
Washington, D.C. proper are also more costly, but not disproportionately so. In short, I do not 
attempt to generate a cost-benefit differential for each speech type. National addresses, however 




been sufficiently called into question by at least one prominent piece of scholarship (Edwards 
2003).  Likewise, despite a more limited audience, even a speech to a more selective audience in 
a U.S. city has the capacity to generate positive and comparatively greater (page placement, 
column inches) coverage than a speech delivered in Washington covered only by a major paper 
(Barrett and Peake 2007).  
My model is also quite generalized in the sense that there are multiple presidents, each 
likely using different criterion to make decisions about the audience and location of a speech. 
The decision-making logic for Reagan is not assumed to be similar for Kennedy. Decision 
criteria may also change throughout the course of a given presidency due to factors such as 
approval ratings, candidate health, and whether the incumbent is pursuing reelection.  
With these assumptions stated, a speech-type decision tree with multiple causal paths is 
presented in Figure 5.1.  It should be clear that the decision process it depicts is not a single 
decision among multiple speech type options. Instead, the model is based on a series of nested 
choices leading to one of six possible outcomes: major address from Washington to a non-
selective audience, major address from a U.S. city to a non-selective audience, minor speech to a 
selective audience in Washington, minor speech to a non-selective audience in a Washington, 
minor speech to a selective audience in a U.S. city, minor speech to a non-selective audience in a 
U.S. city. These outcomes represent my core audience types. Following all of the extensions of 
the initial decision, two end-points (shaded more lightly than the others in Figure 5.1) are not 
actually possible. A major speech can be held either inside or outside of Washington, but it 
cannot be directed toward a selective audience, given how I define "major". Furthermore, while 




observations of the absence of a speechmaking event. Therefore, I do not include a path for a 
decision not to speak. 
The basic logic represented in Figure 5.1 bears similarity to Dubin and Kaslow‘s (1996) 
model of absentee voting, where voters decide whether to vote or not and then whether to vote 
absentee or at the precinct.
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  The end points in my model (audience and location combination) 
are also reached through a series of nested choices. However, unlike Dubin and Kaslow, I do not 
attempt to model utilities at later stages that are associated with choices made in earlier stages 
(1996, 375). The purpose of the decision tree here is merely to specify what I perceive as the 
fundamental causal paths that would lead to the different possible combination of audience and 
location speech types, recognizing that the model does not perfectly account for all such decision 
processes. For instance, the president receives numerous invitations to speak to various 
audiences. In such cases, the decision to accept the invitation may be reached without full 
consideration of all other speechmaking options available to the president. However, one could 
envision an instance where the decision to accept an invitation is weighed against other possible 
venues and audiences – ones that may represent a better strategic decision for the president given 
his immediate policy or political objectives.  
 
The Predictors of Choice of Speech Type 
 The decision tree in Figure 5.1 models paths leading to a choice of a distinct speech type. 
Therefore, the concern is not the incidence of a particular speech type as it was in the prior 
section.  Rather, the fundamental question is, given that a president has decided to deliver a 
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speech of some sort, under what conditions is he likely to make a speech of one type or another? 
For instance, what conditions engender the choice to make a speech to a selective audience in a 
U.S. city as opposed to a non-selective audience in Washington? The appropriate statistical 
model to address this question is multinomial logit regression. As Long explains, ―the 
multinomial logit model can be thought of as simultaneously estimating binary logits for all 
possible comparisons among the outcome categories‖ (1997, 149).  While this statistical model 
can be used to estimate outcomes that do not occur through a choice process, Long and Freese 
(2006) highlight the applicability of the multinomial logit model to choice processes.
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 My unit of analysis is speech audience. As mentioned earlier, while I created dummies 
for speech audience to examine incidence of audience type, the speech audience variable is 
essentially a nominal variable with six core outcomes. Although there are other distinct speech 
types (radio address, press conference, speech in a foreign location), I lump these other choices 
into one other possible outcome – the category of all other speech types. Therefore, the speech 
audience variable that serves as the dependent variable has seven categories.  
 In a multinomial logistic regression, one category of the dependent variable serves as the 
comparison category. For instance, if one were estimating the vote choice of president in the 
1992 election using a single three category nominal dependent variable where presidential choice 
equals Clinton or G.H.W. Bush or Perot, and the independent variables were race, gender and 
partisan identification the following model could be estimated: 
                              race +                                  
                              race +                                  
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where the choice of Bush is specified as the base, or comparison category. Using this structure, 
we could estimate the effects of race, gender and partisan identification on a choice between 
Clinton and Bush and on a choice between Perot and Bush, leaving the Clinton or Perot choice 
implicit.  Instead, one could designate Clinton as the base category to estimate the effects of 
these same variables on a choice between Perot and Clinton, for instance. The model (predictor 
variables included) would be identical, but the interpretation of coefficients would differ.  The 
choice of baseline is unimportant mathematically, but it facilitates some comparisons.  
 While I could undertake the herculean task of estimating all possible choices, such an 
undertaking would be both laborious for the reader and obscure the most relevant concerns of the 
present analysis. Accordingly, I estimate the choice of delivering a speech to a selective audience 
in a U.S. city compared to the choice of a speech to a non-selective audience in a U.S. city, to a 
selective audience in Washington, and to a non-selective audience in Washington. In essence, 
this allows me to estimate a comparison involving all forms of minor addresses I observe across 
the entire range of presidential administrations. Given my concern with minor, as opposed to 
major speeches and, more importantly, my interest with the predictors of speeches to selective 
audiences outside of Washington, the decision to limit the choices I analyze is consistent with 
my larger focus.  
 
Independent Variables 
 All of the variables from the earlier count models (Presidential Approval, Inflation, 
Unemployment, Cable Television Penetration, Divided Government and Presidential Election 
Year) are included in the multinomial regression models presented below. The one additional 




Electoral College votes (Electoral College Votes).
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 Such a measure has been used by other 
studies seeking to explain the frequency of presidential visits to a state. Cohen and Powell 
(2005), Doherty (2007) and Sellers and Denton (2006) all point to a state‘s Electoral College 
votes as being positively related to number of official visits to the state. However, Doherty 
claims that, contrary to popular opinion, these states do not tend to receive disproportionate 
attention.  For this analysis, the variable is included primarily to determine whether a state‘s 
electoral weight has any bearing on the choice of a speech to a selective audience rather than a 
non-selective audience. It is only natural that this variable would have a have a statistically 
significant impact on the decision to deliver a speech in a U.S. city rather than Washington, D.C. 
Finally, in one model I use dummy variables for each administration. In addition to patterns 
across all presidents, I am interested in how the choice of speech type is influenced by the 
officeholder.  
Due to the multiple comparisons one can make in a multinomial logistic regression 
model, specific hypotheses would need to be generated for all relevant comparisons. The 
influence of divided government, for instance, could be hypothesized to have a different impact 
on the odds of making a speech to a selective audience in a U.S. city compared to a speech to a 
selective audience in Washington than this same independent variable is hypothesized to have on 
the odds of making a speech to a non-selective audience in Washington compared to a non-
selective audience in a U.S. city. However, as I emphasized earlier, in the interest of focusing on 
the audience type of greatest relevance to this study, I only examine the influence of independent 
variables on the odds of choosing an address to a selective audience in a U.S. city rather than 
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other types of minor addresses. This speech type is always the comparison. While I do not 
generate specific hypotheses, I do expect the predictors to exert different influences according to 
the choice of audience types that are considered. In some instances these expectations will vary 
from the findings for the count models. For example, if, when speaking outside of Washington 
during a presidential election year and the choice is between a speech to a selective audience and 
a non-selective audience, I‘d expect election year considerations to increase the odds of a choice 
of a non-selective audience.  My reasoning is that presidents seeking reelection must be 
increasingly concerned about broadening their base of support during this year. Again, given that 
three separate choices are modeled by the multinomial logistic regressions I generate, my 
analysis focuses more on the possible explanations for and implications of the observed 
outcomes observed as well as possible refinements and extensions to the analysis that could be 
conducted in future work on the choice of audience type. 
Before proceeding to the results, it is important to clarify the manner in which I‘ve 
decided to display the coefficients in the tables. As stated earlier, I am interested in the odds of a 
president choosing to speak to a selective audience in a U.S. city as opposed to three other types 
of audiences: a non-selective audience in a U.S. city, a selective audience in Washington, D.C., a 
non-selective audience in Washington, D.C. In the tables, the coefficients listed under these other 
three audience types represent the influence of each independent variable (e.g., presidential 
approval), holding all other variables constant, on the odds of delivering a speech to a selective 
audience in a U.S. city, rather than the comparison audience type.  As an example, I direct the 
reader to the coefficient for presidential approval under the column titled non-selective (U.S. 
city) in Table 5.5. The positive (β=.02) and statistically significant coefficient (p<.001) for 




of choosing to deliver a speech to a selective audience in a U.S. city over a speech to a non-
selective audience in a U.S. city by about two percent.  Therefore, positive coefficients increase 
the odds of a speech to a selective audience in a U.S. city, whereas negative coefficients decrease 
the odds of a speech to such an audience. With this important clarification established, I continue 
with the interpretation of this same table, beginning with additional consideration of the 
influence of presidential approval on choice of audience type. 
 
Results 
The results presented in Table 5.5 show that higher approval is associated with speeches 
given to selective audiences as opposed to non-selective audiences. On the other hand, as 
approval rises, speeches given within D.C.—to both kinds of audiences – are comparatively 
more likely, as against selective speeches away from the capital. If we take the pattern as a 
causal effect, then ceteris paribus, higher approval encourages presidents to face more 
predictable (pre-selected) crowds when they travel outside of Washington. One possible 
explanation for this pattern is that presidents with higher approval don‘t face the same pressure 
to build political capital among independents and the opposition party. Accordingly, they may 
not see the need to engage in risk-taking behavior by scheduling speeches in front of less 
predictable audiences. By the same token, one could argue that presidents basking the glow of 
high approval would feel more supported at this juncture by audiences normally thought to be 
more confrontational and, therefore, more likely to agree to face such an environment. 
The coefficients for the two measures of national economic performance, meanwhile, are 
relatively consistent across the three audience choice comparisons. In general, worsening 




compared to speeches in Washington and compared to broader audiences outside of the Beltway.  
These results suggest that while presidents may be using the bully pulpit to rally the nation in 
tough economic times, this rallying is being done among audiences perhaps less likely to assign 
blame to the president for the struggling economy rather than those more critical of the 
president‘s leadership in this area. 
Turning to variables that capture electoral dimensions, the coefficients for state Electoral 
College vote totals and the influence of a presidential reelection year are consistent with 
expectations. To lay the groundwork for what they hope are victories in the nation‘s largest 
electoral prizes, presidents obviously need to travel outside of Washington.  Thus, the influence 
this variable exerts on the odds of a speech to a selective audience in a U.S. city over speeches to 
either audience type in Washington is trivial. By far the more interesting comparison is between 
speeches to selective and non-selective audiences outside of Washington. Holding all other 
variables constant, a one unit increase in state Electoral College vote total increases the odds of a 
speech to a selective audience in a U.S. city over a non-selective audience in a U.S. city by two 
percent.  
The effect of a presidential election year on the choice of these two audience types is 
most notable. The coefficient is both large (-.70) and statistically significant (p<.001). While 
presidents certainly do speak frequently to their immediate supporters during election years, this 
is also the time to broaden their appeal.  When the choice is between a narrow and a broad 
audience, a presidential election year discourages the choice of narrowcasting when traveling 




when the comparison includes the choice of speaking in D.C.
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 As a further test of the influence 
of a presidential election year, I fix all other variables in the model at their means and calculate 
the probability of selecting each audience type during both presidential election and non-election 
(presidential) years (results not displayed). The differences are most notable for speeches to non-
selective audiences in U.S. cities (.42 for election years, .26 otherwise) and speeches to selective 
audiences in U.S. cities (.17 for election years, .22 otherwise). These results provide further 
support for the tendency to opt for more broadly-defined audiences over more insular ones in 
presidential election years.  
Casting the analysis in terms of choices of more specific audience types among the larger 
category of minor addresses also refines our understanding of one of the most touted influences 
of the going public thesis – the presence of divided government. Table 5.5. shows that speeches 
to selective audiences outside the nation‘s capital are comparative more likely than those to non-
selective audiences in U.S. cities and speeches in Washington in general under divided 
government. As with the variable for presidential election year, I generate probabilities for 
audience types selections for divided and unified government when all other variable are set at 
mean levels. The largest predicted differences for all audience types is found among speeches to 
selective audiences in domestic locations outside D.C. (predicted probability of .22 during 
divided and .17 during unified government). So, not only do the odds of presidents deciding to 
go public during divided government by traveling rather than staying home increase, so do the 
odds of speaking to more selective rather than more diverse audiences.  The data suggest that 
more solidifying rather than persuading may take place during less favorable legislative 
conditions in Washington. 
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Yet another key component of the going public thesis reflected in the model is the spread 
of cable television in American households – a development documented by other studies as 
encouraging the use of minor addresses, particularly those outside of Washington, over major 
nationally televised addresses. (Baum and Kernell 1999; Cohen 2008, 2010; Kernell 2007). 
Table 5.5 shows that as the percentage of households with cable television has increased, so have 
the odds of presidents delivering speeches to tailored audiences located outside Washington 
rather than either broader audiences in these locations, or speeches in Washington in general. As 
the coefficients suggest, the impact of this measure of a change in media exerts a fairly 
consistent influence across all three comparisons.  
To provide the reader with another sense of the influence of each of the independent 
variables in the model, I calculate the marginal effect of each independent variable on the 
probabilities of the selection of each audience type of all minor addresses. These results are 
presented in Table 5.6.  As Long and Freese remind us, ―as the value of    changes, the sign of 
the marginal can change‖ (2006, 255). For instance, the marginal effect of presidential approval 
on delivering a selective address in Washington is positive, but its effect on delivering a non-
selective address in a U.S. city is negative. With few exceptions, the effects are statistically 
significant at the p<.001 level. 
As I was with the count models, I am also interested in patterns of choices that may be 
consistent across or vary by individual presidents. Therefore, I generate a model including only 
dummy variables for each administration (Table 5.7). The results comparing the choice of a 
speech to a selective audience in a U.S. city with a speech to a non-selective audience in a U.S. 
city are consistent with data presented in earlier chapters. Trends displayed in Chapter 2, for 




and 2004. Eyeballing the general pattern as we move from the Truman administration forward, 
we see that earlier presidents (Truman through Nixon) are more likely to choose general than 
selective audiences when traveling outside of Washington, whereas the reverse is true of 
presidents Carter through Clinton. The timing of the shift coincides with the onset of the change 
in the mid 1970s from institutionalized to individualized pluralism identified by Kernell (2007).  
Continuing the focus on this same choice, the coefficients for individual presidents are 
also consistent with my earlier analysis in many respects. In Chapter 3, I documented the 
―public‖ nature of President Truman‘s minor addresses outside of Washington. In Table 5.7, the 
coefficient for Truman shows that compared to other presidents, the odds of Truman delivering a 
speech to a selective audience compared to a non-selective audience when traveling in domestic 
locations were less than any other president – results that are statistically significant at the 
p<.001 level. The direction of the coefficients for presidents Carter through Clinton, meanwhile, 
are consistent with expectations that the odds of more recent presidents ―going narrow‖ rather 
than ―going public‖ are greater than those for earlier presidents. Again, these coefficients are 
highly significant (p<.001 in all instances).  
The perhaps surprisingly larger coefficients for Reagan and Bush are likely explained by 
the fact that speeches to selective audiences in U.S. cities comprised a larger percentage of their 
total public speech output than those for Clinton, who delivered a larger volume of speeches to 
this audience type. One other pattern worth mention is differences between Republican and 
Democratic presidents among the more recent presidents (Carter through Clinton).  Republican 








When the comparison is made between the choice of a selective audience outside of 
Washington versus either one to a selective or non-selective audience in Washington, the pattern 
suggests a tendency to stay close to home rather than travel. In making substantive sense of these 
results a few points are important to consider. First, travel is not without its costs. It is easier to 
arrange a speech in either the White House or a Washington-area hotel ballroom than it is to take 
the president‘s stage on the road. Second, many organizations that are prime fodder for 
presidential addresses on key public policy issues hold their annual meetings in Washington. 
Addresses to such organizations, including many partisan-leaning groups, fall under the category 
of a selective audience.  Third, the convenience of speaking outside of the Washington 
metropolitan area has increased over the modern presidency. Advances in technology have made 
Air Force One faster and more conducive to managing presidential duties while away from the 
White House (Burton 2006). Fourth, it is important to recall that all forms of minor addresses 
have been on the upswing since 1945.  Collectively, the coefficients in the last two columns 
speak to these trends.  
The fact that the odds of a speech to a selective audience in Washington as opposed to a 
selective audience in a U.S. city are greater for all presidents (second column), points at least 
partially to the issue of convenience.  The choice of staying in Washington, however, is not as 
strong for recent presidents (Ford through Clinton) – a result consistent with the increasing pull 
toward addresses to pre-selected audiences and greater ease of travel. The exceptions among this 
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later collection of presidents, Carter and Reagan, can be explained to an extent by some unique 
circumstances each president faced during their presidencies. Reagan‘s travel was curtailed early 
in his presidency by injuries suffered during the failed assassination attempt in 1981.  Carter 
would have likely delivered many more speeches outside of Washington in 1980 if not for the 
Iranian Hostage Crisis that spanned the entire calendar year. Crises also likely play a role in the 
coefficients for both Johnson (Vietnam) and Nixon (Vietnam and later Watergate).  
Some of these same trends and president-specific conditions provide plausible 
explanations for the coefficients in the last column, where the comparison is with speeches to 
non-selective audiences in Washington. Given that Ford‘s audience and location selections were 
skewed by the unique combination of a national election and the nation‘s bicentennial in the 
same year (1976), the greater odds of a selective address outside of Washington over an address 
to a non-selective audience in Washington is no great shock.  The direction and lack of statistical 
significance for Clinton, however, is puzzling as is the size, direction and significance of the 
coefficient for Bush.  Again, these results may be attributable to the proportion of addresses to 
these two audience types.  
Finally, having noted in earlier chapters the changes in both the overall frequency and 
audience type of speeches from the Reagan presidency to present, I divide the modern presidents 
into older (Truman through Carter) and newer (Reagan through George W. Bush, 2004) 
groupings to ascertain whether the variables affecting the choice of audience types differs 
substantially between these two periods. These results are presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. In 
drawing comparisons, I will discuss the three choices of interest one at a time by referring to 




Predictors of the choice of a speech to a selective audience rather than a non-selective 
audience in a U.S. city (first column in both Table 5.7 and 5.8) differ substantially between the 
two models. Indeed, the only consistent result is the presence of a presidential election year, 
which can reasonably be interpreted as a need to move to the ideological middle during an 
election – a strategy that would make a choice of a broader rather than a more narrow audience 
greater in election rather than non-election years. Among the older grouping, speeches to 
selective audiences are associated primarily with higher levels of approval (β=.01, p=.001) and 
unemployment (β=.20, p=.001) and the rise of cable television in American households (β=.06, 
p=.001). Among the collection of more recent presidents, speeches to selective audiences rather 
than a non-selective audience when scheduling speaking events in U.S. cities are associated 
primarily with higher levels of inflation (β=.13, p=.001), states with more Electoral College 
votes (β=.02, p=.001) and the presence of divided government (β=.64, p=.001). Among earlier 
presidents, divided government was associated with speeches given to non-selective rather than 
selective audiences. While my initial thought is that this result is possibly a confirmation of the 
dominance of institutionalized pluralism in this period, this notion is rendered less plausible by 
the choice comparisons for both audience types in Washington (second and third columns of 
Table 5.7) where the results are less consistent with the notion of institutionalized pluralism.
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Predictors of the choice of a speech to a selective audience in a U.S. city rather than a 
selective audience in the nation‘s capital (second column in both Table 5.7 and 5.8) share a few 
more similarities across the two groupings. Speeches to selective audiences in both cases are 
associated primarily with higher unemployment, more homes with cable television,
92
 and divided 
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 When the comparison is drawn with speeches to non-selective audiences in 
Washington (third column in both Table 5.7 and 5.8) the only similarities of note are households 
with cable television and divided government; a higher percentage of the former and the 
presence of the latter being associated with the choice of speeches to selective audiences outside 
of Washington rather than broader audiences in Washington.  
 
Conclusions 
In the introductory chapter of this dissertation, I argued that our understanding of the 
rhetorical presidency, particularly the going public thesis of presidential leadership, is actually 
quite limited by the scant attention devoted to the most frequently used classification of 
presidential speeches – minor addresses. More specifically, I maintained that we need to focus 
more attention on the audience of these minor addresses, claiming that there are politically 
meaningful differences to speeches made to largely predefined audiences (selective audiences, as 
I‘ve termed them) and those where attendees do not need to meet certain criteria (e.g., 
organizational affiliation, campaign contributor). Empirical evidence in earlier chapters 
documented the rise of speeches to selective audiences over the course of the modern presidency, 
particularly their exponential growth during the most recent presidencies (Reagan – George W. 
Bush).   
In the present chapter, I‘ve attempted to advance our consideration of the audience of 
presidential speeches beyond Hart‘s (1987) meaningful but descriptive account and Cohen‘s 
(2005, 2010) sound logic for, yet more indirect measures of, the determinants of speeches to 
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  I‘ve done so by creating what I believe are more refined measures of 
audience type and then generating two collections of models. The first is a series of count models 
that explain the frequency of speeches to particular audience types. The second is a series of 
choice models that identify conditions under which presidents choose one audience type over 
another, all within the broader collection of minor addresses. The negative binomial regression 
(count) models afforded some indirect comparisons with a handful of recent studies that have 
attempted to explain the frequency of minor addresses in general, but my focus on audience 
moves the research in new directions, as does the multinomial logistic regression models that 
predict choice of audience. I conclude this chapter by highlighting some of the leading pieces of 
evidence from this inquiry as well as the limitations and possible extensions of this two pronged-
approach. Discussions of the normative implications these findings hold for presidential 
leadership are reserved for the next, concluding chapter.  
 
A Refined Sense of Going Public 
One of the leading questions about the use of the bully pulpit is the extent to which such 
addresses are used to boost presidential approval ratings, provided they are even capable of 
accomplishing this task. In earlier chapters, I conducted some simple comparisons of means to 
see if speeches to certain audience types vary according to levels of presidential approval. In the 
multivariate models in this chapter (which control for the effects of other variables), presidential 
approval ratings do not have a bearing on the occurrence of speeches to most audience types, 
particularly the selective audiences with which I have been primarily concerned. From this 
perspective, the increase in speeches to selective audiences among more recent presidents has 
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taken place irrespective of their standing with the American public. Presidents may be preaching 
to the choir or speaking to more predictable audiences, but perhaps not out of any strong concern 
over their public approval ratings. In the multinomial logit models, however, when the decision 
of whether to speak to a selective audience in a U.S. city is pitted against the option of speaking 
to a less-controlled audience, higher approval levels increase the odds of a speech to a selective 
audience – a result I speculated might be associated with the perception that risk-taking behavior 
is not as necessary when approval ratings are perceived as relatively secure. Presidents may also 
reason that higher approval ratings create a good opportunity to shore up their partisan base. 
In the count models, the presence of a presidential election year had the expected effect 
of increasing speeches to all audience types, but, once again, the choice models provide new 
insight. In the latter models, an election year increased the odds of choosing a non-selective 
audience rather than a selective audience when traveling to domestic locations outside of 
Washington. While the permanent campaign increases in intensity in election years, the results 
indicate that election season is the time when the intended audience is more broadly construed. 
When we consider that voters are more likely to pay attention to presidential speeches during the 
height of an election than they are during the previous three years of a first term president, this 
outcome is beneficial to the public. However, it raises concerns about the apparent tendency to 
target more narrow audiences rather than more general ones in off-election years. 
Another key component of the going public thesis explored by both sets of models is the 
influence of divided government, a condition that supposedly encourages presidents to heighten 
their rhetorical activity, particularly by traveling to locations outside of a supposedly more 
acrimonious legislative environment in Washington. In the count models, divided government 




government was the most prominent influence on the odds of delivering a speech to a selective 
audience in a U.S. city over the other types of audiences of minor addresses. The implication is 
that when presidents consider how to use minor addresses during periods of divided government, 
they opt for going narrow outside of Washington.  
The results of both the count and choice models also point to important presidency-
centered and president-centered explanations (Hager and Sullivan 1994) of presidential rhetorical 
activity that have been noted by at least one other study where minor addresses were included in 
the analysis (Powell 1999). These patterns emerge in models that compare earlier and more 
recent presidents of the modern presidency. We see differences in either frequency of speeches 
to audience type (less selective for earlier presidents, more selective for more recent presidents), 
or choice of audience type. While I do not have direct measures, these differences are indicative 
of institutional changes such as the growth of the presidential communications apparatus and 
ease of traversing the country. Future studies that included more direct measures of these aspects 
could test such suspected relationships. Some evidence of the influence of change in the mass 
media over the course of the modern presidency was also evident in the performance of the cable 
television variable in some of the models. The fact that this variable was not more influential 
may have something more to do with the subdivisions of audience type.
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The president-centered explanations are apparent in both models of the frequency of 
speeches to the different audience types and the choice models. Given the number of 
observations of speeches for each president, more president-specific analysis along the lines 
presented here could be conducted in subsequent treatments using the data I‘ve collected. 
Combined with the kind of archival research included in Chapter 3, the triangulation of 
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 In two separate analyses, Cohen (2006, 2010) makes a compelling case for the relationship between changes in 




quantitative and qualitative data could generate very rich accounts of the rhetorical patterns of 
individual presidents.   
 
Additional Extensions 
In this study I made the decision to replicate Hart‘s (1987) original coding rules. This 
decision allowed me to use an established coding scheme and alleviate the need to code 
thousands of presidential speeches between 1945 and 1983. While I followed Hart‘s rules as I 
coded speeches between 1984 and 2004, I combined several of his audience categories to create 
a new audience variable that included the selective audience designation. Arguably the main 
limitation of this new designation is that it includes speeches to collectives such as partisan 
audiences, private organizations and special interest groups. As such, it does not provide the kind 
of fine-grained measure of audience one would ideally desire. It also runs the risk of lumping 
certain audiences into the category of selective that, with more detailed information, may not be 
appropriately designated as such. Nevertheless, based on my understanding of the original 
coding scheme and my own work in coding the speeches (as well as that of an inter-reliability 
coder), I believe the selective audience designation generally identifies both partisan audiences 
and those where the average person on the street could not have been present at the speaking 
engagement. Given appropriate coding assistance, a future study could both develop more 
specific categories of audience that could more specifically designate audience types such as 
interest groups, partisan organizations, and partisan gatherings for campaign fundraising 
purposes.  
The data I‘ve collected can also easily be applied to questions of timing. The monthly 




sequencing inherent in time. Furthermore, while my data does not observe the decision not to 
speak, a daily series of speaking/not-speaking could easily be generated from the existing data.  
Future studies, therefore, could consider questions such as the timing of minor addresses relative 
to major addresses or the timing of minor addresses to selective audiences in U.S. states. The 
latter suggestion in particular, could make a nice contribution to the presidential campaign 
literature.  
Finally, while I have concentrated on the issue of audience in this analysis, the depth and 
breadth of the data affords many other focal points. As the Appendix documents, I have data 
between 1945 and 2004 on the general topic of these 19,371 addresses as well as information on 
the genre of speeches (e.g., ceremonial, honorific, etc.). While some studies have analyzed the 
extent to which and how presidents speak about certain topics, more work could be done in these 
areas – investigations that would help identify both trends across modern presidents and the 
rhetorical choices of particular presidents.  
At present, however, the major remaining question I have yet to address is what 
difference does audience really make? In particular, what are the implications of the increased 










Table 5.1  Summary Statistics for Variables in Regression Models  
 
Variable     Minimum Maximum Mean      Standard Deviation 
 
Presidential Approval Rating        22  90  54.69   12.04 
Inflation Rate           -2.87 19.67    4.00     2.98 
Unemployment Rate           1.00 11.40    5.72     1.60 
Cable TV (Percentage of Households with)        0.00 87.10  39.64   31.50   
Divided Government           0     1      .64       .48 
Presidential Reelection Year          0     1      .32       .47 
Electoral College Votes in State          0   55    8.21   11.38 
Truman             0     1                   .07       .26 
Eisenhower            0     1      .05       .21 
Kennedy            0     1      .04       .20 
Johnson            0     1      .08       .28 
Nixon             0     1      .05       .22 
Ford             0     1      .06       .24 
Carter             0     1      .07       .25 
Reagan             0     1      .14       .35 
G.H.W. Bush            0     1      .10       .29 
Clinton             0     1      .24       .43  
G.W. Bush            0     1      .10       .30 




Table 5.2  Prediction of Monthly Frequency of Core Speech Types 
                 (Truman – G.W. Bush, 2004) 
      
          Major          Minor 
         All  
     Minor 
     Domestic 
     Selective 
     All 
 
     Selective 
      Local 
Approval           -.00                 
          (.00) 
 
          -.01** 
          (.00) 
        -.02*** 
         (.00) 
        -.00 
        (.00) 
          -.01 
          (.00) 
Inflation            .00 
         (.01) 
 
          -.01 
          (.00) 
         -.04* 
         (.02) 
          .01 
        (.01) 
           .02 
          (.02) 
Unemployment           .07** 
         (.03) 
 
           .04** 
          (.02) 
         -.00 
         (.03) 
         .09*** 
        (.02) 
           .13*** 
          (.03) 
Cable TV           .02*** 
         (.00) 
 
           .02*** 
          (.00) 
          .02*** 
         (.00) 
          .02*** 
        (.00) 
           .03*** 
          (.00) 
 
Divided Government           .18* 
         (.08) 
 
          -.26*** 
          (.06) 
        -.04 
         (.11) 
        -.18** 
        (.07) 
          -.05 
          (.11) 
Presidential Election Year          -.22* 
         (.10) 
 
           .47*** 
          (.06) 
        1.19*** 
         (.12) 
          .08 
        (.07) 
           .49*** 
          (.12) 
Constant           .43 
        (.28) 
 
        2.84*** 
           .15 
        2.61*** 
         (.29) 
        1.42*** 
        (.19) 
          -.27 
          (.34) 
N (months)     717      717     717     717        717 
Log-likelihood -1762.99 -2760.26 -2107.83 -2334.41   -1571.65 
       206.45  - 284.12     195.18     252.07      250.33 
Prob>              .0000           .0000           .0000            .0000             .0000 
Pseudo R2            .05           .05           .04            .05              .07 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05 









                   Table 5.3   Percent Change in Speech Type for Unit Increase in Independent Variable 
          Major       Minor All Minor Domestic Selective All Selective Local 
Approval 
 
           -8.1               -.6           -2.2         -0.0           -.5 
Inflation 
 
              .2               -.5           -3.7          1.0          1.7 
Unemployment 
 
            7.0              3.7            -.4          9.4        14.2 
Cable TV 
 
            1.9              1.5            1.9          1.7          2.7 
Divided Govt. 
 
          19.9           -22.8           -4.4       -16.2         -4.7 
Presidential Election Year 
 
         -19.7            60.3        227.5          8.8        62.7 




Table 5.4   Prediction of Monthly Frequency of Speech Types, Indicators for Presidents Included       
(Truman – G.W. Bush, 2004) 
      
       Major        Minor All Minor Domestic Selective All Selective Local 
Approval            .00 
         (.00) 
 
         -.01*** 
         (.00) 
         -.03*** 
         (.00) 
          -.01*** 
          (.00) 
                -.02*** 
                (.00) 
Inflation          -.01 
         (.02) 
 
         -.06*** 
         (.01) 
         -.14*** 
         (.02) 
          -.04*** 
          (.01) 
                -.05* 
                (.02) 
Unemployment           .02 
         (.04) 
 
         -.06** 
         (.02) 
         -.11* 
          (.05) 
          -.04 
          (.02) 
                 .02 
                (.05) 
Cable TV          .02 
        (.01) 
 
         -.02** 
         (.01) 
         -.03 
          (.02) 
          -.00 
          (.01) 
                 .02 
                (.01) 
Divided Government          .36** 
        (.14) 
 
           .16* 
         (.07) 
          .44** 
         (.16) 
           .17* 
          (.09) 
                 .31* 
                (.16) 
Presidential Election Year         -.19 
        (.10) 
 
           .36*** 
          (.06) 
         1.03*** 
         (.12) 
          -.01 
          (.06) 
                 .28** 
                (.11) 
Truman         -.81 
         (.96) 
 
       -2.18*** 
          (.53) 
       -3.03**    
       (1.17) 
        -1.67** 
          (.57) 
             -1.25 
             (1.08) 
Eisenhower          -.24 
         (.95) 
 
       -2.72*** 
         (.52) 
       -3.90*** 
       (1.15) 
        -1.33* 
          (.56) 
                -.76 
              (1.07) 
Kennedy           .45 
         (.92) 
 
       -1.55** 
         (.51) 
       -2.57* 
       (1.12) 
          -.27 
          (.54) 
                 .19 
              (1.03) 
Johnson           .06 
         (.92) 
 
       -1.53** 
          (.50) 
      -2.81** 
      (1.11) 
          -.18 
          (.54) 
                 .13 
              (1.03) 
 
Nixon           .11 
         (.84) 
 
       -2.07*** 
          (.46) 
       -3.0* 
       (1.01) 
         -.87 
          (.50) 
                -.65 
                (.93) 
Ford           .07 
         (.72) 
 
         -.69* 
          (.40) 
       -1.01 
         (.87) 
           .39 
          (.42) 
               1.09 
                (.79) 
Carter           .37 
         (.66) 
 
         -.84* 
         (.36)  
        -1.2    
          (.78) 
           .25 
          (.38) 
                 .61 
                 (.70) 
Reagan          -.07 
         (.39) 
 
         -.78*** 
         (.22) 
       -1.60*** 
         (.47) 
          -.03 
          (.23) 
                -.36 
                (.43) 
G.H.W. Bush         -.56* 
         (.24) 
 
         -.09 
          (.14) 
         -.40 
         (.29) 
            .47*** 
           (.14) 
                 .28 
                (.25) 
Clinton           .11 
         (.18) 
 
           .03 
         (.10) 
         -.38 
         (.22) 
           .29** 
         (.11) 
                 .09 
                (.20) 
G.W. Bush __ 
 




               __ 
 
Constant           .92 
      (1.16) 
         5.64*** 
         (.63) 
        6.60*** 
       (1.39) 
          3.47*** 
          (.70) 
               1.39 
              (1.34) 
N (months)     717       717     717      717            717 
Log-likelihood 1730.51  -2661.88 -2066.57  -2203.70       -1514.90 
      271.40     480.87     277.70      513.51          363.81 
Prob>          .0000            .0000      .0000            .0000                 .0000 
Pseudo R2          .07           .08 .06           .10                 .11 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05 





Table 5.5    Multinomial Logistic Regression of Selective Speeches in U.S. Cities 
                     Compared to Other Types of Minor Addresses  
                     (Truman through G.W. Bush 2004) 
    
Speech type    
Selective (U.S. city) vs.    
 Non-selective (U.S. city) Selective (D.C.)  Non-selective (D.C.) 
Approval  .02   (5.32)***  -.01  (-3.516)***  -.01  (-2.28)* 
Inflation   .07  (6.48)***   .01     (.77)   .03  (2.21)* 
Unemployment  .15  (8.45)***   .02   ( 1.09)   .04  (1.61) 
Cable T.V.  .01 (11.00)***   .01   (9.08)***   .01  (7.29)*** 
Electoral College Votes  .02 (10.86)***    .49 (44.77)***   .48 (45.97)*** 
Divided government  .24  (3.85)***   .29  (3.64)***   .46    (5.97)*** 
Presidential election year -.70 (-12.09)***  -.07  (-1.00)   .10    (1.32) 
    
Log likelihood                   -24168.46   
Probability chi-square                                .0000   
Pseudo R-square                                .23   
N                    19,371   
    






Table 5.6  Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on Predicted Probabilities for  
                   Selected Audience Types 











Addresses in  
U.S. City 
 
Approval   54.69 
 (12.04) 
       .00219607*** 
       
    -.00162124*** 
     
       .00016932 
        
         -.00438358*** 
          
Inflation     4.00 
   (2.98) 
       .00440907*** 
 
     .00120577 
 
       .00728348*** 
        
         -.01155282*** 
          
Unemployment     5.72 
   (1.60) 
       .00702996*** 
       
     .00561111 
 
       .01324204*** 
        
         -.02850259*** 
          
Cable TV   39.34 
 (31.50) 
      -.00062841*** 
       
    -.00026006* 
     
       .00150605*** 
        
         -.00100903*** 
          
Electoral College Votes      8.21 
 (11.38) 
      -.04215582*** 
       
    -.04654880*** 
     
       .04879237*** 
        
          .06657012*** 
          
Divided Government        .64 
     (.48) 
      -.01223730 
       
    -.04917185*** 
     
       .04243952*** 
        
         -.00880378 
          
Presidential Reelection 
Year 
       .32 
      (.47) 
      -.02487265*** 
       
    -.05734992*** 
     
      -.04313207*** 
        
          .15838325*** 
          
Effects generated using the mfx command following the mlogit command in Stata 11. In the case of the two dummy variables  





Table 5.7   Multinomial Logistic Regression of Selective Speeches in U.S. Cities 
                    Compared  to Other Types of Minor Addresses  
                    (Results by Presidential Administration, Truman through G.W. Bush 2004)  
    
Speech type    
Selective (U.S. city) vs.    
 Non-selective (U.S. city) Selective (D.C.)  Non-selective (D.C.) 
Truman -2.14       (-13.05)*** -1.54        (-8.70)*** -1.50     (-9.10)*** 
Eisenhower   -.16            (-.97) -1.30        (-9.38)***    -.79    (-6.10)*** 
Kennedy   -.03            (-.14) -1.47        (-8.79)***    -.95    (-5.92)*** 
Johnson   -.24          (-1.78) -1.63      (-12.63)***    -.87    (-7.13)*** 
Nixon   -.18          (-1.18) -1.15        (-7.17)***    -.58    (-4.07)*** 
Ford   .14            (1.23)    -.00          (-.03)     .50      (4.46)*** 
Carter   .47            (3.63)***    -.81       (-6.64)***    -.07      (-.61) 
Reagan   .83            (7.18)***   -1.06     -10.24)***    -.21    (-2.12)* 
G.H.W. Bush   .71            (6.47)***    -.44       (-4.10)***     .70     (6.47)*** 
Clinton   .52            (5.71)***    -.40       (-4.10)***    -.01       (.16) 
G.W. Bush –   –   –   
    
Log likelihood            -30463.50   
Probability chi-square                        .0000   
Pseudo R-square                        .04   
N             19,371   
    




Table 5.8    Multinomial Logistic Regression of Selective Speeches in U.S. Cities 
                     Compared to Other Types of Minor Addresses (Truman through Carter) 
    
Speech type    
Selective (U.S. city) vs.    
 Non-selective (U.S. city) Selective (D.C.)  Non-selective (D.C.) 
Approval     .01        (3.18)***   -.02      (-4.03)***     -.02        (-3.86)*** 
 Inflation    -.01          (-.68)   -.07      (-2.48)**     -.08        (-3.11)** 
Unemployment     .20        (4.86)***    .14        (2.61)**      .16          (2.93)** 
Cable T.V.     .06        (4.88) ***    .02        (1.33)      .04          (2.51)** 
Electoral College Votes     .03        (7.84)    .80     (27.85)***      .80        (28.50)*** 
Divided government    -.35      (-3.61) ***    .41        (2.97) **      .27           (1.97) * 
Presidential election year    -.97    (-10.25)***  -.41       (-3.11)**     -.22         (-1.65) 
    
Log likelihood             -8975.30   
Probability chi-square                       .0000   
Pseudo R-square                       .33   
N               8334   
    





Table 5.9   Multinomial Logistic Regression of Selective Speeches in U.S. Cities 
                    Compared to Other Types of Minor Addresses  
                    (Reagan through G.W. Bush 2004) 
    
Speech type    
Selective (U.S. city) vs.    
 Non-selective (U.S. city) Selective (D.C.)  Non-selective (D.C.) 
Approval    .01           (1.44) -.01         (-2.28)* -.01         (-1.09) 
 Inflation     .13           (3.30)***   .10          (2.55)**   .06          (1.54) 
Unemployment   -.10          (-2.30)**   .19          (4.19)***  -.01          (-.12) 
Cable T.V.   -.01          (-1.23)   .04          (7.77)***   .01          (2.60)** 
 Electoral College Votes    .02           (7.55)***   .41       (31.28)***   .41       (32.81)*** 
 Divided government    .64           (5.92)***   .36          (2.74)**   .65          (5.14)*** 
Presidential election year   -.55          (-6.61)***   .01            (.13)   .18          (1.89)* 
    
Log likelihood            -14269.47   
Probability chi-square                         .0000   
Pseudo R-square                         .21   
N            11,037   
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WHY AUDIENCE MATTERS 
 
The central assertion of the ―going public‖ literature is that since the mid-1970s, the 
traditional strategy of executive-legislative bargaining has been largely supplanted by direct 
appeals on the part of the president to the American public – appeals that will supposedly  
mobilize public support for the president‘s legislative agenda. To date, scholars have turned 
almost exclusively to the more infrequent, yet higher-profile presidential addresses in an attempt 
to understand how presidents execute this strategy and to what effect. One of the main problems 
with these inquiries, however, is that they marginalize the contribution to the going public 
strategy of minor addresses – the category of presidential speeches most responsible for the 
growth in the total volume of presidential speechmaking activity. In the preceding pages, I 
present compelling empirical evidence that the going public strategy can be best understood by 
concentrating more attention on these minor addresses, specifically the audience of these minor 
addresses.  
Building on the descriptive work of Roderick Hart (1987) and the theoretical 
underpinnings of Jeffrey Cohen (2005, 2010), I draw finer distinctions among the audience of 
minor addresses that affords new insights into the manner in which presidents engage the 
American public through their public speeches. My primary contribution is the development of 
an audience classification I define as selective – a collection of individuals whose partisan or 
organizational affiliation is required in order to receive the president‘s message. Supported by 
evidence indicating stronger partisan and ideological congruence between presidents and these 
selective audiences, I maintain that speeches to such groups are fundamentally speeches to 
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audiences predisposed to agree with the president. In Chapter 2 of this study, a set of descriptive 
statistics documented the increased use of these selective speeches by the most recent modern 
presidents (Reagan through George W. Bush). The stark contrast between these presidents and 
the earlier presidents of the modern presidency was amplified in my case study of the Truman 
presidency. As I demonstrated, when Truman took his message to the American people, 
audiences were rarely restricted by some requirement of partisan or organizational affiliation. 
―Going public‖ in the Truman presidency involved speaking to an audience that was indeed quite 
―public.‖  Whereas other descriptive accounts of going public speak more to the increased 
volume of major and minor addresses, my more explicit consideration of audience suggests a 
paradigmatic shift in strategic use of speeches. Specifically, I show how more recent presidents 
are engaging in what Cohen (2005, 2010) characterizes as ―narrowcasting.‖   
Having highlighted this trend in earlier chapters, my attention then shifted to a 
consideration of the conditions under which all modern presidents would be more likely to adopt 
this strategy of narrowcasting. Among the leading findings from simple comparisons of 
speechmaking under different conditions (high vs. low approval, strong vs. poor economy, etc.) 
in Chapter 4 was that speeches to selective audiences were significantly more likely under 
divided rather than unified government, suggesting that as presidents encounter a less favorable 
legislative environment, they actually go ―narrow‖ rather than ―public.‖ While the going public 
literature suggests that divided government is one of the leading conditions encouraging 
presidents to forego traditional bargaining in favor of speeches to audiences outside of the 
Beltway, it does not specify exactly how presidents go public. By focusing on the audience of 
these speeches, I was therefore able to make more precise statements about the form of going 
public. Similarly, the data showed that presidents were less likely to speak to selective audiences 
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in presidential election years, suggesting that there is indeed variation in the nature of the 
permanent campaign – a finding supported by other scholarship (Doherty 2007) and reinforced 
in this analysis by the attention to audience.  
The primary empirical contributions, however, are provided by two sets of multivariate 
models in Chapter 5.  The first uses negative binomial regression to examine the conditions 
under which presidents deliver speeches to different audience types. This analysis of monthly 
counts showed that speeches to selective audiences are associated primarily with increases in 
unemployment rates, a finding that dovetails with results from a small collection of studies that 
have analyzed the incidence of presidential speeches (Duff and Gubala 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha 
2010; Eshbaugh-Soha and Andary 2004). Conspicuously absent from the category of statistically 
significant predictors is presidential approval, long thought to be a driving force in the use of the 
bully pulpit. In these count models, the strong indication is that presidents ―go public‖ in front of 
a variety of audiences (minor address to selective audience, minor address to non-selective 
audience, major national address) in a manner not apparently contingent on their standing with 
the American public.  
The second set of models addresses the more theoretically compelling question of choice 
of audience type. Specifically, I explore why a president selects to delivery an address to one 
audience type within the larger category of minor addresses given the choice of other audience 
types. The primary interest is the decision to deliver a speech to a selective audience, particularly 
when the location is a domestic city outside of Washington. This particular choice is the decision 
to ―go narrow‖ by ―going local‖ (Cohen 2010). When the discrete choices are modeled using 
multinomial logistic regression, higher approval ratings, worsening economic conditions and the 
presence of divided government each increase the probability of a speech to a selective audience 
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in a U.S. city compared to other audience and location combinations.  Using the same basic 
modeling structure, I separate the sample into early (Truman – Nixon) and more recent (Ford 
forward) presidents in order to explore whether factors influencing the choice of audience type, 
particularly selective audiences in U.S. cities, have changed over the duration of the modern 
presidency. The only consistent influence between the two groupings was then tendency of 
presidential election years to decrease the likelihood of speeches to selective audiences outside 
of Washington. Earlier presidents were more likely to hit the road to visit with favorable 
audiences when their approval ratings were higher. More recent presidents were influenced more 
by worsening economic conditions, divided government and electoral incentives (states with 
more Electoral College votes).  
Collectively, the empirical analysis demonstrates that recent presidents are speaking more 
frequently to audiences more predisposed to agree with their positions and that certain conditions 
appear to increase the choice of this audience type over other possible audiences. In the course of 
this analysis, I have raised concerns about the implications of these trends. In the remainder of 
this chapter, these normative issues are addressed in a more direct fashion.  
Indeed, long before a recent handful of studies, including my present contribution, started 
to focus more attention on the use of minor addresses by modern presidents, scholars of the 
rhetorical presidency voiced concerns about the normative implications of going public.  In 
particular, much consternation emanates from what the literature sees as a form of presidential 
leadership that is largely an extension of campaigning – a phenomenon Blumenthal (1980) 
coined the ―permanent campaign.‖ Two decades later, Ornstein and Mann concluded, ―the 
process of campaigning and the process of governing have each lost their distinctiveness. Just as 
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significant, the process of campaigning has become in many ways the dominant partner of the 
two‖ (2000, 219). 
The primary normative issue voiced by these studies is that when presidents make direct 
public appeals for support for their policy agenda, they are engaging in activity more appropriate 
for a candidate seeking office than an individual responsible for governing. Drawing a distinction 
between the two roles, Heclo writes, ―Campaigning is geared to one unambiguous decision point 
in time. In other words, campaigning must necessarily focus on affecting a single decision that is 
itself the outcome . . . governing, by contrast, has many interconnected points of outcome 
through time‖ (2000, 22). The fixed duration of campaigning, Heclo contends, makes the process 
adversarial rather than deliberative. Echoing these sentiments, Edwards argues that the core 
strategy of going public, ―is to defeat the opposition, creating winners and losers in a zero-sum 
game. . . destroying enemies rather than producing legislative products broadly acceptable to the 
electorate‖ (2007, 286). Not mincing words, Edwards asserts, ―The permanent campaign is 
antithetical to governing‖ (2007, 285). The empirical evidence presented in earlier chapters 
should only intensify these concerns.  
In addition to a discussion of the normative implications of an increased volume of 
speeches to selective audiences, I also devote attention to features of modern presidential politics 
that have enabled such narrowcasting – a form of presidential leadership I believe is likely to 
continue, if not intensify in the future.  In the course of this review, I also suggest ways that 
audience considerations and other dimensions of minor presidential addresses could play a larger 






The Detriments of Speaking “Selectively” 
In one of the earliest works on the rhetorical presidency, Tulis (1987) issued a grave 
assessment of the impact more frequent public appeals would have on the president‘s capacity to 
foster public deliberation. A central role for rhetoric in presidential leadership strategies, he 
maintained, ran directly counter to the Framers‘ original intentions. While the executive would 
be popularly elected, the Electoral College would help protect against mass ―mass politics.‖ The 
design, Tulis argues, was that that power of the institution would be derived from the 
Constitution rather than the mass public. The presidency of Woodrow Wilson, Tulis argues, 
ushered in a ―view of statecraft that is in tension with the original Constitution‖ (1987, 18). This 
―second Constitution," he writes, ". . . puts a premium on active and continuous presidential 
leadership of popular opinion‖ (18).  Even more profoundly, Tulis asserts that Wilson‘s effective 
establishment of the rhetorical presidency challenged the Founders‘ conception of the separation 
of powers. Wilson‘s aims, according to Tulis, were to enhance the American public‘s 
deliberation of public policy issues – to broaden the dialogue beyond the legislative branch. 
Instead, the development of the rhetorical presidency, he argues, has diminished public 
deliberation. Tulis writes, ―Today the pace of policy development follows less the rhythms of 
Congress and more the dynamics of public opinion. The consequence of this development is not 
only that Congress will often be left out of the deliberative stages of policy formation and that 
rhetorical imperatives will play a large role, but also that Congress will be forced to respond in 
kind.‖ (178) 
While some critiques contend that Tulis has either misinterpreted the Framers‘ 
expectations of presidential management of popular opinion (Laracey 2002), there is no debate 
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that public appeals have become a central aspect of presidential leadership. As we devote 
additional attention to the full complement of presidential speeches, particularly those by the 
most recent occupants of the White House, it is increasingly clear that going public is assuming a 
new form. Jacobs captures the dynamic quite well in the following statement:  
The efforts of contemporary presidents stand out for the techniques they use and the 
sharpness of the contrast between their ubiquitous public persona and their intensifying 
strategies behind the scene.  One of the paradoxes of our time is that as presidents have 
promoted themselves ever more aggressively and visibly as defenders of the national 
interest, they and their advisors have devoted more attention to tracking and influencing 
narrow, discrete segments of the country to support the administration (2005, 178). 
  
My analysis of minor presidential addresses over the past 60 year, which takes into 
account the audience of presidential addresses – a factor largely neglected by prior studies – 
raises particular questions about the president‘s capacity to fulfill Wilson‘s vision of the 
president as a leading promoter of public deliberation. As the audience of presidential addresses 
becomes more partisan and less demographically diverse, so does the incentive to speak as an 
educator rather than a campaigner.  When presidents preach to the choir (e.g., deliver speeches to 
selective audiences), they are more interested in moving the audience to action in the direction 
both are already inclined to follow, rather than challenging the audience, and themselves, to 
consider whether the path they have chosen is truly the best available. As Hart concluded from 
his consideration of audience even through just the midpoint of Reagan‘s presidency, ―the more 
frequently presidents retreat to political ceremonies, to closed rallies, and to carefully staged 
media events, the less they use communication to promote understanding among all people, to 
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challenge the minds and wills and hearts of citizens, to solve immediate human problems‖ (1987, 
206).  
When addressing selective audiences, presidents and their speechwriters have less of a 
need to be concerned about views held by partisan opponents – views which may even reflect 
majority sentiment. As Jacobs writes, narrowcasting ―intensifies and expands the incentives to 
discount the preferences of majorities on a range of issues . . . in favor of the views of subgroups 
who harbor intense preferences (2005, 206). Thus, the rhetoric of speeches to selective audiences 
is more likely to be more partisan and ideologically extreme than rhetoric the president would 
utilize before a broader audience.  As Cohen suggests, ―Since the public at-large tends to be 
moderate compared to interest groups and other population segments, going ‗national‘ will pull a 
president toward a moderate stance in comparison to going ‗narrow‘ which will pull him toward 
a more extreme position‖ (2005, 5).  Admittedly, such assertions about the relationship between 
rhetoric and audience type need to be subjected to more stringent tests. With data distinguishing 
selective and non-selective audiences in hand, one could compare the partisan tone of a sample 
of speeches to selective audiences with those of a sample of speeches to non-selective audiences. 
Speeches to selective audiences would also seem to increase the likelihood of pandering 
on the part of presidents – behavior counterproductive to public deliberation. Here again, a 
comparison of rhetoric used in speeches to selective and non-selective audiences could provide a 
useful test of this hypothesis. Perhaps, rather than pandering, the context of a speech to a 
selective audience simply allows presidents to make their case in an environment when they are 
less likely to be challenged by the immediate recipients. This later scenario would be more akin 
to the conclusions of Canes-Wrone, who found that while presidential addresses ―may give the 
misimpression that [the president] is a plebiscite who endorses whatever the current stances of 
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the public are. . . the president is typically publicizing policies that he would have supported had 
they not been popular‖ (2006, 186).    Again, such speculation needs to be subjected to empirical 
verification. Doing so would either strengthen or call into question Canes-Wrone‘s conclusions 
about the conditions under which pandering is more likely to occur. 
 Even in the absence of pandering, however, speeches to selective audiences are clearly 
more likely to reinforce the preexisting beliefs of the audience as well as those of the president.   
One of the ways this occurs is through the emotional connection between the audience and 
speaker. An audience predisposed to the president‘s position, argues Hart (1987), primarily 
serves as an emotional ally for the president.  Presidents, he notes, ―polish their acts before such 
groups, often becoming seduced by the applause they and their staffs have prearranged. Such 
speechmaking thus has a self-reflexive impact on a president, insulating him from contrary 
viewpoints and rewarding him for feeling the emotions he is currently feeling‖ (1987, 196). This 
kind of reinforcement would be particularly detrimental for presidents who have failed to 
sufficiently surround themselves with individuals who are consistently capable of challenging 
the president‘s thinking.  
A prime example of this dynamic is captured by Tulis (1987).   Examining a string of 
speeches Reagan made early in his term in which he promoted his administration‘s positive 
record on gender equality in the workplace, Tulis noted an interesting trend. Speeches on this 
topic were almost exclusively delivered before receptive audiences generally accepting of the 
messages and, therefore unwilling to question the validity of the claims – claims which largely 
over exaggerated the administration‘s actual efforts to address gender discrimination.    
 Another detrimental effect rendered more likely by speeches to selective audiences is 
suggested by Pious in his work ominously titled Why Presidents Fail. Assessing the impact of 
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going public by presidents more generally, Pious noted, ―if their primary audience is electoral 
constituencies rather than congressional colleagues, they will make unreasonable proposals while 
maintaining the pretense of reasonableness. Or they will successfully conclude closed-door 
negotiations while trying to maintain their base with unreasonable public rhetoric. Either way, 
the public will see that their positioning is out of sync with their rhetoric‖ (2008, 291).  So, 
ironically, a speaking to selective audiences may actually do more to create larger disconnects 
between the president and the public, particularly when the rhetoric in such instances is not in 
sync with rhetoric used in speeches to broader audiences.  
 As the frequency of speeches to selective audiences increases, we should also be 
concerned with not only the potential effects of such activity on presidential leadership, but also 
what appears to encourage the strategy of narrowcasting. In earlier chapters, I identified 
conditions under which speeches to selective audiences are more likely to occur and conditions 
under which presidents choose to speak to a selective audience over a more ―public‖ audience. 
While the models are helpful in advancing our understanding of both frequency and choice of 
speech type, they don‘t capture some features that may explain why speeches to selective 
audiences have become more feasible and enticing to presidents, and appear likely to for the 
foreseeable future.   
 
Why Speaking Selectively will Continue 
Prior scholarship identified various ways in which the development of the White House, 
presidential politics and the media have contributed to the general growth of going public.  As 
I‘ve revisited these accounts in light of the increased use of speeches to selective audiences I‘ve 
documented, a few of these developments appear well suited to the maintenance of a 
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narrowcasting strategy. One of the most prominent enablers is the further entrenchment of an 
increasingly sophisticated White House public opinion polling apparatus. Launched in the Nixon 
administration, and used extensively by each successive president, this resource has allowed and 
should continue to allow presidential aides to target very specific potential audiences for 
presidential addresses.  One particular advancement of this operation that is especially well 
suited to narrowcasting is the rise of subgroup polling documented by Jacobs (2005).  Equipped 
with even more detailed information about specific segments of the American populous, 
presidential aides will more effectively be able to identify favorable audiences and hone 
messages designed to bolster their support.   
While internal polling has further enabled the knowledge of where and how to target 
presidential appeals, the ability to actually deliver the president‘s message has been advanced by 
a core triumvirate of White House offices established since 1969, the Office of Communications 
(1969), Office of Public Liaison (1974), and Office of Political Affairs (1981).
96
 According to 
Tenpas, the essential function of these offices is to ―enhance the president‘s popularity among 
key constituents in an effort to gain support for a governmental program, policy, or campaign. 
―In short,‖ she continues, ―the modern White House is now able to perform many of the same 
tasks that a party organization or political campaign would carry out in the course of daily 
business‖ (2000, 109).    
Of the three offices, the Office of Political Affairs is most frequently cited as the one 
most directly responsible for the implementation of the permanent campaign. According to the 
current (2010) White House description, ―The Office of Political Affairs serves the President by 
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providing him with an accurate assessment of the political dynamics affecting the work of his 
administration, supporting the advancement of his agenda, and ensuring that the White House 
understands the priorities of and remains in close contact with Americans across the nation.‖97  
Assailed by Republicans and Democrats alike depending on the party in control of the Oval 
Office, the Office of Political Affairs remains the most visible taxpayer funded political 
apparatus of the White House.  ―The Office of Political Affairs, writes Tenpas,‖ now a mainstay 
in the White House office, is exactly what Sidney Blumenthal was referring to when he pointed 
out that the permanent campaign had ‗remade the government into an instrument designed to 
sustain an elected official‘s popularity.‘ No White House office comes closer to achieving that 
goal than the Office of Political Affairs‖ (2000, 111).  
Outside of institutional features, several scholars have also pointed to changes in 
presidential election dynamics since the mid-1970s as leading contributors to the strategy of 
going public.  These components include the growth of primaries and caucuses, the development 
of candidate-centered campaigns, and the increase in the number of ―outsider‖ candidates, four 
of which who achieved electoral victories between 1976 and 2004 (Carter, Reagan, Clinton and 
George W. Bush). Burns, for one, suggests an even earlier paradigmatic shift in campaigning that 
has spilled over into governing. Specifically, he points to the 1960 Kennedy campaign as the 
blueprint for all subsequent presidential campaigns and governing strategies. He argues that all 
presidents from 1960 forward have constructed ―personal, transient electoral coalitions whose 
one purpose was to get them into office,‖ a strategy he refers to as ―running alone‖ (2006, 3). As 
a result of this strategy, he argues that the nature of governing has been effectively altered. In 
order to maintain this coalition, presidents have to construct policy agendas that are reinforced 





by targeted public appeals. Therefore, presidents should not be surprised to find themselves 
struggling to build coalitions and using speeches primarily as devices to hold onto these carefully 
crafted coalitions instead of finding ways to develop more diverse bases of support. Such 
behavior, he contends, contributes to the further personalization of the presidency; a concern 
noted two decades earlier by Lowi (1985).  
Given the alleged connections between campaigning and governing, a more detailed 
examination of the audience of presidential campaign activities may also be in order. Such an 
examination would give us a better sense of whether the nature of presidential campaign 
appearances have changed in meaningful ways –knowledge that would refine our claims about 
the spillover effects from campaigning to governing.  Focusing on the frequency and location of 
candidate appearances, Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw (2002) find that the concentration of 
candidate appearances in competitive states has, contrary to anecdotal accounts, remained 
relatively stable since 1972, as have visits to states where a candidate‘s political opponents have 
enjoyed more electoral success.  From this standpoint, campaigning does not appear to have 
become more narrowly tailored, despite technological developments that would appear to have 
encouraged such targeted campaigning. However, in Chapter 3, I showed that while both the 
number of open and partisan rallies involving incumbent presidents has increased over time, 
partisan rallies consistently outpace the number of open rallies since the mid-1970s.  While the 
speaking engagements included in the analysis of rallies include campaign activities for 
congressional candidates as well as a president‘s own reelection efforts, I raise the point to stress 
the need for a closer consideration of the audience of presidential campaign activities.  
Finally, developments in the media have made the use of minor addresses to more 
narrowly defined audiences in domestic locations outside of Washington an increasingly 
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attractive option for presidents. Several pieces of scholarship document that presidents garner not 
only more extensive, but also more favorable coverage from these events (Barrett and Peake 
2007; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2006; Cohen 2010). In his most recent contribution to this line 
of evidence, Cohen presents convincing evidence that ―going narrow‖ by ―going local‖ has the 
capacity to influence narrow segments of the population. Examining the effects on readers of 
local newspapers in locations the president had visited, he found that appeals to local audiences 
generated coverage that is more positive for presidents – coverage that, in turn, improved 
respondent‘s thermometer ratings of the president.  While the impact was greater for readers of 
major rather than minor local newspapers and for those citizens who are not as skilled in 
interpreting events reported by newspapers, the findings are one of the clearest pieces of 
evidence of a payoff for the strategy of narrowcasting.   
Even more importantly, Cohen found evidence that the scope of presidential appeals – 
dictated by the composition of the intended audience – resulted in notable differences in the 
president‘s ability to influence public opinion. ‗Presidential leadership effects,‖ he concluded,  
―have a greater influence on public opinion when the content of the news people receive is 
targeted than when a president speaks directly to the entire mass public‖ (2010, 221).  In an 
environment of partisan polarization and media fragmentation, Cohen speculates, presidents go 
narrow because it is perhaps their most effective strategy.  
If, as I‘m inclined to agree, narrowcasting has emerged as the dominant strategy for 
future presidents as they attempt to garner needed support for their policy and political 
objectives, it is increasingly important that we devote attention to the large volume of minor 
addresses.  We need to know more about not only the audience of such speeches, but their 
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timing, geographical allocation and policy focus. Doing so will be crucial to our understanding 
of presidential leadership. 
―Theory is richest,‖ writes Hart, ―when it accounts comprehensively for multiple events 
rather than individual instances, for the comparatively unmonitored rather than the widely 
observed activity, for the regularized rather than the idiosyncratic behavior‖ (Hart 1984, 294). 
Despite comprising the most ―regularized‖ form of presidential public activity, minor addresses 
have languished as the ―comparatively unmonitored‖ class of presidential speeches among 
students of the rhetorical presidency and, more broadly, presidential leadership. In this present 
work, I‘ve concentrated primarily on the facet of audience, attempting to draw distinctions 
between broad types of audiences of presidential speeches and recognizing the need for further 
refinement of these typologies. While I‘ve also stopped well short of undertaking theory 
development project, my hope is that my contribution has demonstrated that continued study of 
the rich volume of all presidential addresses could lead to new and more refined theories of 
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General Coding Guidelines  
 
Dr. Roderick P. Hart, Shivers Chair in Communication and Professor of Government at the 
University of Texas at Austin, graciously granted me permission to utilize data he collected on 
11,731 instances of presidential speechmaking between 1945 and mid-January 1993. His dataset 
does not contain records of speeches delivered by President Reagan between 1983 and 1985. 
Speeches delivered during these three years, along with all remarks delivered between 1993 and 
2004 (Clinton and George W. Bush), were coded for this project using Professor Hart‘s original 
coding scheme and guidelines I developed for additional dependent and independent variables 
presented in this thesis. Hart‘s original coding scheme is presented verbatim in this Appendix 
(denoted by the use of quotation marks).  
 
Either all presidential speeches coded by Professor Hart or me are published in bound volumes 
of the Public Papers of the Presidents or the loose-leaf supplement, Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents. The American Presidency Project at the University of California at 
Santa Barbara has also made these documents available in electronic format 
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu). As Hart notes, these sources ―contain essential, historical 
information about the speaking events in question, including (brief) designations of audience, 
setting, timing, etc.‖ (Hart 1987, 216). While the sources also contain all written directives, 
announcements, designations, etc. issued by the White House, my focus, like Hart‘s, is the 
spoken word. Accordingly, I follow Hart‘s lead and code only presidential remarks with the 
following designations in these publications:  







Remarks and Q&A with 
Question and Answer Session with 
News Conference 
 
Documents with these designations indicate speeches delivered by the president as opposed to 
written documents that may bear the president‘s signature. Consistent with Hart, to be included 
as a speechmaking event, the total verbal output by the president had to exceed 150 words even 
if the president was not the sole individual delivering remarks (e.g., joint press conference with 









Categories of Variables and Descriptions of Individual Variables 
 In many ways, this study is about the who, what, when, where, why, to whom and how of 
presidential speechmaking. In addition to patterns across the modern presidency (defined here as 
presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt), the data collected for this thesis allows me to make 
statements about the speechmaking nuances of individual presidents. I present the most complete 
account to date of the policy topics on which modern presidents have spoken, how frequently 
they have delivered various types of speeches (e.g., major nationally televised speeches, remarks 
at receptions honoring heads of state), where they have spoken (e.g., key electoral states, foreign 
cities), to whom, and under what conditions (e.g., seeking reelection, favorable economic 
conditions, high vs. low approval ratings). The remainder of this Appendix is thus organized 
according to these fundamental categories (who, what, when, etc.). To facilitate both future 
replication and/or reliability checks, I provide detailed accounts of both Hart‘s original coding 
scheme and additional variables I have added to his original dataset. 
 
Who Delivered the Speech 
 The following variables allow me to make statements about individual presidents and 
patterns across the entire collection of presidents examined.  
 
President. Each president is identified by a unique number. I also create dummy variables for 
each president.  
 
Political Party. Political party affiliation of the president, coded 1 for Democratic presidents and 
0 for Republican presidents. 
 
Term of Administration. Dummy variables are created for both the first term of an administration 
and, where applicable, its second term. Death and resignation create three unique situations. 
Given President Roosevelt‘s passing in April of 1945, I treat this month and year as the start of 
President Harry Truman‘s first term. Since President John Kennedy was assassinated in 
November 1963, the records for President Lyndon Johnson start this same month, but I do not 
count speeches delivered during the remainder of 1963 and all of 1964 as President Johnson‘s 
first term. I treat January 1965 as the start of Johnson‘s first and only term. Finally, Richard 
Nixon‘s resignation in August 1974 marked the start of Gerald Ford‘s speeches. Therefore, I 
treat all speeches by President Ford (starting on August 9, 1974) as Ford‘s first term as opposed 
to a continuation of President Nixon‘s second term.  
 
 
When the Speech Was Delivered 
 In addition to the date of delivery (Date), I extend two of Hart‘s original variables. 
Season of the year in which the remarks were delivered is designated as follows: winter 
(December, January, February), spring (March, April, May), summer (June, July, August) and 
fall (September, October, November). Hart placed presidents in the following periods (Era): 
early modern presidents (1945-1957), middle modern presidents (1958-1969), and recent modern 
presidents (1970-present). Given that a substantial proportion of the speeches were delivered 
after 1970, I recoded this variable as follows: 1945-1960, 1961-1968, 1969-1980, 1981-1992, 
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and 1993-2004. These recoded time periods have several advantages. First, they keep entire 
administrations intact. Hart‘s early modern period, for instance, concludes in the middle of 
President Eisenhower‘s second term. Second, they provide greater coherence of speechmaking 
trends influenced by one or more of the following aspects: party affiliation (1961-1968, 1981-
1992), technological differences (1945-1960 era when television was in its infancy) and volume 
of speechmaking (1993-2004 representing a notable increase in activity from even the 1981-1992 
period).  
 Hart also recorded two additional variables that relate to the timing of speeches. Order 
identifies the sequence within which a speech was delivered within a given day (1=first speech 
delivered, 2=second speech delivered, etc.). Activity records the number of speeches delivered on 
a day when the president made at least one speech (coded as 1=one speech, 2=two to three 
speeches, 3=four to six speeches, 4=seven or more speeches). These original coding schemes for 
Order and Activity remain intact. 
 
 
Where the Speech Was Delivered 
 Hart (1987) and later, Kernell (1993), documented the increasing propensity of presidents 
to deliver minor addresses outside of Washington, D.C. Place identifies the general location the 
remarks were delivered, where 1 denotes remarks delivered Washington, D.C. or the surrounding 
metropolitan area, 2 remarks delivered in a U.S. city, and 3 remarks delivered in an international 
city. State identifies the U.S. state in which the remarks were delivered. I also record whether the 
speech was delivered in the home state of a president. Consistent with Doherty (2007), the home 
states for presidents are: Truman (Missouri), Eisenhower (none), Kennedy (Massachusetts), 
Johnson (Texas), Nixon (California), Ford (Michigan), Carter (Georgia), Reagan (California), 
George H.W. Bush (Texas and Maine), Clinton (Arkansas and New York 2000), George W. 
Bush (Texas). Continuing Hart‘s practice, I also note the geographic sector of the United States 
where the speech was delivered (Sector), using the following designations: 
 
Northeast (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont) 
 
South (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia) 
 
Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin) 
 
West (Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, 









What the President Spoke About 
 While I record more detailed information about the policy topic of each address delivered 
by presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, I otherwise follow Hart‘s coding scheme (Topic), 
presented verbatim in quotation marks below:  
 
―If 25% or more of the printed content of a given speech could not be easily assigned to one of 
the following categories, it was designated Other [Miscellaneous]. If 75% or more of such 
content dealt with two or more of the following categories, it was designated Multiple. In all 
other cases, one of the following topical designations was used: 
 
Science. Speeches focusing on the political ramifications of understanding the 
fundamental laws of nature and on preserving or exploiting natural phenomena. Includes 
environmental concerns, space exploration, agricultural production, energy resources, 
transportation advances, wildlife protection, new technologies, and medical research 
opportunities. 
 
Economy. Speeches dealing with budgetary operations at the federal level and with 
broad-scale economic fluctuations on the domestic scene. Includes unemployment trends, 
labor-management disputes, spending policy, interstate banking, industrial development, 
and supplies of goods and commodities.  
 
Government. Speeches commenting upon the regulatory function of government, 
primarily as that function is institutionalized in the executive, judicial, and congressional 
branches of the federal bureaucracy. Includes criminal prosecution, law and its 
implementation, judicial appointments, intergovernmental relations, the two-party 
system, federal election procedures, etc. 
 
Human services. Speeches describing immediate social problems, the political remedies 
available to solve those problems, and the implications for society of meeting these 
human needs. Includes discussions of educational standards, school busing, public 
welfare, medical care, social security, urban decay, public housing, etc. 
 
Human values. Speeches heralding the overarching importance of philosophical 
commitments, ethical responsibility, and creative genius. Includes such topics as religious 
freedom, historical truths and events, patriotic duties, charitable institutions, moral 




International cooperation. Speeches focusing on the obligations of the United States 
government and its people to participate with other countries in scientific, educational, 
and cultural projects and to provide medical and other assistance when needed. Includes 
such matters as the Peace Corps, historical commemorations, cultural exchanges, 
international trade, Voice of Democracy, detente, UNESCO, etc. 
 
International conflict. Speeches dealing with major ruptures in the international 
community and with the relative advisability of using military action to resolve those 
disputes. Includes topics like international terrorism, major police actions, arms control, 
military embargos, weapons systems, and such major conflagrations as Korea, Vietnam, 
the Middle East, etc.‖ (Hart 1987, 218-219) 
 
 
How the Speech is Categorized 
The circumstances under which presidents deliver speeches varies considerably. Hart 
(1987) documented this variation in two variables with multiple categories. The first, Format, 
―refers to the social/spatial environment surrounding the presidential speech in question, 
including its interpersonal circumstances as well as its comparative formality. Specifically 
includes the following: 
 
Initiating ceremony. Includes the public signing of a newly created piece of legislation, 
the formal enactment of a compact or treaty, or the swearing-in of a government official 
or some other newly designated person of authority. 
 
Honorific ceremony. Includes remarks at testimonial dinners, at Medal of Honor 
ceremonies, at college or university commencement exercises, or at some other event 
designated to bestow formal recognition of achievement on some group or individual. 
 
Celebrative ceremony. Includes presidential eulogies, patriotic remembrances, 
anniversary celebrations, building dedications, formal dinners for visiting heads of state 
and other events designed to herald important values, historical truths, and interpersonal 
relations. 
 
Greeting/Departure ceremony. Includes all presidential speeches in which the president 
formally welcomes a visiting dignitary to the United States (often at either the airport or 
the White House) or when the president himself arrives at some new locale for (largely) 
diplomatic purposes. Many such greetings were followed within a day or two by 
departure ceremonies. 
 
Briefing. Consisted of all formal (i.e., regularly scheduled or specially arranged) 
interactions between the president and members of the press or ordinary citizens or both. 
Includes official announcements from the Oval Office, press conferences with national, 




Organizational meeting. Typically consisted of the president meeting with members of 
fraternal, educational, corporate, or social organizations as part of their normal schedule 
of meetings. Occasionally, such encounters took place at the White House, but 
convention halls and hotel ballrooms were the more common locations. Often the 
president‘s speech served to introduce or keynote the proceedings, and, not uncommonly, 
the president‘s remarks bore only tangential relevance to the stated purposes and goals of 
the organization in question.  
 
Political rally. Speeches by the president given in avowedly political surroundings. 
Included convention keynote addresses, brief airport visits, annual political 
remembrances, standard stump speeches, fundraising dinners, etc. Occasionally, such 
remarks were presented in ceremonial surroundings; in such ‗mottled‘ cases, the 
designation of ‗political rally‘ was used if the speech made repeated references to 
campaign activities or occurred adjacent in time to other election-based events. 
 
Miscellaneous remarks. Consisted of a wide variety of communicative events that could 
not be expressly assigned to one of the foregoing settings. Included spontaneous remarks 
during foreign and domestic travel, introductions of dignitaries or artists visiting the 
White House, miscellaneous commentaries on events of the day (e.g., at the site of a 
natural disaster), etc.‖ (Hart 1987, 219-220) 
 
The second variable that identifies unique types of speeches is Genre. As Hart (1987) 
writes, this denotes ―a variety of unique speech events distinguished by location, topic, or by 
audience composition. Is there an end quotes here? These categories proved useful for examining 




Recorded. Nationally telecast (or radio only) briefings by the president for the press. This 
category included only those briefings that focused on a variety of topics‖ [includes State 
of the Union addresses and weekly radio addresses]. 
 
Traditional press conferences (D.C.). Press conferences held at the White House. 
 
Traditional press conferences (local). Press conferences held in a U.S. or international 
city.  
 
Traditional ceremonies (D.C.). Formal ceremonies held in the nation‘s capital. 
 
Traditional ceremonies (local). Formal ceremonies held in a U.S. city or international 
city. 
 
Open rallies. ―Political gatherings explicitly featuring a candidate for political office and 
attended by self-selected audience members. Typically, such gatherings were held on 
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public grounds, in public buildings, or in private, large-space facilities rented for the 
event.  
 
Partisan rallies. Political gatherings explicitly featuring a candidate for political office 
and attended by audience members explicitly invited for the event or by persons united 
by some sort of formal, organizational tie. Typically, such gatherings were held in private 
dining or meeting facilities.  
 
Local foreign policy speeches. Any set of public remarks by the president devoted 
exclusively to international matters and presented to an audience in one of the continental 
United States. Although not terribly common, such speeches proved to be interesting 
markers of a chief executive‘s willingness to ‗campaign‘ for specific foreign policy 
initiatives.‖ (Hart 1987, 221) 
 
 In addition to these variables, I provide more refined measures of certain types of 
addresses listed above. One such address is presidential remarks to members of the media. Hart‘s 
only category is press conferences, but as Kumar (2003b) notes and the headings in the Public 
Papers of the President reflect, presidents are increasingly using formats outside of the 
traditional press conference. Accordingly, to draw appropriate distinctions, I create a few new 
variables.  News Conferences, captures formal news conferences or ―press conferences‖ as they 
are often referred to in the literature. For reliability purposes, I use the list of news conferences 
generated by the American Presidency Project at the University of California at Santa Barbara 
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/news_conferences.php).  More specifically, news conferences 
are coded as follows: 1=news conference conducted by the president in Washington, 2=news 
conference conducted by the president in a domestic U.S. city, 3=news conference conducted by 
the president in a foreign city, 4=joint news conference (e.g., president and another head of state) 
conducted in Washington, 5=joint news conference conducted in a domestic U.S. city, 6=joint 
news conference conducted in a foreign city.  
 
I also construct a dummy variable, Press Briefings, which identifies more routine 
statements to the media outside of formal press conferences, including events that fall under the 
heading  ―Exchange with Reporters‖ in the Public Papers of the President.  Presidents have been 
utilizing these settings with much greater frequency since 1993 (Clinton). They allow the 
president to control the topic of the briefing and limit the interaction with the media.  A separate 
dummy variable (Local Press Briefings) notes whether these briefings were conducted in a 
domestic U.S. city.  
 
Since Hart‘s original work, presidents have also expanded their use of weekly radio 
addresses to the American public. Considering this a unique medium of communication, I 
chronicle the weekly radio address delivered during by the only three presidents who 
consistently used this medium throughout their tenure in office, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and 
George W. Bush (through 2004) in a dummy variable, Radio.   
 
Three additional genres of speeches also warrant unique classification. I create separate 
dummy variables for State of the Union Addresses (State of Union), presidential debates 
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(Debate) involving sitting presidents, and national nominating convention acceptance speeches 
delivered by presidents seeking reelection (Convention). For a complete list of radio addresses, 
State of the Union Addresses, presidential debates and nominating convention acceptance 
speeches, I rely on the American Presidency Project at the University of California at Santa 
Barbara (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu). 
 
 Finally, I make an important distinction between major and minor addresses. Working 
within Hart‘s coding scheme, I define major addresses as consisting of all remarks Hart labels 
―Recorded‖ (see description of Genre, above) with the exception of radio addresses (Radio). The 
―Recorded‖ category includes formal press conferences (as opposed to press briefings) and State 
of the Union Addresses. Minor addresses consist of all addresses that are not major addresses or 
any of the following unique types of addresses: radio addresses, debates, convention acceptance 
speeches, press briefings.  
 
Who the President Addressed  
The central argument of my thesis is that presidents are speaking to increasingly selective 
audiences when they are going public, particularly when they are delivering minor addresses in 
locations outside of Washington, D.C.  Therefore, ―audience‖ variables are arguably the most 
important variables I construct. Since I am extending Hart‘s original determination of audience 
type, I first present his description of the Audience variable. I then explain how I use these 
categories to generate new audience variables that are most relevant to my analysis.  
 
In documenting his coding decisions for this variable, Hart (1987) writes, ―To the extent 
that the specific members of a given audience could be isolated for the presidential speech in 
question, the group was assigned to one of the following categories:  
 
Governmental Employees. Any duly authorized assemblage of federal employees, most 
of whom were either members of the military, cabinet officers and/or White House 
staffers, or civil service workers in the various departments of government (Department 
of State, the Pentagon, National Parks employees, etc.) 
 
Local and/or Press. By far the most common audience, consisting typically of 
undifferentiated persons in local communities gathered together spontaneously for a 
presidential address. Presidential remarks made exclusively to members of the press had 
to conform to the criteria (of duration) described above to be included in the data bank. 
 
National. Included all mediated presidential addresses before live audiences, those 
delivered in real time to a television or radio audience exclusively, or those presented on 




Invited guests. Persons specially selected for attendance at a presidential event who 
represent no discernable group or organization but who have gathered together for some 
formal purpose (e.g., a state dinner). 
 
Group members. Includes members of any formally constituted group or organization 
who assembled for a special presidential speech or who were being visited by the 
president as part of their normal schedule of meetings (e.g., such groups as the United 
Steel Workers, International Press Association, Republican party, etc.) 
 
Other. Used where the audience could not be classified according to one of the 
aforementioned categories‖ (Hart 1987, 219).  
 
Using Hart‘s categories, all addresses identified as audiences of invited guests and group 
members are included in a new variable, designed Selective Audience. This variable also includes 
addresses identified as Partisan Rallies (see description under Genre). I then create two separate 
a dummy variables, the first for speeches delivered to selective audiences in the greater 
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area (Selective D.C.) and a second for speeches delivered to 
selective audiences in domestic U.S. cities (Selective Domestic).   
 
 
Under What Conditions Were the Speeches Delivered 
 While the aforementioned variables contribute to a descriptive account of presidential 
speechmaking activity, the following variables factor prominently into models that seek to 
explain such activity.  
  
Presidential Approval 
I use the Gallup Organization‘s presidential approval series for all administrations covered by 




 The going public literature suggests that changes in the executive-legislative 
bargaining environment have encouraged greater use of presidential public activity. In my 
study, I explore aspects of this notion via the following indicators:  
 
Divided Government: A traditional measure of divided government, coded 1 if at least 
one chamber of Congress is controlled by the opposite party of the president and 0 if the 




Partisan Control: This alternate measure of divided government allows me to explore the 
possibility that presidential speechmaking may vary in circumstances where the president 
faces an entire Congress controlled by the opposing party rather than one chamber. 
Coded 3 when a single party controls the presidency, House and Senate, coded 2 when a 
single party controls the presidency and either the House or the Senate, and coded 1 when 
a single party controls only the presidency. 
 
Partisan Arrangement: As a way of testing an even more refined measure of partisan 
control of the presidency and Congress, this variable notes which one of the eight 
possible alignments was present at the time the speech was delivered (RRR, RRD, RDR, 
RDD, DDD, DRD, DDR, DRR, where the first letter refers to control of the presidency, 
the second, control of the Senate and the third, control of the House.  For instance, 
Republicans could control the presidency, Senate and House (RRR), or just the 





 Empirical evidence demonstrates a marked difference in presidential rhetorical activity 
between election and non-election years as well differences in presidential visits to states 
according to their electoral strength (Electoral College votes) or favorable partisan environment 
(locations within states where presidents enjoyed more electoral support). The following 
variables capture such dynamics: 
 
Election Year: Remarks delivered during presidential or midterm election years.  
 
Midterm Election Year: Dummy variable recording remarks delivered during a midterm 
election year.  
 
Presidential Election Year: Dummy variable recording remarks delivered during 
presidential election years, even if the incumbent was not running for reelection.  
 
Reelection Year: Dummy variable recording remarks delivered in a presidential election 
year where the incumbent sought a second term.  
 
Electoral College Votes:  For observations where presidents spoke in a domestic U.S. 
city, I record the number of Electoral College votes for that state in the upcoming 
presidential election. This allows me to explore the influence of a state‘s electoral 
strength in the president‘s decision to visit this state. Electoral College votes are also 
recoded into an ordinal variable where 1=3 to 5 Electoral College votes, 2=6 to 10 
Electoral College votes, 3=11 to 19 Electoral College votes, 4=20 or more Electoral 
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College votes.  While some states have obviously gained or lost Electoral College votes 
from election to election, vote totals are recorded at the time of the speech delivered. 
 
Two separate variables allow me to explore the influence of a favorable electoral 
environment on the decision to deliver an address. For all presidents, I record the 
percentage of the two party vote total (Percentage of Vote in State) the president (or, in 
the cases of certain years for Truman and Johnson and all of Ford) received in the prior 
election.  For use in my case-study of the George W. Bush administration, I also record 
the percentage of the two party vote total the president received in the county in which 






 The going public literature also explores the extent to which presidential speechmaking 
activity is influenced by national economic conditions. I test this notion in multivariate models 
that use the following measures of economic performance: 
 
Unemployment Rate: Monthly national unemployment rate figures generated by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics for the period under consideration in this study are utilized 
(www.bls.gov). Since I am interested in the degree to which presidential rhetorical 
activity reacts to positive or negative changes in the economy, I also create a three-month 
lag of unemployment rate. Both current unemployment rate and the quarterly lag are 
tested in various models (Similar tests of unemployment were conducted by Ragsdale, 
1984). Since unemployment data is a monthly series, observations to coincide with 
instances of speechmaking are generated by linear interpolation. Appropriate lags for 
each model are determined by applicable statistical tests.  
 
Inflation: The measure of inflation is the level of the monthly consumer price index, for 
the months under consideration in this study. Data were obtained from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics web page (www.bls.gov). Similar to the unemployment rate, both current 
and three-month lags of inflation are tested in various models (See Ragsdale, 1984 for 
further discussion of such treatment).  Since unemployment data is a monthly series, 
observations to coincide with instances of speechmaking are generated by linear 





Percentage of Households with Cable Television  
  Baum and Kernell (1999) demonstrate that the growth of cable and satellite television 
has resulted in a decline of audiences tuning into nationally televised addresses. Accordingly, I 
record the percentage of U.S. households with cable television (Cable) as documented annually 
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by the National Cable and Telecommunications Association. Missing observations are generated 




 Given available resources to assist with intercoder reliability, I directed another 
individual to code a proportionate stratified sample of 500 speeches from the full complement of 
speeches in my dataset.  The number of speeches for each president selected for this sample is 
equivalent to their proportion of speeches in the full dataset. George W. Bush, for instance, 
comprised ten percent of all speeches coded. Therefore, the other coder recorded relevant 
information for 50 of Bush‘s speeches (10% of 500). The percentage of all speeches delivered by 
each president is displayed in Figure 2.2 of Chapter 2. A single year of each president‗s term was 
randomly selected and the requisite number of speeches for each president was then also 
randomly selected from that year‘s volume of the Public Papers of the President.  
From Hart‘s original coding categories, I selected the following variables for the 
individual to code: Topic, Format, Audience, and Genre.  Detailed descriptions of each of these 
variables are contained earlier in this Appendix. Among these variables, Format, Audience, and 
Genre are particularly relevant since particular categories of each variable were used to generate 
the important Selective Audience variable I constructed (also described earlier in this Appendix). 
After reviewing the coding rules contained in this Appendix with the individual, answering any 
clarifying questions they had about the rules, and discussing their decisions on these variables for 
several ―practice‖ speeches (randomly selected, but not included in the sample of 500), the 
individual proceeded to code the sample of 500. I recognize that the individual was essentially 
providing collateral coding for two separate primary coders (Hart and I). Furthermore, my own 
experience in examining Hart‘s original data at the outset of this project leads me to believe that 
different individuals may have been assisted in the coding for various presidents or portions of 
different presidencies.  Given the large volume of speeches and time required to code each 
speech, this is would be entirely understandable. Ultimately, my decision to have the collateral 
coder draw from all presidencies does provide a measure of reliability for the full dataset, not 
merely the speeches from portions of the Reagan (not included in Hart‘s data), Bush Sr., Clinton, 
and Bush Jr. presidencies I contributed. 
The ―original‖ coding and the work of the collateral coder was placed in an Excel 
spreadsheet and then converted to SPSS (Version 17.0). Within the Crosstabs procedure of 
SPSS, I requested Cohen‘s Kappa as the measure of agreement between primary and collateral 
coder.  The values of Kappa are .74 (p<.001) for Topic, .84 (p<.001) for Format, .85 (p<.001) for 
Audience, and .81 (p<.001) for Genre.  While not at the .90 level or above, these results fall 
within the acceptable range of reliability according to conventional benchmarks. The more 
frequent disagreements for the Topic variable appear to be caused by discrepancies between the 
miscellaneous and multiple topics categories. 
 
 
